"We Have Ceased to be a Nation in Retreat": Margaret Thatcher and the use of Memory in the Falklands Conflict, by Billy Armstrong

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The Falklands War began on 2 April 1982 when Argentina invaded the British-held Falkland Islands. The British responded by sending a Task Force to recapture their territory. Fighting would last for two and a half months, culminating in a British victory in June 1982. In 1992 Margaret Thatcher, Britain's Prime Minister during the Falklands Conflict, unveiled the commemorative statue of the Yomper, honouring the marines who fought to reclaim the Falkland Islands in 1982. Thatcher presented the role of the Task Force sent to reclaim the islands in the following way:

> [W]ithout warning, they and others were called upon to restore British people and British territory to the freedom and justice which we take for granted until it is suddenly taken away by the hands of a dictator. ... It is men and women who fight battles, it is they who overcome danger, it is their character and courage, their professional judgment which triumphs over impossible odds. And they were impossible odds. If we were to assess the chances of victory by feeding statistics to some computer, the outlook in the Falklands and the Battle of Britain could have been very different. But great causes which stir men's souls are not decided by mere statistics but by what I call 'the British Factor': the unbroken spirit of the British people and her armed forces.[1]

Thatcher's speech drew on a number of parallels between the Falklands Conflict and the Second World War. The impossible odds reference the threat that Britain faced in 1940 when they stood alone against Nazi Germany, a year that saw England endure the evacuation

Contents

at Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and the Blitz. This endurance is often presented to as the nation's "unbroken spirit", or, as Thatcher describes, "the British Factor". When Thatcher gave her speech, she invoked the memories in which Britons had come to remember the Second World War. Thatcher was continuing a trend that took place in 1982. That is, despite few similarities in terms of size and scale, both the Government and the press relentlessly presented connections between the British memory of the Second World War and the Falklands War.

Historian Martin Shaw argues: "During the Falklands War Margaret Thatcher clearly tried, in a way in which no other British leader has done since 1945, to revive a wartime nationalism and beliefs about British heroism".[2] By presenting parallels between the two conflicts, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative government, and the press, provided a distraction to those focused on an economy that was suffering at the time, leading to a political opportunity for Thatcher to boost her popularity in which she capitalized on. Additionally, the parallels would solidify the Right's interpretation of the memory of the war.

Thatcher's decision to send the Task Force to the Falklands was not made because of the economic situation in Britain; nonetheless, military action provided an opportunity for the Government to draw attention away from domestic issues. Thatcher used Churchillian rhetoric and direct parallels to the Second World War when discussing the Falklands. She stressed the greatness of Britain's "Island Race", Britain's long history of fighting for democracy, and the patriotism of the British. In doing so, she reshaped the memory of the Second World War into one that focused on conservative values: patriotism, and great

leaders such as Churchill. By presenting these parallels, Thatcher presented a Britain that had overcome its national shame associated with the Suez Crisis and its loss of empire. Thatcher's handling of the Falklands crisis proved successful when her popularity significantly rose during and after the conflict, culminating in her victory in the 1983 general election.

The press aided in this end. The parallels they made with the Second World War served to confirm Thatcher's rhetoric. This was partly due to a move to the right by the press in the late seventies after a new generation of interventionist, right-wing proprietors, such as Rupert Murdoch, asserted their authority, leading to support for Thatcher.[3] Censorship also played a role. The Ministry of Defense initiated a "Good News Campaign" that severely limited the content the press could use, leading to the use of relatable war memories for the public. The press also faced criticism whenever they did not follow the patriotism put forward by Thatcher and her government. Such was the case regarding the BBC and their objective language in reference to the Falklands in their television programs *Newsnight and Panorama*.

The use of Second World War connections in 1982 was not a new phenomenon in British politics. Both the Labour and Conservative parties used the memory of the Second World War to outline their political strategy post-1945. Much of this memory was associated with the memory of the "People's War". "The People's War" dominated the British memory of the Second World War until the 1980s, and historians aided in confirming this memory in the fifties and sixties. Works such as Richard Titmuss's *Problems of Social Policy* (1950) and Angus Calder's *The People's War* (1969) argued that shared experiences such as the

[2] Martin Shaw, "Past Wars and Present Conflicts: From the Second World War to the Gulf," *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, Edited by Martin Evans and Ken Lunn, (New York: Berg, 1997), 193.

[3] James Curran and Jean Seaton, *Power Without Responsibility: Press, Boradcasting and the Internet in Britain*, Seventh Edition, (New York: Routledge, 2010), 69.

destruction of the Blitz, rationing, and evacuations forced rich and poor to cooperate, leading to a sense of unity within England.[4] The Narrative of The People's War begins in the 1930s when years of Conservative foreign neglect resulted in the appeasement of Hitler, and the resignation of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain after the fall of Poland. The narrative transitions to 1940 and the year of the people's glory, a time when all classes pulled together during Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and the Blitz. The people's glory also witnessed a national regeneration with the replacement of the Conservative "old guard" (represented by Chamberlain) by the dynamic Churchill. Finally, the war's conclusion presented a revived Britain, serving as Europe's defender of democracy.[5]

Labour, who found themselves victorious over Churchill's Conservatives in 1945, used the spirit of the People's war to put forward their platform:

The problems and pressures of the post-war world threaten our security and progress as surely as…the Germans threatened them in 1940. We need the spirit of Dunkirk and the Blitz sustained over a period of years. The Labour party's programme is a practical expression of that spirit applied to the tasks of peace.[6]

Labour needed the unity and spirit of the people to succeed in their upheaval of the social order. In the Left's opinion, England needed a planned economy to get the country out of bankruptcy, and the experience of the war proved that the economy could be planned, while still producing full employment without inflation. [7] Additionally, Labour attributed England's victory to the collectivist methods of the people, and because the people achieved victory, it was the Government's duty to pay the people back; this was the justification used for the implementation welfare state.[8] They also focused on the guilty men of the People's War myth to attack the Tories. In focusing on the Tory failures of the interwar years, the party parodied Churchill's rhetoric: "Never was so much injury done to so many by so few."[9] Labour also utilized the memory of the People's War for their domestic policies. They attacked the individuality associated with the guilty men of the Conservatives while focusing on social issues as a whole, such as reconstruction and social welfare for all. Therefore, the Left's version of the memory was one of the people as a whole, a memory of unity.

Unlike Labour, the Tories used the memory of the war to put forward ideas of the individual and patriotism. In 1945 the memory of the war showed the Conservatives that international involvement was more significant than domestic issues. To the Conservatives, the war proved that England still had a role in "saving the world" from tyranny.[10] Before the Labour victory in 1945, the Conservatives' platform was to end the war, and to prevent other wars from erupting through a strong international presence; however, the call for more international effort over domestic issues after such a costly conflict did not resonate in the public. [11] Nonetheless, instead of focusing on the unity of the "People's War", the Right put forward a patriotic memory: England saved the world from Nazi tyranny. Labour would remain in power until 1951 when Churchill was re-

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[4] Mark Connelly, " 'We Can Take It!" Britain and the Memory of the Home Front in the Second World War," *Experience and Memory: The Second World War in Europe*, edited by Jorg Echternkamp and Stephan Martens, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 59.

[5] Mark Connelly, *We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second World War*, (Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2004), 278.

[6] Malcolm Smith, *Britain and 1940: History, Myth and Popular Memory*, (London: Malcolm Smith, 2000), 111.

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[7] Smith, 112.

[8] Ibid, 114.

[9] Ibid, 112.

[10] Ibid, 112.

[11] Ibid.

elected. By this time, Labour's reliance on the guilty men myth was running thin. The Conservatives were successfully able to utilize the economic success of Labour's policies to begin the process of eliminating state control.[12] While still putting effort toward international policy, the Tories also shifted their focus to domestic polices with a focus on the individual. In the electoral material of the 1950s, the Tories attacked the idea of state control with posters stating "queues, controls, rationing-don't risk it again"; state control that was made necessary as a result of the war was now, because of England's economic success, seen as a part of the past; it was time for the people to enjoy the individual fruits of their victory.[13] Churchill's successors, Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan, helped to halt Labour's use of the guilty men myth. Both were seen as "anti-Chamberlain" with their expansionist budgets in the fifties and sixties, which greatly increased the standard of living in the country.[14] This Tory success negated Labour's strategy of using the memory of 1930 because it confirmed that the Conservatives had moved past the polices of the thirties, making the strategy seem outdated.[15] The Tories solidified their version of the memory. It focused on the patriotism of England and its role in defeating Nazism. It also focused on the idea of the individual, attacking the collectivists methods put forward by Labour after the war. The Tories framed these methods as a restriction to the individual freedom that the people fought for in the Second World War, and they were the ones who were going to bring them back. Margaret Thatcher would draw from the individuality and patriotism associated with the Tory stance during the Falklands War.

Margaret Thatcher was always a Conservative, growing up as an admirer of Churchill.[16] She studied chemistry at Oxford University where she became the president of the Oxford University Conservative Society.[17] Until she became leader of the Conservative party in 1975, Thatcher was best known as the Education Minister in Heath's Conservative Government; here, policies that would later be associated with Thatcherism revealed themselves. For example, in order to meet budget-cutting targets in the seventies, Thatcher abolished the provision of free milk in British schools, giving her the nickname "Maggie Thatcher the Milk Snatcher".[18] Under Thatcher's term as Prime Minister Thatcherism stood for reduced taxes, free market and enterprise, the privatization of industry, patriotism, and a focus on the individual. Thatcher was one to stick to her beliefs. When her monetarist policies associated with Thatcherism seemed to be failing in 1980, Conservatives begged her to reverse her stance, to which Thatcher replied, "You turn if you want. The lady's not for turning".[19]

Thatcher's "no compromise" attitude hurt her popularity in a Britain that was suffering both economically and in terms of prestige. Britain was no longer the world power it was before the Second World War. This became apparent after the United States forced Britain to withdraw from Egypt after it had landed paratroopers to re-capture control of the Suez Canal during the Suez Crisis of 1956.[20] Furthermore, Britain was suffering economically before the invasion. Under Thatcher, British manufacturers' international competitiveness had dropped by 50 percent, leading many to slash profits and borrow from

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[12] Ibid, 115.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid, 116.
[15] Ibid.

[16] R. Gerald Hughes, *The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement*, (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 92.
[17] Tony Judt, *Post War: A History of Europe Since 1945*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 539.
[18] Ibid, 540.
[19] Ibid, 541.
[20] Hughes, 92.

the banks to survive.[21] This led to the rise in interest rates and inflation. By 1981 unemployment was at 13.3 percent (the highest of any Western European nation), inflation was at 20 percent, and the GDP had fallen by 2.5 percent.[22] The erosion of the manufacturing centers in Wales were coupled with riots in Bristol, Liverpool and London.[23] By the time war broke out in 1982, unemployment had reached 3 million.[24] These factors significantly undermined the Government's popularity, with polls suggesting that Thatcher was the most unpopular Prime Minister Britain had had.[25]

Argentina found itself in a worse situation economically before the invasion. In 1982 Argentina was facing falling industrial output, falling wages, rising unemployment, and inflation over 100 percent.[26] This was unsettling news for Argentina's dictator President, General Galtieri, who remembered President Peron's fall in 1976 because of his inability to manage the country's economy.[27] With the economy in a dire situation, Galtieri planned to distract the populace with a nationalistic goal. Argentina had disputed England's ownership of the Falkland Islands since the British seized them in the early 19th century. To Galtieri, a successful war would legitimize his leadership. On 2 April 1982 Argentinian invaded the Falkland Islands.

Despite Argentine claims to the islands, the islands were largely inhabited by those with Anglo-Saxon heritage. According to a 1980 census, the island had a population of 1813, 1300 of which were born on the island; almost all of the inhabitants were Anglo-Saxon.[28] Despite the high Anglo-Saxon population, the decade prior to the outbreak of the Falklands conflict presented clear signs that successive British governments were losing interest in the Falklands.[29] One sign was the Government's lack of commitment to the region in material resources. Government officials were aware of the de-capitalization of the Falklands' economy, which led to a drain of capital and discouraged private investment.[30] England's poor economic conditions in the seventies meant that the Government, under Prime Minister David Owen, who was unable to send economic aid to the islands, was willing to negotiate with Argentina over the Falklands issue.[31] These actions saw the formation of the Falkland Islands Committee, made up of politicians, senior officers of the armed forces, and business tycoons, who fought to keep the islands British.[32] Under Thatcher in 1981, the Government decided to remove the HMS *Endurance*, an ice patrol ship that patrolled the Falklands, from duty in order to reduce the military budget.[33] The Falklands Council located on the island sent the following letter to the Government:

> The people of the Falklands deplore in the strongest terms the decision to withdraw HMS *Endurance* from service. … They feel such a withdrawal will further weaken British sovereignty in this area in the eyes of not only the Islanders but the world. They urge that all possible endeavours be made to secure a reversal of the decision.[34]

The removal of HMS *Endurance* is often attributed to Argentina's decision to invade.

[21] Daniel K. Gibran, *The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic*, (North Carolina: McFarland and Company Inc. 1998), 104.

[22] Noakes, 105.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Helmut Norpoth, "The Falklands War and Government Popularity in Britain: Rally Without Consequence or Surge Without Decline?" *Electoral Studies* 6 no. 1 (1987), 12.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Martin Middlebrook, *Operation Corporate: The Falklands War, 1982*, (London: Viking, 1985), 35.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Gibran, 18.

[29] Ibid, 44.

[30] Ibid, 45.

[31] Ibid, 47-48.

[32] Ibid, 48.

[33] Ibid, 49.

[34] Ibid, 49.

Therefore, while the Falklanders had close ties to Britain, and wished to keep those ties, the British government revealed a lack of interest in the islands prior to the Falklands War.

Despite a seemingly lack of interest in the islands, Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet agreed to send a Task Force to reclaim the Falklands. The military situation proved a difficult one. The Falkland Islands were 8000 miles away from the home islands, the Argentinians had numerically superior forces, and the nearest British base was 3000 miles away.[35] Commenting on Thatcher's persona as the Iron Lady, MP Enoch Powell stated in the House of Commons, "in the next week or two this House, the nation and the Rt. Hon. Lady herself will learn of what medal she is made".[36]

Other members of the opposition proposed a more radical proposition: Margaret Thatcher's resignation as Prime Minister. Labour MPs continued their trend of using the guilty men of the thirties to humiliate the Right. Nigel Fisher drew this comparison on 3 April: "The truth is that we have been pre-empted, as we were in Norway by the Germans in 1940, and that led to the fall of Mr. Chamberlain's Government." [37] Ioan Evans placed the blame squarely on the Prime Minister's shoulders, "The responsibility is that of the entire Government, especially the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is guilty."[38] To Alan Clark, the Falklanders were sharing the of the Sudeten Czechs:

> I remind the House that British Governments have in the past 35 years betrayed minorities, allegedly for reasons of State and expediency. Sudeten Czechs were forced to sign away their rights at Munich, ... I believe that this is the last chance, the very last

chance, for us to redeem much of our history over the past 25 years, of which we may be ashamed, and from which we may have averted our gaze.[39]

The Labour party was on the attack. It rebuilt Britain after the last war with the welfare state; it was prepared to rebuild it again after another "Tory destruction".[40] Margaret Thatcher did not resign, and there was no Tory destruction. Instead, Thatcher drew from the man she admired growing up: Winston Churchill. Announcing the invasion on 3 April she stressed the British stock and tradition of the Falkland Islanders, noting they were part of the "Island Race".[41] "The Island Race", being the British, had the tradition of enduring the hardships of the Second World War, a tradition of the few of Britain's island standing against the odds of a continental Europe controlled by Nazi Germany. Churchill presented these odds in 1940:

> Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, ... we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be. We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.[42]

From the beginning, Thatcher connected the conflict to the Second World War. The Falklanders were presented as members of the "Island Race", and they faced overwhelming odds against Argentina as Britain had done against Germany. By paralleling Churchill's

[35] Robin Renwick, *A Journey With Margaret Thatcher: Foreign Policy Under the Iron Lady*, (London: Biteback Publishing, 2013), 50.
[36] Ibid.
[37] United Kingdom, *House of Commons Debates,* 3 April 1982.
[38] United Kingdom, *House of Commons Debates,* 7 April 1982.

[39] Ibid.
[40] Smith, 126.
[41] United Kingdom, *House of Commons Debates*, 3 April 1982.
[42] United Kingdom, *House of Commons Debates*, 4 June 1940.

rhetoric, Thatcher was presenting herself as a strong determined leader who was going to lead the nation to victory.

Thatcher's Churchillian rhetoric served to stress the fact that England was, once again, protecting democracy from a dictator. In making the connection, Thatcher put forward a patriotic version of the memory. In a television interview with ITN (Independent Television News) on 5 April, she was asked about the loss of British life if there was to be a battle to reclaim the islands; Thatcher responded: "When you stop a dictator there are always risks but there are great risks in not stopping a dictator. My generation learned that a long time ago."[43] The Tory stance was simple; it was standing up to naked aggression:

> We have a long and proud history of recognising the right of others to determine their own destiny. Indeed, in that respect we have an experience unrivalled by any other nation in the world. … The eyes of the world are now focused on the Falkland Islands. Others are watching anxiously to see whether brute force or the rule of law will triumph. Wherever naked aggression occurs it must be overcome. … That is why, through diplomatic, economic and, if necessary, through military means, we shall persevere until freedom and democracy are restored to the people of the Falkland Islands.[44]

Thatcher used Churchillian rhetoric to draw on Britain's tradition of preserving freedom in order to rally the nation and the Government into a hounourable cause: fighting for democracy. It was a cause with which England had experience. This experience calls back to the patriotic view the Tories put forward in 1945. By focusing on Britain's defense of democracy, Thatcher focused on the great deeds of Britain's war, deeds that Britain had "unrivalled" experience in. Like the Tory stance in 1945, England once again had a part in saving a part of the world from the actions of a dictator. Therefore, by connecting the Falklands to the Right's interpretation of the Second World War, Thatcher shifted the memory of the war to the Right. It did not revolve around the unity of "The People's War"; it revolved around patriotism for British deeds.

Other Conservative ministers presented the Right's version of the memory by drawing on connections with the Second World War. John Stokes felt nostalgia during the Falklands campaign, noting that the spirit of the population reminded him of the summer of 1940 in that the people knew they had to see the conflict through to the end, noting that if they failed, democracy would not be safe.[45] Lord Robert Hankey believed Galtieri made the same mistake as Hitler:

> Personally, I think that neither the First World War nor the Second World War would have happened just when they did if Kaiser Wilhelm and later Hitler had fully realised Britain's real potential. They thought we were weak. They thought we were not determined. They thought they could get away with it. How wrong they were. They landed us, each of them, in a world war of incomparable destruction. I think that General Galtieri foolishly fell into a similar trap.[46]

Memories of the Second World War were often called upon to describe the Falklands conflict. By connecting the wartime memories of fighting dictators, and the British spirit to the situation in the Falklands, the Government presented a sense of experience and confidence: "We have succeeded before; we

[43] Margaret Thatcher, "TV Interview for ITN 5 April 1982," *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104913.
[44] United Kingdom, *House of Commons Debates*, 14 April 1982.

[45] United Kingdom, *House of Commons Debates,* 20 May 1982.
[46] Ibid.

will succeed again." Again, these connections present a patriotic view of England's deeds, shifting the memory to the right.

Historian Lucy Noakes argues that Thatcher's handling of the Falklands War served to continue the narrative of the Second World War: Britain was once again fighting a dictator, the spirit of the British people was put forward, and the Falklanders were facing overwhelming odds.[47] While continuing the narrative of the Second World War, Thatcher's use of Second World War connections also served to solidify the Right's interpretation of the memory. No longer was the war presented as the People's War, but instead it focused on Thatcherite values such as patriotism and great leaders such as Churchill. The rhetoric put forward by Thatcher and her Conservative government focused on the greatness of England's "Island Race, and patriotism associated with Britain's deeds, such as their defense of democracy. The greatness of leaders was also present: the Second World War had Churchill; the Falklands War had Thatcher. As Noakes argues, 1982 was filtered through the lens of the Right, making Thatcher and her Conservatives the heirs of the Second World War.[48]

During the Second World War England still maintained its empire and was considered a "great" nation. Therefore, in using the memories of the war, Thatcher presented the Falklands Conflict as the event that would make England great once again. In a speech to the Mid-Bedfordshire Conservatives on 30 April, Thatcher touched on England's rejuvenation: "We were after all a very great Empire and Commonwealth."[49] She continued,

> [T]he great feature of this country, if we ever had to get into battle—and battle was very much a part, it overhung my

childhood and the childhood of many of you here— … [w]e were the sort of people who could take our own initiative, who could decide in difficult times what we would do and carry it out. And this was the great character and great feature of Britain.[50]

Thatcher used similar rhetoric in a speech to a Conservative Women's Conference on 26 May:

> We in Britain know the reality of war. We know its hazards and its dangers. We know the task that faces our fighting men. … The older generation in our country, and generations before them, have made sacrifices so that we could be a free society and belong to a community of nations which seeks to resolve disputes by civilised means. Today it falls to us to bear the same responsibility, we shall not shirk it. What has happened since that day, eight weeks ago, is a matter of history—the history of a nation which rose instinctively to the needs of the occasion.[51]

To Thatcher, the British were repeating history. The Falklands War was Britain's opportunity to continue England's responsibility of "rising to the needs of the occasion", a responsibility England carried when it was considered a great nation. Thatcher was consciously using the memory of the Second World War to present a rejuvenated nation, one that had shed the international shame of Suez and the loss of its empire.

This appropriation of the memory was most present at Thatcher's speech at the Conservative rally at Cheltenham. The speech begins by suggesting that there was

[47] Noakes, 104.
[48] Ibid, 105.
[49] Margaret Thatcher, "Speech to Mid-Bedfordshire Conservatives 30 April 1982," *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104929.

[50] Ibid.
[51] Margaret Thatcher, "Speech to Conservative Women's Conference 26 May 1982," *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104948.

apprehension within the country, that there were those who did not believe England could accomplish victory in the Falklands; however, according to Thatcher, they were proven wrong.[52] The Falklands provided lessons for Britain:

> The lesson of the Falklands is that Britain has not changed and that this nation still has those sterling qualities which shine through our history. This generation can match their fathers and grandfathers in ability, in courage, and in resolution. We have not changed. When the demands of war and the dangers to our own people call us to arms—then we British are as we have always been: … competent, courageous and resolute.[53]

Thatcher's thesis was simple: "We have ceased to be a nation in retreat." [54] By connecting the Second World War to The Falklands War, Thatcher brought forward a prestige that England felt in 1945. This prestige served to symbolically halt the "retreat" England had found itself in. As historian R. Gerald Hughes argues, the Falklands War served to dissipate the shameful memory of appeasement in the 1930s; for Thatcher, the Falklands War, not the shameful incidents of Munich and Suez, represented "the dominant tradition in British history."[55] The Prime Minister helped to halt the decline.[56]

The connections Thatcher made between the Second World War and the Falklands War served as a political opportunity for her to boost her popularity. This is not to suggest that Thatcher's main decision to send the Task

force was to distract the populace from the economic situation facing Britain. Instead, as Daniel Gibran argues, "In short, the U.K. government pursued the war despite economic difficulties at home."[57] The British faced annexation from a foreign power, and so, diplomatically, Thatcher had to act; however, this did not stop her from using the conflict as a political opportunity to present a distraction. As noted earlier, it is clear that the removal of HMS *Endurance* in 1981 revealed that the Thatcher government, like prior governments, had little interest in the Falklands. England's decline in prestige, and Thatcher's low approval rating meant she could not let the invasion go unprovoked; Thatcher needed to send the Task Force to save face. However, her commitment to the islands after the Task Force was sent presents a major shift in her stance on the islands. Furthermore, by connecting the conflict to the Second World War, and by personifying Churchill with her rhetoric, Thatcher presented the Falklands as a campaign the nation could follow, drawing their attention away from the economy. Thatcher's use of the memory was her way of taking advantage of a political opportunity.

The opportunity would pay off, as the war saw Thatcher's popularity increase significantly. During the three month war, Tory support increased by 15 percent.[58] In mid-April, according to a MORI (a market research group in England) survey, 39 percent believed the Falklands was the most important problem facing Britain, with as many naming unemployment. Two weeks later the opinion toward the Falklands increased to 61 percent in comparison to 25 percent that argued unemployment. Furthermore, the mid-April survey had an 83 percent approval rating toward sending the Task Force, with another 67 percent approval of the Task Force

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[52] Margaret Thatcher, "Speech to Conservative Rally at Cheltenham 3 July 1982," *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104989.

[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Hughes, 114.
[56] Ibid.

[57] Gibran, 106.
[58] David Sanders, Hugh Ward, and David Marsh, "Government Popularity and the Falklands War: A Reassessment," *British Journal of Political Science* 17 no.3 (July 1987), 281-313.

participating in the fighting. Finally, by June, polls suggested that half the country's opinion of Margaret Thatcher had improved. [59] Margaret Thatcher's handling of the Falklands War paid off for her politically. Her Churchillian rhetoric, and her patriotic stance, connected with the populace and aided in her increased approval.

Margaret Thatcher's Government was not alone in drawing comparisons to the Second World War; the press participated in it as well. "A Bitter Taste Down at Old Mucky Duck" was an editorial released in *The Times* a few days after the Argentinian invasion. The article asked why the British should bother getting involved in the Falklands. To the author the answer was simple: "Because they are British-more British than the British in many ways."[60] The article stressed the Anglo-Saxon origins of the inhabitants, and explained the history, geography, and daily activities of the island, humanizing the situation in which the islanders found themselves. The editorial revealed that the Falklanders have always wanted to remain British, including a Falklander by the name of Des Peck who sold "Keep the Falkland Islands British" stickers at his local store. [61] The article presented the islanders as British, as part of the "Island Race". They were the "few" that were facing Argentine aggression. It subtlety stressed the need for Britain to reclaim the islands.

Some editorials were more outspoken about the connection the home islands had with the Falklands. An editorial in *The Times* stressed the similarities between 1982 and 1939: "As in 1939, so today; the same principles apply to the Falklands. We have given our word, and we must, where we can, prevent the expansionist policies of a dictatorship affecting our interests." [62] As

England had gone to war to defend Poland in 1939, it was time to defend the Falklands. Stressing the connection the British shared with the islanders, the editorial proclaimed, "We are all Falklanders now."[63] The editorial shared themes of unity and British patriotism associated with the memory; the British were unified behind the Falklanders.

Despite publishing a few issues a year, The *London Illustrated News* followed Thatcher's rhetoric. On 29 May, its piece on the conflict stressed the importance of fighting to protect the democratic freedoms of the Falkland Islanders. [64] Towards the end of the war its piece on the Falklands added that Britain's victory revealed that territorial aggression did not pay. [65] These reports followed the same themes that Thatcher put forward in her speeches, revealing a support for her stance on the war.

The press followed Thatcher's strategy by presenting the Falklands War as if it was the continuation of the Second World War. They compared the conflict to 1939, and they shared Thatcher's rhetoric. This was partly due to support for the Thatcher Government by pro-Conservative media outlets. Using stories of the Second World War helped to affirm the national cause.[66] This support was a result of the move to the right for many papers in England. Such was the case after editor Sir David English influenced a sharp move to the right in *The Daily Mail* between 1971-1992.[67] Papers often fell in line with Conservative polices by attacking immigrants and trade unions, often pitting strikers against the poor.[68] This harsh relationship with the Left was contradicted with a "cheery relationship" with the Right by providing support for the

[59] Norpoth, 13.

[60] Michael Frenchmen, "A Bitter Taste Down at Old Mucky Duck," *The Times*, 5 April 1982.

[61] Ibid.

[62] "We Are All Falklanders Now," *The Times*, 5 April 1982.

[63] Ibid.

[64] "Preparing for War," *London Illustrated News*, 29 May 1982.

[65] "After the Battle," *London Illustrated News*, 26 June 1982.

[66] David George Boyce, *The Falklands War*, (New York: Palgrave and MacMillan, 2005), 178.

[67] Curran ,72.

[68] Ibid, 73.

Falklands War, supporting privatization, and anti-union legislation.[69] For example, Rupert Murdoch explained to Conservative MP, Woodrow Wyatt, "how much he admired what she (Margaret Thatcher) had done".[70] After being informed of this, Thatcher expressed her appreciation for the wonderful support given to her by both *The Sun* and *The Times*.[71] This support was revealed in an editorial in *The Times* published on 21 June. According to the editorial, Thatcher had become the Conservative's greatest asset. The Falklands had led to the restoration of the nation's national morale, and Thatcher could claim the credit. She was considered the most un-popular Prime Minister in history before the war; however, she rose to the occasion. The people saw her on Churchillian terms.[72] Therefore, support for Thatcher by the pro-Conservative press led papers to make connections to the Second World War, and in turn, it helped to confirm Thatcher's rhetoric.

Connections to the Second World War were not made solely for support for Thatcher. Stark comparisons between the battles of the Second World War and the Falklands were presented in many papers. On 19 June *The Times* printed an article connecting an air battle in the Falklands to the Battle of Britain. According to the article, "the odds over the Falklands were worse for the Harriers than for the fighter pilots during the Battle of Britain."[73] The article did not serve to negate the actions of the pilots during the Battle of Britain, but to present connections that were relatable to the public. Other articles compared the battles of the Falklands to the Second World War. *The Sun* compared the Falkland Islands to the island of Malta, which was cut off by the Italian navy and bombed by the Germans in the Second World War.[74] After the British landing on the Falkland Islands, the BBC reported that the marines acted courageously and in accordance with the D-Day model.[75] An article in the *Daily Mail* was titled "The Finest of the Few", in which it paid homage to the memory of the Battle of Britain.[76] For the press, the battles of the Falklands served as mirror images to those of the Second World War. Even historian E.P Thompson, who wrote a relatively critical opinion piece published in *The Times* on 29 April, drew connections to the Second World War. Although being critical of the British Government for selling arms to the Argentinians before the war, he found that the conflict brought a sense of nostalgia: "To return to England on Day 10 of the crisis was like passing through a time-warp into an earlier imperial age. ... We found ourselves back in the days of Dunkirk, replayed this time as a nostalgic period piece".[77] The press was presenting the nostalgic period piece. They reported on the battles of the Falklands as if they were the mirror image of a Second World War counterpart. The connections were a result of the Government's policies.

During the Falklands War, the Government initiated a censorship program that greatly influenced what and how the press could publish regarding the conflict. When asked about the lack of "shocking" images, land forces commander Sir Jeremy Moore stated it was because of the "good taste" of journalists.[78] However this was not the case. The campaign in the Falklands involved military censorship and the suppression of sensitive information by the Ministry of

[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] "Margaret Thatcher Unchanged and Unstoppable," *The Times*, 21 June 1982.
[73] "Harriers Face Worse Odds than 1940 Pilots," *The Times*, 19 June 1982.

[74] Connelly, 272.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] E.P. Thompson, "Why Neither Side is Worth Backing," *The Times*, 29 April 1982.
[78] John Taylor, "Heroes and Human Interest in the News," *Framing the Falklands War: Nationhood, Culture, and Identity*, Edited by James Aulich, (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1992), 15.

Defense (MOD), who claimed it was for the protection of British lives.[79] The MOD instead focused on a "good news" strategy to keep up public support.[80] For example, initially only representatives from the *Daily Mirror,* the *Daily Express*, the *Daily Telegraph*, and the *Daily Mail* were chosen out of a hat to sail with the task force; however, after intense lobbying, more press correspondents were allowed to attend.[81] While there, reporters learned of the censorship. Mr. Nicholson noted this in his diary when a MOD officer instructed him, "You must have been told you couldn't report bad news before you left. You knew when you came here you were expected to do a 1940 propaganda job."[82] The MOD would stop reports from reaching home if the tone was not supportive.[83] Peter Snow of BBC's *Newsnight* described the relationship between journalists and the MOD: "We were getting a lot of stuff out of Argentina and… virtually nothing out of the Ministry of Defense."[84] The presence of censorship severely limited what and how the press could report on.

Since little information was coming in from the Falklands, the press had to rely on something else to present to their readers. Lucy Noakes argues that this censorship led the press to use Second World War narratives. The press focused on three issues according to Noakes: parallels to World War Two, the heroism of the soldiers, and the anguish of the soldiers' family members waiting at home.[85] The press had to present the war in a manner that the public could connect with; therefore, they relied on connections to the Second World War, which contained stories that the population were familiar with and could relate to. This was made easier with the rhetoric used by Thatcher in the House and in her speeches. Both the press and the Government were presenting the same material. Additionally, it made it difficult for the press to present a contradictory view because most members Parliament supported the actions of the Task Force.[86]

Those that did report against party lines found criticism in the Government. Two BBC programs, *Newsnight* and *Panorama*, came under major criticism. *Newsnight* was criticized for its objectivity by using terms such as "British Soldiers" instead of "our soldiers" or "our troops"; *Panorama* was criticized for airing an episode that contained "critical appraisal" for the government's policies.[87] Criticism from the Government came in the House on 11 May when Sally Oppenheim brought the question to the Prime Minister:

> If my right hon. Friend has time today, will she watch a recording of last night's "Panorama" programme? Is she aware that for the most part, but not all, it was an odious, subversive, travesty in which Michael Cockerell and other BBC reporters dishonoured the right to freedom of speech in this country? Is it not time that such people accepted the fact that if they have these rights, they also have responsibilities?[88]

The Prime Minister responded:

> I share the deep concern that has been expressed on many sides, particularly about the content of yesterday evening's "Panorama" programme. I know how strongly many people feel that the case for our country is not

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[79] Michael Cockerell, Peter Hennessy, and David Walker, *Sources Close to the Prime Minister: Inside the Hidden World of the News Manipulators*, (London: MacMillan, 1984), 144.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid, 174.
[83] Ibid.
[84] David E. Morrison and Howard Tumber, *Journalists at War: The Dynamics of News Reporting During the Falklands Conflict*, (London: Sage Publications, 1988), 201.
[85] Noakes, 108.

[86] Raplph Negrine, *Politics and the Mass Media in Britain*, (London: Routledge, 1989), 129.
[87] Ibid.
[88] United Kingdom, *House of Commons Debates*, 11 May 1982.

being put with sufficient vigour on certain—I do not say all—BBC programmes... It is our great pride that the British media are free. We ask them, when the lives of some of our people may be at stake through information or through discussions that can be of use to the enemy—[Interruption.]—to take that into account in their programmes. It is our pride that we have no censorship. That is the essence of a free country. But we expect the case for freedom to be put by those who are responsible for doing so.[89]

The Government was disappointed that the BBC did not display the patriotism that it believed was necessary.

Others also found that the BBC was mistaken. One such person was Lord Dulverton: "The world is at risk from such piracy, and Mr. Francis and his colleagues in the BBC ought to be proud that, at great sacrifice, Britain is prepared to stand up for the rule of law in the world."[90] Lord Greenhill, former governor of the BBC, shared similar thoughts. He believed that the nature of "indifference" associated with the program gave offence to those who had family members putting their lives at risk in the Falklands.[91] It is clear that the Government was sticking to their line: both the Government and the press were to put forward a patriotic agenda.

The press used Second World War narratives because it had few other choices. Much of the press was supportive of the Government and agreed with their conservative policies. Therefore, they were supportive of the Falklands conflict and followed the Government line. Yet censorship also played a major role. Because of the limited information coming out of the Falklands, the press was forced to produce material the public could sympathize with. This material consisted of connections to the Second World War; therefore, many of the battles that took place were compared to those that took place forty years earlier. Finally, the Government heavily criticized those who did not follow the patriotism that was put forward by Thatcher and her government.

The Falklands War came to an end on 14 June after the capture of Port Stanley by British forces. Although the war was over, parallels to the Second World War did not end, with victory celebrations in the streets of London similar to those in 1945.[92] After the victory was announced in the House, Alan Clarked remarked to the Prime Minister, "Your place in history is assured."[93] As David George Boyce argues in his work *The Falklands War*, Margaret Thatcher provided a form of nostalgia that won her continued support from the country.[94] The Falklands War was not Margaret Thatcher's last victory. Margaret Thatcher rode what political scientists refer to as the "Falklands Factor" to victory in the 1983 general election, destroying the Labour party in the process. The Labour Party lost 3 million votes leading to a landslide victory for Thacther.[95] Thatcher's popularity did decline however, after her proposition to privatize the health sector, and by the nineties she was no longer Prime Minister.[96]

Thatcher's use of the memory in 1982 would see a revisionist reaction from historians. In 1990, shortly after her end as Prime Minister, Clive Ponting published the revisionist *1940 Myth and Reality*. In an attempt to reveal the lies behind the memory

[89] Ibid.
[90] " 'Panorama' and the Falklands: Was the Balance Right?" *The Times*, 14 May 1982.
[91] Ibid.

[92] John Ramsden, "Myths and Relaities of the People's War in Britain," *Experience and Memory: The Second World War in Europe*, Edited by Jorg Echternkamp and Stephan Martens, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 44.
[93] Jonathan Aitken, *Margaret Thatcher Power and Personality*, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 369.
[94] Boyce, 177.
[95] Judt, 546.
[96] Ibid.

of the People's War, Ponting argued against the unity of the British in 1940 by exposing class divisions.[97] The revisionist trend would end with the publication of Lucy Noakes' *War and the British: Gender, Memory, and National Identity*. Instead of trying to expose the lies behind the memory, Noakes examined the promotion of the memory and its connections to gender and national identity. She argues that the memory of the war is so easily accepted in British society because of its relatable nature; both the patriotism of the Right and unity of the Left associated with the memory make it easy for all to accept. [98] Although Thatcher was able to shift the memory of the war to the Right, historian Mark Connelly, author of *We Can Take It: Britain and the Memory of the Second World War*, argues that the memory of England's war experience does not hold as much significance as it once did. Changes in technology and activities have meant that young Britons are not forced to conceptualize Britain's wartime experience as the films of the fifties, sixties, and seventies did for the baby boomer generation. [99] Furthermore, Connelly argues that an interest in the Second World War remains, but interest in England's experience takes a back seat to a newly sparked interest in Nazism and the implications of the Holocaust. [100] Nonetheless, the memory of Britain's Second World War was at the forefront of the Falklands War.

The parallels made between the Falklands War and the memory of the Second World War by Thatcher would see her take advantage of a political opportunity to boost her popularity, while simultaneously, see her shift the interpretation of the memory to the right. Thatcher's decision to send the Task Force to the Falklands was made out of diplomatic

necessity; nonetheless, it provided an opportunity for the Government to distract the populace domestic issues. Thatcher used Churchillian rhetoric and connections to the Second World War addressing Falklands. Thatcher reshaped the memory into one that focused on Conservative values by stressing the patriotism of the British, Britain's long history of fighting for democracy, and the greatness of the Island Race. These connections presented a Britain that had overcome its national shame associated with the embarrassments of Suez. Thatcher's opportunity was successful her popularity significantly rose during and after the conflict, culminating in her victory in the 1983 general election. The press aided in this end. Support for the Tory's by the pro-Conservative press served to confirm Thatcher's rhetoric.. Censorship also played a role, limiting the content the press could use, forcing them connect the Falklands War to Second World War memories the public could sympathize with. If the press did not follow the Government line, they faced criticism by Thatcher and her government. During her speech at Cheltenham, Thatcher drew a conclusion from the Falklands conflict as if she understood the effect she had on the memory of the Second World War: "But the spirit has stirred and the nation has begun to assert itself. Things are not going to be the same again."[101]

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[97] Clive Ponting, *1940: Myth and Reality*, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1991), 3.
[98] Noakes, 28.
[99] Connelly, 300.
[100] Ibid, 301.

[101] Thatcher, Cheltenham.

Disunity From Within: Social Issues Within the Confederacy Throughout the Civil War and their Relationship to Confederate Collapse," by Connor Hisko

HI495: Research Seminar on the Era of the U.S Civil War
Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo Campus
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Historians commonly reference the American Civil War as the most destructive war in American history, resulting in the death of over 600,000 Americans in a four-year span.[1] The Civil War is best known as a battle between the northern (Union) and southern (Confederate) States of America and was a war that divided families and brothers living on either side of the Mason-Dixon line.[2] On April 9, 1865, Confederate General Robert E. Lee surrendered to the Union at Appomattox courthouse, ending the American Civil War and ensuring that the Union stayed intact. While the conflict between the Union and Confederacy is well known to all who have the slightest understanding of the Civil War, a less-studied subtopic has been the social disorder that occurred within the Confederacy from 1861 to 1865. In historical circles there is debate surrounding the main contributing factor in the collapse of the Confederacy and research is published every year in an attempt to prove or disprove each argument. Some historical scholars argue that the main factor behind Confederate collapse was the size of the Union army, the industrial capabilities in the North, or the unparalleled military strategies put forward by Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant, but there is an abundance of information that proves there was a growing inner conflict within the Confederacy during the Civil War Era, severely hindering its wartime capabilities, and was a significant factor contributing towards Confederate demise. Confederate President Jefferson Davis's failed to address and resolve these inner conflicts, resulting in the inner collapse and ultimate failure of the Confederacy.

The Confederacy was divided from the beginning; prior to the advancement of a full-fledged Civil War within America, there were many southern people who continued to pledge their loyalty to the Union. Support for the Union continued throughout the Civil War, and led to a number of different social conflicts within the Confederacy such as families and friends becoming divided against one another, a dwindling sense of nationalism throughout the Confederacy, growing desertion rate within the Confederate army, and the development of anti-Confederate peace societies throughout the South. The disaffection with the Confederate state was enhanced due the lack of food and supplies available in the Confederacy during the Civil War. Throughout the Civil War, Jefferson Davis failed to control his cabinet, composed of rich southerners, and as food supplies dwindled in the South, rich farmers continued to produce and sell cotton, further increasing their economic prosperity and causing further conflict in the South. Further contributing to social division within the Confederacy was the ideology that the Civil War was the "rich man's

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[1] Drew Gilpin Faust, "Numbers on Top of Numbers: Counting the Civil War Dead", *The Journal of Military History* (2006): 997,
https://web.viu.ca/davies/h325%20civil%20war/CivilWar.Dead.Numbers.pdf (accessed January 17, 2015).
[2] Jay Bellamy, "Brother Vs. Brother, Friend vs. Friend: A Story of Family, Friendship, Love and War," *Prologue Magazine,* (2013), 20,
http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2013/spring/gettysburg.pdf (accessed February 19, 2015).

war, and the poor man's fight."[3] The policies that President Jefferson Davis enacted during the Civil War favored the rich elite within the South, while those in the army and on the home front continued to suffer. Davis' inability to control minority groups within the Confederacy, namely the African American slave population and the Native Americans, further impacted the Confederate military capabilities throughout the Civil War. These groups physically fought against the Confederacy during the Civil War and did everything within their power to aid the Union army to victory. By researching and reading an abundance of primary sources from the Civil War South, such as diaries, journals, presidential papers, newspapers, and interviews conducted immediately following the Civil War, it can be concluded that social issues doomed the Confederacy throughout the Civil War, and were the main contributing factors in its collapse.

It is first important to understand how the historiography of this subject has shifted over time and to situate this essay within the larger historiographical field of study. Throughout the 19th and 20th century, changes in the "Lost Cause ideology", a term coined by Edward Pollard in 1866 to "vindicate the Southern man," has shifted the way historical scholars have interpreted the Confederate demise.[4] Following the Civil War in 1865, southerners looked to "justify their huge wartime casualties and the catastrophic destruction and social upheaval they saw around them," which signified the first phase of the Lost Cause ideology.[5] During this phase of the Lost

Cause ideology, which lasted until the early 20th century, scholars regarded high ranking confederate officials such as Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis as saints, beaten by the Union forces due to the "overwhelming numbers of northern soldiers."[6] Studies written during this time do not look at the social and political issues that plagued the Confederacy, but instead argue that the Confederacy was beaten on the battlefield only because of the overwhelming military capabilities of the Union Army. In 1905 William R. Garrent and Robert A. Halley wrote *The Civil War from the Southern Standpoint,* which is an example of the early Lost Cause narrative. *The Civil War from the Southern Standpoint* argues that the Confederacy was forced into submission by the Union forces due to a blockade of food and supplies.[7] Like other studies from the first phase of Lost Cause ideology, the authors of *The Civil War from the Southern Standpoint* consulted survivors of the Confederate army to help draw the conclusions that were reached; the Confederate men used in this study were General Stephen D. Lee and General John B. Gordon." [8] This study does not divulge information regarding the vast amounts of desertion within the Confederate army and the ways this significantly affected Confederate military capabilities, or the many social issues that plagued the Confederate home front throughout the war, such as lack of food and popular support, but instead dedicates the majority of the work towards understanding the military campaigns that devastated the Confederacy, only because of the sheer size of the Union army.[9] Although understanding military campaigns does hold an important place in Civil War scholarship, *The Civil War from the Southern Standpoint* clearly

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[3] Winston Stephens to Octavia Stephens, January 18, 1864, *Rose Cottage Chronicles: Civil War Letters of the Bryant-Stephens Families,* ed. Arch Blakey, Ann Lianhart, and Winston Stephens Jr. (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1998), 307.
[4] Elizabeth McKinsey, review of *God and General Longstreet: The Lost Cause and the Southern Mind,* by Thomas L. Connelly and Barbara L. Bellows, *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography,* April 1983, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4248643, (accessed April 8, 2015), 235.
[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.
[7] William R. Garret and Robert Ambrose Halley, *The Civil War from a Southern Standpoint* (Philadelphia: G. Barrie & Sons, 1905), i
[8] Ibid., VI.
[9] Ibid., xvi-xxv.

represents the first phase of the Lost Cause ideology. Instead of focusing on the disunity and dissatisfaction of the Confederate people; Garret and Halley create an "image of the starving, ragged, noble Johnny Reb who surrendered only when all the food and ammunition was gone," a common theme in the first phase of Lost Cause Ideology according to historian Brian Dirk.[10] Garret and Halley emphasized that the Confederacy was forced to surrender due to a Union blockade on the South, however this was not the only factor of Confederate surrender. There were many social issues that influenced the southern demise that are not discussed in *The Civil War from the Southern Standpoint*, and other studies written during the first phase of Lost Cause ideology.[11]

As the romanticized view of the Confederacy from the first phase of Lost Cause ideology slowly vanished in the early 20th century due to the death of die hard Confederate nationalists, there developed of a new field of Lost Cause scholarship in America. This new field of study sought to understand the internal problems the Confederacy faced during the Civil War, and the ways these internal problems contributed to Confederate demise.[12] Two notable books that were published in the 1930s that represent this new field of Confederate study are Georgia Lee Tatum's *Disloyalty in the Confederacy* (1934) and Charles H. Wesley's *The Collapse of the Confederacy* (1937). Tatum's book was the first study written that argued there was widespread disloyalty within the Confederate States of America throughout the Civil War.[13] Tatum stated that "until recently, many historians...have commonly accepted the idea

that every man, woman and child in the South stood loyally behind Jefferson Davis," and her study attempted to disprove the "false idea that the inhabitants of the seceded states were a unit in supporting the Lost Cause." [14] Although Tatum successfully and effectively argues the fact that not all the people in the South were loyal to the Confederacy, by providing evidence of peace societies that arose throughout the South and the disaffection with the Confederate government that continued to spread from 1861-1865, a shortcoming of Tatum's study is that it fails to address how this disloyalty ultimately affected the Confederacy. [15] With sky rocketing desertion rates, the development of peace societies who fought for peace (sometimes forcefully) throughout the Civil War, and those in the South who helped deserters dodge the Confederate home guard during the Civil War, it is evident that Jefferson Davis's failure to achieve a sense of loyalty and nationalism throughout the Confederacy had a significant impact on the Confederate demise, a fact that will be proven throughout this essay.

Wesley's study, *The Collapse of the Confederacy* takes Tatum's argument a step further arguing that disaffection with the Confederate state and lack of morale within the Confederate army were the reasons behind Union victory stating that "military collapsed [in the Confederacy] followed an internal decline".[16] Wesley takes a hard line approach to understanding Confederate demise by providing evidence to show that there was no unity within the Confederate government, and that lack of unity caused Confederate collapse. [17] Within the Confederate government, there was constant debate between old-line Whigs who continued to

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[10] Brian Dirk, review of *The Collapse of the Confederacy,* by Charles H. Wesley, *Civil War History*, December 2002, https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/civilwarhistory/v048/ 48.4dirk.html (accessed December 13, 2014).

[11] Ibid., 463.

[12] McKinsey, review of *God and General Longstreet,* 235.

[13] Dirk, review of *The Collapse of the Confederacy,* 2002.

[14] Georgia Lee Tatum, *Disloyalty In the Confederacy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1934), vii.

[15] Ibid., 24.

[16] Charles H. Wesley, *The Collapse of the Confederacy* (Washington: The Associated Publishers INC, 1937), 168.

[17] Wesley, *The Collapse of the Confederacy,* 46.

support the Union, and the new secessionist radicals who came to dominate the political landscape of the South in the 1860's, leading to political issues within the Confederate state.[18] Wesley provides evidence to prove the Confederate public became increasingly dissatisfied with the policies that were passed during the Civil War, and that this dissatisfaction significantly contributed to Confederate collapse.[19] Although much of what Wesley argues throughout his study is agreed within this essay, one aspect of his argument that contradicts the findings of this paper is that "it is astonishing that with its resources the Confederacy did not continue the War for a longer period."[20] As an alternative to this statement, this essay will use first hand accounts from Confederate soldiers, diaries from Confederate civilians on the home front, and newspaper articles published in the Confederacy between 1860- 1865 to prove that resources within the Confederacy were extremely low because Confederate President Jefferson Davis was unable to control his cabinet, composed of rich, cotton producing, plantation owners, who refused to allow the passage of policies that would have limited the amount of cotton production in the South. The lack of food and supplies contributed to creating further dissatisfaction amongst the Confederate people, and increasing dissertation rates within the Confederate army which, in turn, lowered its military capabilities and contributed to its collapse.

A modern, 21st century, study that argues inner social issues had a direct impact on Confederate demise, referenced periodically throughout this essay, is David Williams *Bitterly Divided: The South's Inner Civil War* (2008). Williams argues, as the title suggests, that "between 1861 and 1865, the South was torn apart by a violent inner civil war, a war no

less significant to the Confederacy's fate than its more widely known struggle against the Yankees." [21] Williams proves that the Confederate citizens and minority groups within the Confederacy actively subverted the Confederate war effort, through aiding deserters and fighting with the Confederacy in southern territory, due to disaffection and lack of loyalty to the Confederate state.[22] Although this essay argues much of the same theories, where it differs is allocating the failure to Confederate President Jefferson Davis. With the evidence provided, it will be argued that President Davis' inability to control his government, respond to the needs of the yeoman, and create a sense of Confederate nationalism heightened social tensions and dissatisfaction within the South, perpetuating this "inner Civil War" and contributing to Confederate failure.

While there is debate surrounding the reasons for Confederate demise, there is also debate surrounding the views of Jefferson Davis as a wartime political leader. Some studies argue that he was an apt political leader, while others argue the opposite. William J. Cooper's *Jefferson Davis and the Civil War Era,* for instance, shines a positive light on Davis, arguing that he was effective during his time in office and throughout the Civil War, while *After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate Nationalism* by Paul D. Escott argues the opposing view.[23] Cooper argues that throughout the Civil War era, President Davis responded to the needs of the Confederate people as best he could, as "military affairs and operations were conducted in the political environment of the time."[24] Cooper's study is a sympathetic read into the Presidency of Jefferson Davis, and he

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[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid., viii.

[21] David Williams, *Bitterly Divided: The South's Inner Civil War,* (New York: New York Press, 2008), 1.
[22] Williams, *Bitterly Divided,* 3.
[23] William J. Cooper, *Jefferson Davis and the Civil War Era* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008), 89.
[24] Cooper, *Jefferson Davis and the Civil War Era,* 45.

attempts to prove throughout that President Davis had to make hard decisions of where to allocate resources in order to give the South the best chance at defeating the Union, and was aware that loyalty to the Confederate state would weaken in the less supplied areas.[25] Cooper argues that Davis understood the needs of the people, and attempted to meet these needs as best he could throughout the war.[26] Although Cooper is not quick to dismiss the fact that President Davis was unable to control his military commanders and the high ranking officials that made up his government, which is another important issue, this essay will argue that Davis was not knowledgeable of the political and social landscape during his time in office.[27] There were many social issues that were never resolved; if Davis knew of the severity of the social issues and the impact that these issues were having on Confederate military capabilities, he may have acted differently to give the South the best chance at winning the Civil War.

Unlike Cooper, Escott takes his study in an entirely opposite direction, arguing that that "the primary cause of waning loyalty was the failure of the Davis administration to respond to the problems of the common people, who were the backbone of the Confederacy."[28] Escott argues that the Davis administration was unaware of the political situation of the time and therefore unable to respond to the needs of the common citizen within the Confederacy, which ultimately doomed them.[29] Instead of focusing on the needs of the Confederate citizen, Escott argues that Jefferson Davis and his cabinet only focused on creating a strong military in an attempt to defeat the Union.[30] This essay agrees with

Escott's thesis, but takes his arguments further by providing ample primary source evidence to argue that Davis himself, not his administration, was the reasons the Confederacy failed in solving the important issues that they faced. Instead of listening to the few high ranking officials in the Confederate government that pleaded the case for the average Confederate civilian, President Davis concentrated his time attempting to appease the rich men within his cabinet, leading to further dissatisfaction, disloyalty, and desertion of the Confederate people. By enacting policies that seemed to favor the rich over the average Confederate citizen, President Davis brought on his own demise.

While there is still much debate around the reasons for Confederate collapse, it is evident that before the advancement of the Civil War within America, there was a large political and social divide in the southern population. In 1831, Virginia held a referendum on the question of slavery's presence within the state, asking whether they should begin gradual abolition of the institution throughout the state.[31] The proslavery advocates (who wanted to keep the institution of slavery within the state) won by only two votes over the moderate antislavery representatives (advocating the abolition of slavery within the state), which clearly represents a divide within the population.[32] There is a common misconception that every white person in the southern states of America was proslavery, balking at any thought of abolition, but as represented by the 1831 Virginia referendum, this was not the case. Confederate soldier Sam R. Watkins published a journal that he wrote during his time served in the 1st Tennessee Regiment during the Civil War; in an excerpt from April 27, 1865, following Confederate surrender at Appomattox, Watkins wrote, "our

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid., 88.

[28] Paul D. Escott, *After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate Nationalism,* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008), i.

[29] Escott, *After Secession,* i.

[30] Ibid.,151.

[31] Alison Goodyear Freehling, *Drift Toward Dissolution*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 276.

[32] Freehling, *Drift Toward Dissolution,* 276.

[Confederate] cause was lost from the beginning… Our people were divided upon the question of union or secession."[33] This quote clearly illustrates the socio-political atmosphere in the Confederacy throughout the Civil War, and immediately following the 1860 federal election this social divide became ever more evident.

During the Presidential election of 1860, the divide on the issue of secession and unity, or more simply put, on slavery and abolition, became more apparent throughout the South. Cassius Clay, a 20-year-old university student living in Kentucky, traveled throughout the Confederacy during the presidential elections of 1860, and made numerous speeches in support of Abraham Lincoln.[34] Clay was a strong support of Lincoln leading up to and during the 1860 presidential election, and attempted to convert southern Democrats to Republicans, to limit the prospect of secession following a Republican victory.[35] To aid with this, Clay downplayed the connection between Abraham Lincoln and radical abolitionism, but this had little effect on the southern Democrats who continued to be largely in favor of secession.[36] Clay was not alone in his efforts to retain support for the Union. *The Daily Dispatch*, a newspaper situated in Richmond, Virginia throughout the Civil War Era, reported on the day of the federal election in November of 1860, "there seem to be a large class here who are not a whit behind the fire-eaters of South Carolina".[37] Conventions were

held in the southern states of Georgia and Virginia in October of 1860 to limit the prospects of secession if Lincoln was elected; these conventions attempted to develop peaceful agreements that could be signed with the Union following a Lincoln victory, but had no effect.[38] Although there was still support for the Union throughout the southern states, Christopher Field, a relative of Cassius Clay, realized, as many other Union sympathizers did, by late 1860 that "it is now to late to shriek for the Union," as ordinances of secession for the Confederate States of America were all but signed.[39]

The 1860 Presidential election resulted in a Republican victory, and following this, radical Secessionists pushed for separation from the Union to preserve the Confederate way of life.[40] Unionists in the South throughout the 1860's continuously attempted to protect the integrity of the Union, but these attempts ultimately failed. Christopher Field wrote to his cousin Col. B.J Clay in January of 1861, just months after the Presidential election, stating his concerns for the southern states in the months to come.[41] Field supported the Union, but realized it was too late to stop the onslaught of separatist sentiment that had overcome political leaders in the South.[42] Field attempted to appeal to the few conservative men in the Mississippi government to halt secession, but this was to no avail, as radical secessionist within the government forced the issue of secession into the political and public sphere.[43] "I am aware who has been agitating

[33] Sam R. Watkin, *Co. Aytch: Maury Gray's First Tennessee Regiment or A Side Show of the Big Show* (Tennessee: Cumberland Publishing House, 1882; Project Open Library, 2009), 232, https://archive.org/stream/1861vs1882coaytc00watk#page/231/mode/1up (accessed January 23, 2015).

[34] Cassius Clay to Green Clay, October 21, 1860, *Voices from the Century Before: The Odyssey of a Nineteenth- Century Kentucky Family,* ed. Mary Clay Berry (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1997), 219

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid., 219.

[37] "From Georgia. The Feeling in the State: Exciting Scenes", *The Daily Dispatch,* November

1860, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2006.05.0007:article=pos=6_0&highlight=secession (accessed January 28, 2015).

[38] Ibid.

[39] Christopher Field to B.J Clay, January 1, 1861, *Voices from the Century Before,* 224.

[40] Stephanie McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2010), 49.

[41] Christopher Field to B.J Clay, January 1, 1861, *Voices from the Century Before,* 224.

[42] Ibid., 225.

[43] Ibid.

this whirlwind that we are now in," Field wrote, in reference to the secessionist uproar in Mississippi, "It is demagogue Politicians. They have got but little to lose and all to gain by this revolution..."[44] While Field cast the blame on to those within the Mississippi government, there were still members within the Virginia government advocating for an anti-secession resolution following Lincoln's election. Mr. Tarr, of Brooke County, Virginia, stated at a State Convention that he wished to "avoid conflict and restore harmony between the federal government and seceding states".[45] Mr. Tarr was not alone in his proposition to remain within the Union and avoid conflict, as the Virginia State Convention in 1861 conducted a Peace Conference, in which leaders from across the state came together in an attempt to disband separatist ideology; this came to no avail, as by January of 1861, six states had seceded from the Union, with five more joining these efforts in the months that followed.[46]

Although vote results from the Confederacy regarding the issue of secession depict overwhelming support in favor of seceding from the Union, (such as South Carolina which resulted in a vote of 169-0 in favor of secession), these figures are misleading, and do not accurately represent the political atmosphere of the time.[47] In the southern states, nearly half of the votes passed calling for secession in 1860-1861 were uncontested, as there was no opposition party on the ballot, and thus no way for people to vote to stay in the Union.[48] An unidentified farmer from South Carolina recalls that during the referendum election in October and December of 1860, "one could not vote for the union" as

there was "no opposition [on the] ticket..."[49] South Carolina provides a good case study of the undemocratic secessionist votes that were passed following the election of President Lincoln. William Gist, the governor of South Carolina, was a stronger supporter of secession and declared secession as a fact well before the presidential election of 1860, without proposing the question to the people of South Carolina.[50] Gist placed the prospect of war in a positive light, and declared it the duty of the southern slave states to meet the newly elected Republican government's attempts to diminish states rates and abolish slavery with force.[51] In a democratic process, the states citizens elect their governor, senator and members of the states electoral college, all of whom vote on important issues to inform and change state policy, but this was not the case in South Carolina in 1860.[52] The South Carolina General Assembly, (who were largely controlled and run by the radical secessionist group known as the Fire Eaters), and not the citizens of the state elected delegates to represent the people and vote on the issue of secession[53] Because these delegates were elected during the height of the secessionist furor, no opposition to secession was tolerated within the government, which led to a uncontested support for secession within the state.[54] The delegates voted unanimously in favor of secession, at a tally of 169-0, but this was not representative of the population of the time, as the people of South Carolina did not

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44 Ibid.

45 "Voice of the People," *The Daily Dispatch,* March 13, 1861.

46 Ibid.

47 Stephanie McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South*,
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2010), 40.

48 Ibid., 50.

49 Ibid., 49.

50 John G. Nicolay and John Hay, "Abraham Lincoln: A History. The Secession Movement," *The Century: Illustrated Monthly Magazine, May 1887 to October 1887* (1887): 831, https://books.google.ca/books?id=xuNx0hNq0a4C&pg=PA830&lpg=PA830&dq=William+Gist+%22the+long+awaited+cooperation+was+near+at+hand&source=bl&ots=h3XQcMn3A3&sig=V_vMY4TqUcxS4LPfmyCLcfFh1i0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=uE3WVPz9NYmZNrO_hPgJ&ved=0CDUQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=830&f=false (accessed January 15, 2015).

51 Ibid*.*

52McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning,* 49.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., 50.

elect the delegates who voted on the issue of secession. With help from the radical secessionist group known as the Fire-Eaters, Gist dismantled the democratic process and ensured the passage of the secessionist vote in South Carolina. A Chairman of the South Carolina convention who was elected to vote on secession noted that "there is no honor in taking this seat..." as he, along with others knew that selection of the Southern Carolina delegates was not a fair democratic process.[55] Another delegate of the convention, politician William Porcher Miles, in 1860 wrote, "this thing of walking around the track is rather dull," in in reference to the secession vote, which he symbolized as walking around a track, as no thought could be put into the question of voting on the issue of secession.[56] Even before the war physically began the divisions within the Confederate States of America were clear. The states of Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia and Texas, along with other Confederate states, forcefully pushed through secession legislation creating a falsified view of a unified Confederacy, while Union sympathizers continued to preach northern support leading up to the Civil War.[57] In the years that followed the secession of southern state, Davis could not create a fully unified front on the issue of secession, creating inner turmoil throughout the Confederacy, aiding in its demise.

The radical secessionist groups known as the Fire-Eaters were a vital component in ensuring successful secessionist referendums in South Carolina, and across the southern states. By the 1860s, Union sympathizers knew that they could not speak their mind on the issue of secession because of the influence that this group had throughout the southern states.[58] On November 9th, 1860 in the state of Georgia, a physician named Dr. Thayer (no first name given) was "ordered to leave [Georgia] Thursday night for uttering abolition sentiments," he refused to leave and was forcefully removed by the Minute Men association, a militia group organized across the South by the Fire-Eaters to forcefully control southern citizens.[59] One of the leaders of the Fire-Eaters faction in South Carolina was Edmund Ruffin.[60] In the early 1860's, Ruffin believed that if a large number of southern states seceded from the Union as a single group, secession could be accomplished without a war, however following Lincoln's inauguration speech in 1861, he concluded that there must be a war to ensure southern separation from the Union, in order to protect the southern way of life.[61] In further examination of the votes passed in South Carolina, one can determine that there was not a unified front on the issue of secession, which was typical of not only South Carolina, but also all states that seceded from the Union.

Following the fraudulent secession votes, it was the task of Jefferson Davis to create a unified sense of nationalism throughout the Confederacy, a task that he never fulfilled. President Davis knew that because of the fraudulent referendums that took place in the 1860's, Confederate nationalism was weak and needed to be strengthened. Within the Confederacy, Davis failed in creating a unified government, as old line-Whigs, who supported the Union, continually debated with the newly elected radical secessionists on political matters, until these Union sympathizers were slowly pushed out of the Confederate

[55] Nicolay, *The Century,* 831.
[56] McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning,* 51.
[57] Ibid.

[58] "From Georgia. The Feeling in the State: Exciting Scenes", *The Daily Dispatch,* November 1860, (accessed January 28, 2015).
[59] Ibid.
[60] Edmund Ruffin, *The Diary of Edmund Ruffin: Toward Independence, October, 1856- April, 1861*, ed. William Scarborough (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), 543.
[61] Ibid., 544.

government.[62] In an attempt to create unity on the home front, Jefferson Davis launched a propaganda campaign, which attempted to associate the Confederate cause with "true American values". A propaganda poster from Staunton, Virginia in May of 1861 read "let us drive back the invading foot of a brutal and desperate foe, or leave a record to posterity that we died bravely defending… the sacred graves of our ancestors!"[63] By referencing "the sacred graves of our ancestors," this propaganda piece is trying to show that the Confederacy is leaving the Union in an attempt to preserve traditional American values, not create new ones. This attempt ultimately failed and throughout the war peace societies arose in many Confederate states including Tennessee, Georgia, Mississippi, Florida and Arkansas, Virginia and South Carolina. [64] Although these societies had different names in each state, a common goal amongst all groups was to oppose the Confederacy in any way possible, and create peaceful unification between the Union and Confederacy. [65] The creation of peace societies throughout the South, desertion within Confederate ranks, and events such as the Bread Riots (which will be expanded on later in this paper) prove that President Davis failed in creating a sense of Confederate nationalism throughout the Civil War, which was a major blunder of his presidency.

While peace societies and unionist groups continued to secretly meet in the years that followed secession, another group the Confederacy failed to control was the Aboriginal people.[66] At the onset of the Civil War Aboriginal tribes wanted to remain neutral, but the Confederacy attempted to enlist Aboriginal men into the Confederate army. [67] The Confederacy realized that the Aboriginal people could navigate the costal and mountain regions more quietly, and effectively, than the Confederate men, and thus wanted to use the Aboriginal tribes to their advantage; the Aboriginal groups enlisted included members of the Creek, Cherokees and Choctaw. [68] Although the Confederacy attempted to recruit the Aboriginals, there was a division amongst the tribes with some tribes supporting the Confederacy, some supporting the Union, and others remaining neutral. [69] General Stand Watie was in control of all Indian troops who joined the Confederacy during the Civil War, and although he would attempt to control the Indian tribes throughout the conflict, as time moved onward these men became restless. [70] By 1864, the Aboriginal tribes were making threats to leave the Confederacy if their demands regarding the appointment of the Commander of Indian Territory, and requests for more food and supplies, were not met. [71] In early 1864 Thomas Legion, Colonel of the Indians and Highlanders in the west, wrote to Confederate Commander Robert E. Lee; in this letter he requested more food and supplies to not only aid his men, but the families of his men on the home front who were left starving; but these supplies never came, as Davis never enacted a policy to create enough food production to supply the Confederacy during the Civil War.[72]

[62] Wesley, *Collapse of the Confederacy,* 46.

[63] Yellowstone Trading Post, *Confederate Civil War Recruiting Poster: Men of Virginia, To the Rescue,* May 30, 1861, *Poster Reproduction Appendix B1,* http://www.ettc.net/tah/lessonPlans/papers/PostersConfederateRecruitmentPosters.pdf, (accessed April 8, 2015).

[64] Tatum, *Disloyalty In the Confederacy*, 24.

[65] Ibid., 25.

[66] Williams, *Bitterly Divided,* 235.

[67] "A Timely Move and a Good One," *The Eastern Clarion*, August 8, 1862, http://www.uttyler.edu/vbetts/paulding_ms_eastern_clarion.htm (accessed February 18, 2015).

[68] Ibid.

[69] William, *Bitterly Divided,* 220.

[70] Stand Watie to Mrs. Stand Watie, November 12th, 1863, *Chronicles of Oklahoma*.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Thomas Legion to The Governor and Council of South Carolina, February 28, 1864, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,* ed. John Sheldom Moody and Calvin Cowles (New York: Cornell University Press), 315,

Like white southern men who enlisted in the Confederate army during the Civil War, Aboriginal enlistees began to desert and turn against the Confederate war effort based on these social issues Davis failed to resolve.[73] As the war raged onward a large number of Aboriginal tribes who initially signed with the Confederacy began to back out of their commitment and desert the Confederate cause.[74]

The Confederacy not only lost aboriginal soldiers to desertion, but also had to fight against aboriginal tribes within the South in order to retain control of southern Indian territory, which depleted limited military supplies, and created further disaffection throughout the native population. Within the State of Kansas, General Watie lost command to what he referred to as "wild Indians," in early 1864; these were small tribes of Aboriginal men who turned to fighting against the Confederacy in southern Indian Territory. [75] These "wild Indians" became problematic along the western border, resulting in armed conflicts between the Indians and the Confederate Army, such as the battle fought by Colonel William P. Adair at Fort Smith in 1864.[76] Although this was a small conflict for Col. Adair and his men, skirmishes like this and others continued to arise in the South during

the Civil War, which took the limited Confederate military supplies away from the front line. The Confederate government was constantly spending time and resources ensuring that the Indian Territory remained in Confederate control, which created further disloyalty, and desertion of Aboriginal men who had been enlisted in the Confederate army.[77] In 1862-1863, the Confederate armies campaigned to drive the Opothleyahola tribe, composed of nearly ten thousand anti-war Indians, from Confederate controlled Indian territory. [78] Although Indian Chief Opothleyahola wrote to Confederate officials in early 1861 stating that they did not pose a threat to the Confederate cause, the large grouping of unaligned Indians at the heart of southern Indian territory worried the Confederacy. [79] General Douglas Cooper, Commander of Confederate forces in Indian Territory, wrote to his superiors in the winter of 1861 asking for reinforcements from Arkansas, while General Albert Pike wrote to President Davis in October of 1861, just two months before the first confrontation between the Opothleyahola and Confederacy, assuring him that "if the Indian Territory be not attended to instantly, it will be lost".[80] The Confederacy did not trust the unaligned Indians within the southern borders, and forcefully pushed the Opothleyahola north, killing thousands of the unaligned aboriginals in the process.[81]Although the Confederacy was successful in driving the Opothleyahola from Confederate controlled Indian Territory, it had severe implications for Confederate-Indian relations. Following the battles between the Confederacy and the Opothleyahola, over 700 Confederate Indian men from the Cherokee tribe deserted the Confederacy and joined the

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http://digital.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Thomas%20Legion;idno=waro0111;node=waro0111%3A1;view=toc (accessed February 25, 2015).

[73] Stand Watie to Mrs. Stand Watie, April 24th, 1864, *Chronicles of Oklahoma 1,* no. 1, ed. Edward Dale, http://digital.library.okstate.edu/chronicles/v001/v001p030.html (accessed February 19, 2015).

[74] Thomas Legion to The Governor and Council of South Carolina, February 28, 1864, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,* ed. John Sheldom Moody and Calvin Cowles (New York: Cornell University Press), 315, http://digital.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Thomas%20Legion;idno=waro0111;node=waro0111%3A1;view=toc (accessed February 25, 2015).

[75] Stand Watie to Mrs. Stand Watie, April 24, 1864, *Chronicles of Oklahoma.*

[76] Ibid.

[77] J.B Jones, *A Rebel War Clerks Diary* (Pennsylvania: J. B Lippincott, 1866), 192.

[78] Williams, *Bitterly Divided,* 221.

[79] Williams, *Bitterly Divided,* 218.

[80] Jones, *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary,* 175.

[81] Williams, *Bitterly Divided,* 219.

Union forces while surviving anti- war, unaligned Indians from the Opothleyahola tribe decided to fight for the Union following this campaign. [82] Although the Confederate forces were effectively able to control the majority on Indian Territory throughout the Civil War, it did come at a cost. While Jefferson Davis and Confederate military leaders wanted to put all efforts towards the war with the Union, they were constantly battling the Indian tribes within their own territory, taking resources and men away from the front lines.

Although the campaign to drive out the Opothleyahola can be attributed to strategic military importance, and perceived as a campaign that President Davis was forced into regardless of the dissatisfaction it caused amongst the Indians, this was not the only time during the Civil War that Davis failed to create better social relations between the Indians and the Confederate Government. President Davis not only failed to ease social tensions between the Confederacy and the Indians, but also, at times, worsened this relationship. In October of 1862, the Governor of Arizona John Baylor sent an order to a Confederate military commander in the southwest "to assemble the Apaches under pretense of a treaty – and when they come, to kill every man of them, and sell their children to pay for the whisky."[83] When asked about the order he sent, Baylor confirmed the genuineness of the order, arguing that it was to be a form of retaliation against the Apaches, who had killed many civilians before the outbreak of Civil War. [84] This order from Governor Baylor was published in the southern newspaper, *The Enquirer,* and made readily available to all who wanted to read it. It is important to understand how President Davis responded to this order, and how his response aided in the creation of social

tensions and disaffection between the Indians and the Confederacy. Although President Davis quickly revoked Baylor of his governing authority, no further discipline was prescribed. [85] In reference to Baylor's confession that he sent the order to slaughter the Apache tribe President Davis stated that it was "a confession of an infamous crime," but also came to the defense of Baylor's action.[86] Confederate war clerk J.B Jones recognized the implications that President Davis defense of Baylor would have for the Confederate relations with the Indians; he said, "it was diabolical," what Baylor had ordered, but President Davis never took any further action against Baylor.[87] Instead of charging Baylor, in January of 1863, just a year after Baylor had issued the order, President Davis put Baylor in charge of recruiting and raising troops, including Indians, in Arizona and New Mexico, regardless of the opposition from his staffers including Jones and Secretary of War George W. Randolph who "revolted at such [a] conduct."[88] President Davis failed to listen to his staff, and did not realize the implications of employing Baylor within the Confederate government. Promoting Baylor to a high ranking spot within the Confederate army created further social tensions between Indian tribes and the Confederacy, providing additional reasons for the Aboriginal people to desert the Confederacy and fight against them in the Civil War.

The Confederate government was never to have control of the Aboriginal population within the South, but the Aboriginals people were not the only minority group within the Confederacy that opposed the southern cause. Perhaps more famously recognized within historical circles are the Africa American slave population who fiercely combated the Confederacy though the Civil War by joining

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82 Ibid, 223.
83 Jones, *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary,* 173.
84 Ibid., 187.

85 Ibid., 183.
86 Ibid., 187.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.,380.

the Union military ranks, aiding deserters and causing distress on the home front. Prior to the war, the majority of the Confederate population believed that the slave population would be loyal to their owners and support the Confederacy during the Civil War, but this was not the case. [89] As fighting commenced between the Union and Confederate forces, whites living in the southern slaveholding areas began to worry about the possible uprising of the African American population.[90] Chris Field, a farmer from Mississippi, recalled these dangers in a letter to his father in 1861, stating that one abolitionist amongst the African American population could potentially spread his ideology, starting an insurrection amongst the slaves that would not have been easily suppressed.[91] Field knew that he, along with the white slaveholders in Bolivar, Mississippi, were in danger of "being killed by his own slaves during so much excitement and talk of war."[92] This excitement continued to grow amongst the slave population, leading to violent interactions between the slaves and the Confederate population throughout the 1860's.[93] In 1862, Ann Clay recalls that her son, Christopher Clay, on leave from the army, was forced to draw upon a group of slaves while on the way back from the war, due to the threat of being physically harmed because he was wearing his Confederate uniform.[94] The slave population within the South continued to grow crazy with excitement throughout the Civil War; knowing that the slave population was on their side, the Union Army cooperated with, and informed the slaves as best they could regarding the war effort. Mattie J. Jackson, a slave living in Missouri during the Civil War, recalled that the Union army yelled, or threw newspapers over the fence that separated the plantation from the outside world, to inform the slaves of the happenings of war in an attempt to further encourage the slaves to support or join the Union cause.[95] This war had psychological effects on the slaveholders, as days of sadness due to Confederate failure resulted in days of joy and happiness for the slave population.[96]As Martha Davenport, a white female slaveholder stated in a letter to her husband in March 1861, "I do not know what effect I will have on them [slaves]." Women on the Confederate home front felt unprotected from the threat of African Americans who were attempting to dismantle the Confederacy in any way possible.

While the excitement of freedom at times manifested itself as physical conflict between the slaves and the Confederate population and created psychological issues on the Confederate home front, runaway slaves were another pressing issue that the Confederacy had to deal with throughout the Civil War. By 1861, slaves were making arrangements to flee from the bondage of their owners and join the Union, which resulted in stress and fright amongst the white population.[97] Union efforts to recruit African American men; by supplying the slaves with newspapers, and telling them of the advancements of the Union army in the South, were effective, as there are countless archived diaries and journals of slaves who ran from their owners to join the Union cause to fight for their freedom. An example is the story of William Webb, a slave in Kentucky, who

[89] Drew G. Faust, *The Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South,* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 83.
[90] C.I Field to Col B.J Clay, January 27, 1861, *Voices from the Century Before,* 228.
[91] Ibid, 228.
[92] Christopher Clay to Green Clay, April 23, 1861, *Voices from the Century Before,* 237.
[93] Ann Clay to Brutus Clay, August 18, 1862, *Voices from the Century Before* 296.
[94] Ibid, 296.

[95] L.S. Thompson, *The Story of Mattie J. Jackson: As Given by Mattie* (Missouri: Sentinel Office, 1866) 10, http://docsouth.unc.edu/neh/jacksonm/jackson.html (accessed January 22, 2015).
[96] Thompson, *The Story of Mattie J. Jackson,* 11.
[97] Winston Stephens to Octavia Stephens, December 22, 1861, *Rose Cottage Chronicles*, 80.

escaped from a slave trader and later fought within the Union Army. [98] Webb recalled throughout his narrative, his time in the Civil War; he had created plans with other slaves on the plantation to escape and flee to the Union line, but he was sold just weeks before the attempted escape and thus unable to escape with his fellow slaves.[99] Still eager to escape the confines of slavery, Webb escaped from the slave trader alone and ran 27 miles to meet the Union army in Paducah, Kentucky. [100] Regardless of the racism and poor conditions that the African American soldiers met at the Union camps, the freed slave population continued to enlist in the Union ranks and continued to fight against their former owners to free their brothers and sisters from slavery. While some slaves, such as Webb, ran away with little more than the clothes on their back, other slaves stole from their owners before fleeing to Union lines, causing concern for slaveholders during the Civil War, and creating more social and psychological struggles on the home front. Even President Davis was unable to keep control of his own slaves, as throughout the war they stole from his plantation and escaped to Union lines.[101]

Slaves that could not run or enlist within the Union dismantled the Confederacy through assisting able bodied men in dodging conscription and helping deserters dodge the Confederate home guard; these actions made it impossible for the Confederacy to recruit and sustain enough men to wage an effective war and contributed to its ultimate collapse. The first Confederate conscription law enacted in 1862 allowed for many exemptions from the war effort, but by 1864 General Order Number 77 ended all exemptions and men unwilling to enlist within the Confederacy were forced to

hide from Confederate officials. [102] The Confederate Home Guard was a institution set up by President Davis in 1861 in an attempt to enforce the law on the home front, limit the wartime information the slaves received throughout the war, curb the number of runaway slaves from the Confederacy, and capture any deserters of the Confederate army. This institution had little effect throughout the Confederacy. Slaves such as Levi Ashley recalled bringing food to her master who was hiding in the forests to dodge the conscription law, while the Confederate Home Guard traveled throughout the South searching for able-bodied men.[103] In a recorded narrative taken following the Civil War, Ashley recalled that "when de War come, Marse John hid out in de woods. Men come 'round huntin' fer him but dey couldn' fin' him."[104] No exact date of when Ashley aided her Master is given, but she was not alone in her efforts in aiding white draft dodgers, Confederate deserters, escaping prisoners, and escaping slaves to enhance the possibility of Union victory. [105] Slave Jeff Rayford recalled in a narrative recorded following the Civil War that "I cooked and carried many a pan of food to these men [deserters]," while slave Riley Tirey "carried blankets to help him [his slave owner, Robert Guttery] keep out of the way of Rebel cavalry".[106] Slaves continued to support the Union throughout the Civil War and fought for their freedom in any way possible. The Confederacy's inability to deal with the slave population within the South was another inner

[98] William Webb, *The History of William Webb: Composed by Himself* (Detroit: Egbert Hoekstra, 1873), 31.
[99] Webb, *History of William Webb*, 26.
[100] Webb, *History of William Webb*, 31.
[101] Jones, *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary,* 192

[102] Robert Cogdell ed, *General Orders from the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, Confederate States Army, from July 1, 1864 to December 31, 1864,* (Columbia, Evans and Cogswell, 1865), 81.
[103] Levi Ashley, "Mississippi Slave Narratives from the WPA Records," *WPA Slave Narratives, ed*. Ann Allen Geoghegan, http://msgw.org/slaves/ashley-xslave.htm (accessed January 14, 2015).
[104] Ibid.
[105] Thomas G. Dyer, *Secret Yankees: The Union Circle in Confederate Atlanta* (Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 89.
[106] Williams, *Bitterly Divided,* 184

issue that contributed to Confederate demise. Although President Davis established the Confederate Home Guard in an attempt to curb efforts of the African American population within the South, this had little effect; throughout the Civil War over 180,000 slaves escaped from captivity and join the Union army. [107] Davis could have allocated more resources to suppress the African American population but was most focused on creating a strong military power and thus became unattached with the problems of the home front.

President Davis was not only unable to control the African American population; he also perpetuated the issue by issuing the Enslavement Proclamation on January 5, 1863, four days after the signing of the Emancipation Proclamation in the Union. [108] The Enslavement Proclamation, also known as "An Address to the People of the Free States" gave additional reasons for African Americans within the southern states to flee to the Union lines. The Proclamation affirmed the Confederates' pro- slavery stance, and also stated "all free negroes in the Southern Confederacy shall be placed on the slave status and deemed to be chattels, they and their issue forever."[109] With this issuing of this statement, slaves in the Confederacy who had bought, or been granted their freedom once again became slaves and abolished any hope that the slaves in the South could become free. Jefferson Davis did not only fail to control the African American population within the Confederacy, he perpetuated the problem through the Enslavement Proclamation, creating more issues within the Confederate home front during the Civil War.

Although the African American population put stress on the Confederate home front throughout the Civil War, another growing issue within the Confederacy was the desertion within the Confederate Army. The Confederate Home Guard attempted to deal with this issue but men continued to "flee east of the Blue Ridge for refuge," as stated by Brigadier General J.W of North Carolina, in an effort to dodge Confederate conscription and hide from Confederate officials.[110] In 1863, one year after the passage of the Confederate Conscription Act, Brigadier General McElroy stated, regarding the implementation of conscription, "it has got to be impossible to get any man out there unless he is dragged out, with but very few exceptions."[111] This was the case not only in North Carolina, but also for every Confederate State throughout the Civil War. In 1864 at Macon, Georgia, President Davis gave a speech where he stated that two thirds of the men enlisted within the Confederate Army were absent, and while some of these absences could be attributed to the sick and wounded, the majority were "absent without leave," or in other words, deserted from the Confederate Army. [112] Although this estimate of a 2/3rd desertion has been regarded as to high by Civil War scholars such as Ella Lonn and Thomas Livermore, who estimate desertion rates of around 11% (by 1864) for the Confederacy, the large fraction of desertion rates that Davis provided proves that desertion was a major problem for the Confederate army, something that was not controlled throughout the Civil War. [113] President Davis attempted to stop the problem of desertion within the Confederacy through the development of the Confederate Home

[107] Ibid., II.

[108] Cogdell, *General Orders from the Adjutant and Inspector,* 81.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Brigadier General J.W McElroy to Governor Zebulon Vance, April 22, 1864, *North Carolina Digital History,* http://www.learnnc.org/lp/editions/nchist-civilwar/5615 (accessed February 25, 2015).

[111] Ibid.

[112] Jefferson Davis, *Speech of Macon, Georgia,* September 23, 1864, *The Papers of Jefferson Davis,* ed., Lynda Lasswell Crist, https://jeffersondavis.rice.edu/Content.aspx?id=101 (accessed April 8, 2015)

[113] Ella Lonn, *Desertion during the Civil War,* (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1928), 25-27.

Guard, but due to lack of clear authority and resources in the home guard it ultimately failed, as desertion continued throughout the Civil War.

The reasons for desertions within the Confederate army bring forward a number of different social issues within the Confederacy including lack of food and protection from the Union on the home front. In the southern states in the 19th century, the majority of people did not own slaves (only approximately 26% did own slaves), and because of this, the Confederacy had to enact different methods in an attempt to get people to enlist in the Confederate Army. To reach a larger populace, the Confederacy began to call on men to enlist in order to protect not only the institution of slavery and the southern way of life, but to also protect Confederate women and children from the Union armies.[114] Enlistment propaganda of the time called upon men to enlist based on their masculine duty to protect women and children.[115] As Sam R. Watkins recalled in May of 1864, the men within his regiment fought " to protect their homes and families" along with the laws that "had been guaranteed to them as a heritage forever by their forefathers."[116]

The ideology that serving in the Confederate Army was to protect one's family against the Union was common amongst Confederate soldiers, however as the war progressed, this notion became a reason for desertion. On the Confederate home front, the Civil War brought increased anxieties for many women who witnessed the death and destruction that the war brought. In a letter to her brother in March of 1862, Nancy Dowis, a woman from Kentucky, spoke of the anxiety she felt due to the fact that the war was happening on her doorstep.[117] Dowis wrote, "with much anxiety – I assume to present appearance to write so that you know that I am well and my family also. We live life here in a land of distress and war."[118] Dowis was not alone with her anxieties of the battles happening so close to their home, as many other women in the Confederacy felt that the Confederate army was inadequately prepared to protect them from the Union. President Davis's lack of leadership extended into military affairs, as he was unable to adequately control Generals A. S. Johnston, J. E. Johnston, and P. T. Beauregard, who continually argued over military strategy and tactics, resulting in military blunders and creating distress on the home front.[119] In August of 1862 Ann Clay, living in Kentucky, wrote a letter to her husband, Brutus Clay, who was fighting for the Confederacy at the time, confessing to him that she did not have faith in the Confederate troops' ability to protect the women and children if the Union army was to make an advance.[120] Ann was fearful because, as she said, "our troops are not drilled and I fear they will all run and do us but little good" in the event of Union advancement.[121] Fear of the Union army was common throughout the home front, and women wrote to their husbands of the "dreadful conditions we are feeling that at any moment we must leave our homes, not knowing when we can return, or that we will find anything but ruins when we do," as stated by Martha Davenport who wrote this to husband from Virginia in 1861.[122] Due to the perceived threat of possible Union advancement at any moment, Confederate women buried their expensive items, in fear

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[114] "Address to the Southern Volunteers," *The Eastern Clarion,* May 17, 1861.

[115] Ibid.

[116] Watkin, *Co. Aytch: Maury Gray's First Tennessee Regiment,* 150.

[117] Nancy Dowis to S.J Steele, March 9, 1862, *Voices from the Century Before,* 279.

[118] Ibid., 279.

[119] Cooper, *Jefferson Davis and the Civil War Era,* 89.

[120] Brutus Clay to Ann Clay, August 21, 1862, *Voices from the Century Before* 300.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Martha Davenport to Ann Clay, June 8, 1861, *Voices from the Century Before* 243.

that the Union might, at any moment, raid their houses. [123] Women within the Confederacy felt in danger throughout the Civil War; they wrote letters to their husbands expressing this perceived danger and their wish fir their husbands, brothers, or fathers return home. [124] As many men within the Confederacy enlisted based on the notion that in doing so they were protecting their family, the letters that they continued to receive from their families caused desertion amongst the ranks.

Another cause for desertion amongst Confederate men was the lack of food and supplies on the home front and within the army. The reason that the Confederacy was unable to supply its people and its army with adequate food rations was due to President Davis inability to control high-ranking members in his government. President Davis allowed the plantation owners in the South to continue to overproduce cotton throughout the Civil War, leading to an underproduction of necessary food supplies. [125] Although the Confederacy called for an embargo on cotton exports to Britain and France to ensure food and grain supplies were met, the embargo was voluntary. Congress never fully enacted an outright ban on cotton production due to the high number of men in Confederate Congress who were planters themselves and wished to continue to produce cotton throughout the war and profit.[126] President Davis's inability to control his government, composed of high class, rich plantation owners, resulted in starvation and desertion amongst the Confederacy. Although southern newspapers, such as the Georgia *Macon Telegraph*, pleaded with the plantation owners to "Plant corn! Plant corn," this was to no avail, as plantation

owners throughout the South continued to plant cotton and reap the economic benefits, while those on the home front and within the army continued to suffer.[127]

While the Confederate government was supposed to protect the Confederate people, it failed in supplying the Confederacy with the basic necessities of life, leading to events known as the Bread Riots throughout the South in 1863, which further depleted the Confederate military capabilities. [128] On the Confederate home front, the lack of food was apparent as early as 1861.[129] Prior to the Civil War, raccoon oysters were thought to be inedible by most southerners, but the lack of food changed this.[130] Writing in a letter to her son in November of 1861, a month after the commencement of the Civil War, Rebecca Bryant recalled having to eat raccoon oysters due to the lack of fish available for purchase.[131] In 1882, the newspaper *The Eastern Clarion* began commenting on the lack of food and grain production within the Confederacy, stating that they had never seen the people within the southern states "suffer so much due to lack of food."[132] The limited food available for purchase within the Confederacy saw cost inflation as early as 1861, making it difficult for families who relied on the pay of a Confederate soldier, which was only $11 a month until 1864 (when it was raised to $18 a month).[133] Due to the lack of food, and the inflated cost of available food, tensions amongst the Confederate people grew, resulting in a number of riots throughout the Confederacy, commonly referred to in historical circles as the Bread Riots. One of the most well known riots happened in the

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[123] Octavia Stephens to Winston Stephens, August 12, 1863, *Rose Cottage Chronicles,* 258.
[124] Brutus Clay to Ann Clay, August 21, 1862, *Voices from the Century Before* 300.
[125] Williams, *Bitterly Divided,* 61.
[126] Ibid., 62.

[127] Ibid.
[128] Jones, *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary*, 285.
[129] Rebecca Bryant to Davis Bryant, November 19, 1861, *Rose Cottage Chronicles,* 72.
[130] Ibid, 72.
[131] Winston Stephens to Octavia Stephens, December 5, 1861, *Rose Cottage Chronicles,* 77.
[132] "The Coast," *The Eastern Clarion*, August 15 1862.
[133] Ibid, 77.

Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia on April 2, 1863.[134] What began as a gathering of a hundred people within the capital square turned into a group of over a thousand citizens demanding food and grain from the Confederate government.[135] The group began to march throughout the capital, breaking into different stores, both food and other retail shops, stealing their contents to express their anger towards the Confederate government.[136] President Davis attempted to plea with the Confederate people to stop the riots, but was forced to use the Confederate Army and Confederate home guard to curtail the mob mentality.[137] As mentioned earlier President Davis was again unable to control his government, who insisted on producing cotton during the Civil War, leading to growing social issues on the home front, taking away from limited military capabilities, and creating further discontent within the Confederacy throughout the South.

There was also lack of supplies within the Confederate army, which caused growing issues in the ranks. Newspapers continued to address the Confederate army's lack of supplies and made pleas to the public to send the Confederate men clothing and blankets to ensure that the troops could continue fighting, but this was not enough[138] Winston Stephens recalled in November of 1861 that, many men within his camp did not have adequate clothing or sleeping supplies for the winter months and nearly froze during the nights.[139] An advertisement on September 6, 1861 in *The Eastern Clarion*, a Mississippi newspaper, read,

> your sons, brothers and friends who have gone to fight the battles which are to save you and all you have from

ruin...are without the necessary clothing to save them from the severest suffering...the woolen goods, the shoes, hats, blankets, globes necessary to protect them from freezing cannot be procured by the Government...The industry and liberality of persons and families here at home, can alone supply them.[140]

From the onset of the war, men had to rely on the generosity of strangers or their families for basic necessities such as blankets. Although plantation owners in the South were producing an abundance of cotton, this cotton did not stay in the South, as they continued to ship the product to Britain and France to get the most money for their cotton. [141] The embargo on exporting cotton was only voluntary, and the majority of plantation owners chose not to listen this. Soldiers' food rations were also downsized by the Confederacy, as Willie Bryant recalled, by 1861 his regiment was receiving only dried meat and flour.[142] In 1864, General Robert E. Lee had written to President Jefferson Davis stating that desertion rates within the Confederacy continued to grow based on a lack of food and water, however nothing changed, as food shortages continued to plague the Confederacy throughout the Civil War. [143] While the Confederate government had limited supplies for the Confederate troops, the Union men continued to be adequately supplied; this created Confederate resentment in the Confederate Army of not only the Union men, but also, and more importantly, resentment of the Confederacy. [144] The Confederate Army often had to walk though Yankee camps following a military victory, and saw that all

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[134] Jones, *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary,* 284.
[135] Ibid, 284.
[136] Ibid, 285.
[137] Ibid, 285.
[138] "Clothes or the Soldiers Once More," *The Eastern Clarion,* Sep 6th, 1861.
[139] Winston Stephens to Octavia Stephens, November 3, 1861, *Rose Cottage Chronicles,* 65.

[140] Ibid.
[141] Williams, *Bitterly Divided,* 62.
[142] Willie Bryant to Davis Bryant, December 11, 1861, *Rose Cottage Chronicles,* 79.
[143] Ibid, 411.
[144] Watkin, *Co. Aytch: Maury Gray's First Tennessee Regiment* 35.

the "boys (of the Union) were in clover" as Confederate soldier Watkins recalled in his journal.[145] The Confederate government was unable to adequately supply their army, creating another reasons for desertion.

If the Confederacy's inability to protect and feed the Confederate people on the home front did not make the Confederate men to desert the army, there were many policies enacted by Davis that did. An overreaching problem that Davis failed to solve was the ideology that the Civil War was "the rich man's war and the poor man's fight." [146] Legislation, such as the "Twenty Negro Law," passed in 1862, exempt a plantation owner with twenty or more slaves from the Confederate draft, and provide the opportunity for rich men to pay for a substitute to enlist in the Confederate army. These laws made enlistees in the Confederate army believe that the Confederacy valued lives of the wealthy more than the common man.[147] Although the majority of Confederate officials supported the "Twenty Negro Law," (as most of them owned slaves themselves, or knew people that did), President Davis failed to listen to the few officials, such as Secretary of War James Seddon, who argued that the implementation of the Twenty Negro Law would have a severe impact on yeoman support for the Confederacy.[148] Seddon was right in his hypotheses of the "Twenty Negro Law", as following its implementation in 1862, men within the Confederate army became ever more disloyal to the government. As Sam R. Watkins stated in regard to this law, "It gave us the blues; we wanted twenty Negros. Suddenly negro property became very valuable."[149] The implementation of conscription in 1862 also had a negative impact on the Confederate army; the ability of being able to volunteer to save their country based on patriotism was lost following the passage of the Conscription act.[150] As Watkins recalled in 1862,

> A law had been passed by the Confederate States Congress called the Conscript Act. A soldier had no right to volunteer and to choose the branch of service he preferred. He was conscripted. From this time on till the end of the war, a soldier was simply a machine, a conscript. It was might rough on the rebels. We cursed the war, we cursed Bragg, we cursed the Southern Confederacy. All our pride and valor had gone, and we were sick of war and the Southern Confederacy.[151]

These men viewed themselves as machines in the war cog following the Conscription Act and those who enlisted within the Confederate army prior to the enactment of conscription became less motivated to fight in Confederate army leading once again to an increase in desertion rates.[152] At the same time soldiers were publically shot or whipped for sake of discipline in an attempt to bring order and discipline back to the Confederate army.[153] These public displays of punishment did not bring back order and discipline in the Confederate army as President Davis had hoped, but instead made "the soldier, or the conscript, loathe the very name of southern Confederacy." [154] Throughout the Civil War, President Davis, along with his staff, knew that desertion was a growing social issue, but he was unable to resolve this.[155] Regardless of the efforts put forward through the implementation of the Home Guard and the

[145] Ibid, 35.
[146] Winston Stephens to Octavia Stephens, January 18, 1864, *Rose Cottage Chronicles,* 307.
[147] Watkin, *Co. Aytch: Maury Grays First Tennessee Regiment,* 38.
[148] Escott, *After Secession,* 151.
[149] Watkin, *Co. Aytch: Maury Gray's First Tennessee Regiment,* 38.

[150] Ibid.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid., 38.
[153] Watkin, *Co. Aytch: Maury Gray's First Tennessee Regiment*, 38.
[154] Ibid., 40.
[155] Ibid., 35.

removal of discriminatory policies such as the "Twenty Slave Law," in 1864, desertion rates continued to skyrocket. Jefferson Davis failed to address the concerns of the common people, and any policy put forward in an attempt to address these concerns, such as General Order No. 77 came only in the aftermath of an outcry from the general public.[156] As J.B Jones, a clerk in the war department of the Confederacy, said, "our armies seem to be melting away by desertion faster than they are enlarged with conscription;" this was an issue that President Davis never resolved.[157]

To gain a greater sense of how significant the Confederate desertion problem was, one could compare the desertion rates within the Confederacy to other American conflicts throughout history where conscription was enacted, such as WWII and the Vietnam War. Civil War historian Gary W. Gallagher wrote "the topic of Confederate desertion remains one of the least well understood in the field of Civil War scholarship," and although this holds some truth, there have been various studies published that have attempted to further understand desertion rates within the Confederacy.[158] No statistics were kept by the Confederacy on desertion rates but Civil War scholar, Ella Lonn, author of *Desertion During the Civil War,* estimates that desertion rates within the Confederacy hovered around 11% by 1864, which is a moderate estimate between the low, and high estimates that have been put forward regarding desertion rates.[159] This number is significantly lower than Jefferson Davis' estimate given in his speech at Macon, Georgia in 1864, as previously mentioned, which estimated that 2/3rds of

Confederate men had deserted or gone missing from the Confederate army, Lonn's estimate can be considered more legitimate because her estimate was reached through extensive research into Confederate War Records.[160] When Confederate desertion rates are compared to the desertion rates in WWII and the Vietnam War, it is possible to grasp a better sense of how staggering a rate of 11% desertion is. Desertion rates with the American army during WWII were at 4.5%, (6.5% lower than the Confederacy) while in the Vietnam War desertion rate was at 5.2% (5.8% lower than the Confederacy).[161] While desertion is common in all wars, the amount of desertion within the Confederacy is alarmingly high, and proves that it had a significant impact on the Confederates ability to win battles. The Vietnam War has been cited as creating the highest U.S desertion rate in 20th century America, but still falls 5.8% lower than the desertion rates calculated for the Confederate army.[162] Jefferson Davis stated in his Macon, Georgia speech "...if one-half the men now absent without leave will return to duty, we can defeat the enemy," but this plea was to no avail, as the Confederacy continued to be riddled with desertion amongst the ranks, aiding in the Union military victories.[163]

From 1861 to 1865 Confederate President Jefferson Davis and the Confederate government were engaged in a multi-layered battle, with the Union and the Confederate citizens. Within the Confederate States of America during the Civil War, there were a growing number of social issues and Davis'

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[156] Escott, *After Secession,* 151.

[157] Jones, *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary,* 35.

[158] Gary W. Gallagher, review of *A Higher Duty: Desertion among Georgia Troops during the Civil War,* by Mark A. Weitz, 2000, http://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?3663631&uuid =41cc2229-18ca-483c-9bcc-f415e996986a (accessed April 8, 2015).

[159] Lonn, *Desertion during the Civil War, 226.*

[160] Davis, *Speech at Macon, Georgia,* September 1864.

[161] John Whiteclay Chambers II, "Desertion," *The Oxford Companion to American Military History,* 2000, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O126-Desertion.html (accessed April 5, 2015).

[162] Gerry Moskal, "Vietnam War Produces Highest U.S Desertion Rate," *The Evening News,* November 11, 1972, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1982&dat=19721 111&id =dsFGAAAAIBAJ&sjid=iTMNAAAAIBAJ&pg=6373,2102330&hl =en (accessed March 6, 2015).

[163] Davis, *Speech at Macon, Georgia,* September 1864.

failure to resolve these inner conflicts and create a sense of loyalty throughout the Confederacy resulted in the inner collapse and ultimate demise of the Confederacy. Even before the onset of the Civil War one can see the lack of unity in the Confederacy. In Virginia as early as 1831 this divide is evident, as a referendum held on the question of pro or anti slavery saw the pro slavery advocates win by only two votes. While undemocratic votes on the issue of secession gave the impression of a unified secessionist front in 1860, peace societies arose in the South throughout the Civil War, which worked to promote peace between the Union and the Confederacy, signifying a division within the Confederacy. The minority groups within the South, notably the African American and Aboriginal groups, created issues and tensions that Davis was forced to deal with although ineffectively, and many of his actions, such as the Enslavement Proclamation and the appointment of General John Baylor to the Confederate Army further agitated these minority groups. Institutions set up, such as the Home Guard, ineffectively attempted to curtail the efforts by the African Americans and fight against the Aboriginal groups, and took limited resources away from the Confederate cause. The most significant problem the Confederacy and President Davis faced was desertion. There were many reasons for desertion, including a number of other social issues that the Jefferson Davis failed to address throughout the Civil War. Lack of food, lack of supplies, inability to protect those on the home front, lowered will to fight, and deplorable conditions within the Confederate Army led to increased rates of desertion throughout the war. The lack of clear authority within the Confederate government, and Davis' inability to control his government composed of rich plantation owners, allowed the rich to profit off the war through cotton production, while food supplies dwindled throughout the home front and within the Confederate army. Although public displays of discipline were used on those who attempted to desert the army, mainly death by firing squad or the public hangings of deserters, this only further depleted the Confederate morale, and enhanced disaffection towards the Confederate state.[164] The Confederacy faced desertion rates as high as 11% by the end of the Civil War, which severely impacted its wartime capabilities. Although there is historiographical debate surrounding Jefferson Davis's political capabilities and the reasons for the Confederate demise, the evidence provided in this paper proves that the main contributing factors to the Confederate demise were the numerous social issues within the Confederacy that were never fully remedied

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[164] Watkin, *Co. Aytch: Maury Grays First Tennessee Regiment,* 38.

"'Honoured but by no Means Idle Repose': Sir Robert Borden as Canada's Elder Statesman during the Interwar Period," by Caitlin Mulroney

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On June 27, 1934, a day after his eightieth birthday, Sir Robert Borden collected the many newspaper articles wishing him happy returns. "We, too, take pride in his long record, in his splendid leadership in days of peril[,]" reads a section in the *Ottawa Journal,* "but perhaps we like to think of him best as our most eminent citizen, particularly in the 15 years since his 'retirement'."[1] *The Mail and Empire-Toronto* concurred that "...he is today universally respected as Canada's Elder Statesman *par excellence.*"[2] Despite his retirement from the premiership in 1921, Borden continued to play a role in public affairs which awarded it separate mention in discussions of his life. From his initial retirement to his death in 1937, Sir Robert Borden was still a vocal member of Canadian political life. His experiences as a wartime Prime Minister effectively shaped his strong support for the League of Nations and his hopes for Canada's increased cooperation and responsibility within the British Commonwealth during the interwar period. Borden's advocating on behalf of Canada's international reputation, however, became increasingly symbolic rather than practical during the latter years of his "retirement" under the government of William Lyon Mackenzie King.

Discussions of Borden's "retirement" are often relegated to concluding chapters or paragraphs in works which detail his life. In their biographies of Borden written in the 1970s, John English and Robert Craig Brown provide a detailed record of Borden's retirement activities, yet the topic is still treated as a supplement to the rest of Borden's political career. Even recently, Tim Cook's *War Lords* (2012) explores Borden's experience as a wartime Prime Minister in comparison to Mackenzie King, but his discussion of Borden as an "elder statesman" is brief. Borden's retirement is not the focus of any article or monograph in the secondary literature. In these texts, this period is merely treated as the inevitable conclusion of Borden's life, rather than a logical extension of his political activity.

The historical record of Borden's period of "retirement", therefore, was largely written by Borden himself. According to Borden's Conservative successor Arthur Meighen, "[i]t may be doubted if any political leader ever exercised such scrupulous supervision of the written record."[3] A prolific and meticulous chronicler, he is perhaps second only to Mackenzie King in the number of records left by acting Prime Ministers. In 1928 Borden began his two-volume memoirs, which were published by his nephew ten years later. He also recorded numerous letters on a variety of subjects from 1933-1936 entitled *Letters to Limbo*, which provide unique access into the latter years of his retirement. Furthermore, his stance on the Canadian constitution and Canada's international position during this period are both well-documented in lectures he gave at the University of Toronto and Oxford University. These lectures were published as *Canadian Constitutional Studies*

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[1] Robert Laird Borden, *Letters to Limbo* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 105.

[2] The emphasis is in the original. Ibid, 106.

[3] Arthur Meighen, introduction to *Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs. Volume 1,* by Robert Laird Borden, edited by Henry Borden (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1938), x.

(1922) and *Canada in the Commonwealth* (1929) respectively, and reveal a direct correlation between Borden's view of history and his wartime experience. A specific study of these particular documents is long overdue. By looking closely at these records, Borden's actions during his retirement can be seen as the last assertion of the dying ideal of Commonwealth cooperation.

To fully examine the hardening of Borden's political stance during the interwar period, a brief discussion of his wartime service is necessary. During the First World War, Borden evolved from a staunch Imperialist to a resolute supporter of dominion political autonomy. This change, precipitated by the lack of British consultation with its dominions such as Australia and South Africa regarding the direction of the war, effectively positioned Borden as a leader among the British dominions at international meetings such as the Imperial War Conference of 1917. It was at that conference that he drafted the famous Resolution IX, which effectively allowed the dominions the right to control their own foreign policy and consult with the British Prime Minister (in this case, David Lloyd George) on matters of war which involved them.[4] Passed on April 16th, 1917, Borden regarded it as the most important piece of legislation to emerge from the conference.[5] He argued that "...the growth of the overseas dominions has proceeded on a theory of trusteeship which...is certain to prove not only entirely inadequate to the needs of the Empire, but incompatible with the aspirations of the people of the dominions in the future."[6]

Resolution IX meant that the dominions could no longer be ignored by Great Britain on matters of war. In this way, Borden created a system in which dominions could not only consult with Britain, but with each other as well.

When it came time for the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the dominions expected to have their own representation distinct from that of Great Britain. Borden pressed the British government for the acknowledgment of each dominion in peace negotiations. For his own nation, he argued that "[t]here was no question on which the people of Canada were more insistent than their claim to representation at the Peace Conference which would settle the issues of a war in which they had taken so notable a part."[7] Borden's increasing reputation as a skilled and logical diplomat effectively won not only Canada a seat at the negotiation table, but that of the other dominions as well. Although their influence over the proceedings was remarkably limited, each had a separate signature on the Peace Treaty under the British Empire.

By 1920, Borden's health was on the decline. Despite taking a year's "vacation" in order to regain his strength, his ability to continue fulfilling his exhausting public duties was simply gone.[8] On July 1st, 1921, Borden announced to his colleagues his official retirement from office. "It would be unfair to myself," he argued, "and what was infinitely more important, unfair to the country that I should continue in the premiership."[9] The announcement was met with what Borden describes as "many warm regrets" from his colleagues, who wished him well.[10] Borden seemed to encapsulate his life of public

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4 C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies: Volume I: 1867-1921* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1977), 214.
5 Sir Robert Laird Borden and Kathryn Rose (1912), *The Diaries of Sir Robert Borden, 1912-1918. Transcription by Dr. Kathryn Rose* (Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON (Unpublished)), April 16, 1917.
6 "Resolution Nine of the Imperial War Conference, 1917" in *Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy: 1917-1939,* edited by Walter A. Riddell, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1962), 2.

7 Stacey, 244.
8 Robert Laird Borden, *Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs. Volume 2.* Ed. Henry Borden. Intro. Arthur Meighen (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1938), 1017.
9 Ibid, 1031.
10 Ibid, 1031.

service, rather than his last day in Parliament in his diary entry on July 1st: "At the end I was very tired."[11]

After his official retirement, Borden settled into a routine which allowed him to regain his health. Occupying an office on Sparks Street across from the Parliament buildings throughout the 1920s, he remained attuned to national politics as they developed.[12] One of the roles of a respected elder statesman, notes Robert Craig Brown, "was to know what was happening on the other side of Wellington Street."[13] An official retirement did not mean that Borden had given up on the Canadian political scene. He remained very much aware of the affairs of his day in order to provide counsel and guidance to his fellow politicians.

Despite Borden's assertion that he preferred to remain personally uninvolved in political life, it was not long before others sought his expertise in Canadian domestic and international affairs.[14] Conservatives such as Arthur Meighen and R.B. Bennett called on him for advice, frequently on relations with Britain and the United States "where his name carried considerable clout."[15] Upon his immediate retirement, for example, Borden still endeavoured to help Arthur Meighen in his transition as the new Prime Minister. Still in his weakened condition, Borden urged Meighen to take up the job of "meeting the people" and organizing a base of support throughout the country.[16] His position as

Canada's "elder statesman" immediately began to take hold.

Although he agreed to provide counsel to his successors regarding smaller matters of governance, Borden was careful not to favour any one politician. He recognized early in his retirement that both Meighen and Bennett had aspirations to leadership, which meant he could not give either the unequivocal support they sought.[17] Fortunately, because Bennett was one of Borden's most vocal critics within the Conservative Party, Borden could afford to keep his distance. In this way, he was able to maintain his status as an elder statesman who was "above [active] politics."[18]

However, as historian Robert Craig Brown argues, "[a]s Canada's senior statesman, Borden saw himself as something more than a repository of advice and occasional handyman for his party."[19] In his first letter to "Limbo" written in 1933, he recognized that one who has retired from public political participation but not "from active interest therein" will often deem it necessary to speak out in the press.[20] Indeed, although Borden often took on an advisory role during his retirement, he remained an active supporter of the causes he championed during his term as the Prime Minister. Because of his strong belief in diplomatic representation for Canada in matters of foreign policy, his immediate retirement was spent in practical positions which he felt advanced Canada's international status.

Perhaps his most significant and decisive role in shaping Canadian foreign policy during his retirement came during the Washington Naval Conference in the autumn of 1921. Although officially retired, Borden was designated by Meighen to once again represent Canada on the British Empire

[11] Ibid, 1032

[12] Robert Craig Brown, *Robert Laird Borden: A Biography, 1914:1937 Volume* II (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1975), 192.

[13] Ibid, 192.

[14] "A few years after my retirement from public life I established for myself a self-denying ordinance which debarred me from taking part in further partisan activities." Borden, *Letters to Limbo,* 15.

[15] Tim Cook, *War Lords: Borden, Mackenzie King, and Canada's World Wars* (Toronto: Penguin Canada Books, Inc., 2012), 158.

[16] Robert Laird Borden, *Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs. Volume 2.* edited by Henry Borden. Introduction by Arthur Meighen (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1938), 1040-1041.

[17] Brown, 193.

[18] John English, *Borden: His Life and World*. (Canada: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1977), 213.

[19] Brown, 194.

[20] Borden, *Letters to Limbo*, 2.

Delegation, just as he had in Paris two years before.[21] And, as in Paris, Borden signed the treaties at Washington on behalf of Canada and as a representative of the British Empire. This practical application of dominion constitutional autonomy within the British Empire was the culmination of Borden's efforts both during the original Imperial War Cabinets and the Paris Peace Conference. In his last official role in actual policy-making, Borden effectively demonstrated that cooperation within the British Empire was not only possible, but necessary in order to fulfill the responsibilities of a Commonwealth nation.[22] It was a position which he consistently defended in the subsequent years of his retirement.

Borden saw his participation in the conference, as well as that of the other nations, as not only constitutionally significant, but symbolically as well. As he later remarked to an Oxford audience, "[a] precedent was established for mitigating and controlling... the ruinous competition in armaments, and thus lessening the oppressive burdens of a war-stricken world."[23] For Borden, then, the Conference was most effective in its elimination of suspicion through "constant association and intimate discussion."[24] For the former Prime Minister who championed the cause of consistent consultation among nations, his participation in Washington cemented his view of the importance of consultative diplomacy.

Borden's role in the conference was the result of Meighen's adherence to Borden's approach to foreign policy. As a moderate Imperialist himself, Meighen recognized the need for Canada to have a definite role in policy making within the British Empire.

Meighen agreed that "the Empire must speak with one voice, but a voice whose tone and language were decided by discussion among its self-governing states..."[25] However, because he "never fancied himself as an international statesman..." he relied heavily on Borden's experience in the realm of external relations.[26] Borden could essentially navigate his way through the Naval Conference according to his own consultative approach to foreign policy because Meighen was a product of his guidance.

The election of William Lyon Mackenzie King in the midst of the Washington Conference in 1922, however, marked a shift in conceptions of Canadian foreign policy. In contrast to Meighen who remained (at least in part) influenced by the nation-building rhetoric of Borden, Mackenzie King was markedly less enthusiastic about committing Canada to international responsibilities. During the naval conference, King urged Borden to stay in Washington despite the change in government, yet he consistently voiced his unease in regard to "any obligation or obligations for Canada."[27] Mackenzie King was palpably uncomfortable with Borden's penchant for securing Canada's responsibility to the Commonwealth and the British Empire in writing. It was this shift from the cooperative ideology of Borden to the more cautious and domestically-focused policy of Mackenzie King which transformed Borden's impact on Canadian foreign policy during his retirement from practical to symbolic.

As his reluctance during the Washington Naval Conference demonstrated, King was sceptical of committing Canada to any external responsibility without first garnering the approval of the country. In contrast to Borden, one of King's greatest fears was to enact any piece of legislation which would divide the

[21] Margaret Prang, *N.W. Rowell: Ontario Nationalist* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 380.
[22] Brown, 201.
[23] Sir Robert Borden, *Canada in the Commonwealth: From Conflict to Co-operation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929),122.
[24] Ibid, 122.

[25] Roger Graham, *Arthur Meighen, Volume II: And Fortune Fled* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, & Company Limited, 1963), 60.
[26] Ibid, 55.
[27] Brown, 200.

country as brutally as conscription had in 1917. In this way, he viewed Canada's foreign policy as an increasingly domestic problem.[28] King was terrified of what the effects of a divided nation would have on his political career. His priorities, then, centred around domestic cohesion, rather than the unity of the British Commonwealth.

Moreover, Mackenzie King further curtailed Borden's influence in Ottawa in 1922 when he placed him below the position of Chief Justice of Canada in the table of precedence, the symbolic ordering of positions within the government. In a 1930 memorandum, Borden accused King of being petty and childish. This change in precedence was even more offensive since up to that point Borden's wartime service "had never received any formal recognition."[29] Though Borden confronted King about the change, King insisted that he had not known about it. That being said, he never made any attempt to rectify the situation. The exchange made it clear that Mackenzie King awarded Borden no great importance during his period of retirement, despite his extensive wartime service. From that point on, Borden's influence ceased to be in any decisive capacity, but rather a symbol of an increasingly unpopular vision of Canada's foreign policy.

King's disassociation with external and imperial matters (and by extension, Borden) received national attention during the so-called "King-Byng" affair in 1926. After the federal election of 1925, Mackenzie King and the Liberal Party occupied the minority position in the House of Commons. To ensure that his minority was a strong one, King brought onside some Progressives from the Eastern provinces.[30] After a scandal involving politicians profiting from smuggled cars filled with alcohol reported by the Special Committee on the Department of Customs and Excise, King lost the Progressive support he needed to sustain his government.[31] Rather than waiting for defeat, however, King asked Governor General Lord Byng for the dissolution of parliament so that he could have the chance to run for re-election. Byng refused and asked Meighen to form a government. When it collapsed less than a week later, King ran for re-election on a platform which pitted the right of free governance for Canadians against the unwanted interference of a British Governor General.[32] Because Byng had exercised the right of a Governor General to refuse the dissolution of parliament on King's terms, King cast Byng as an Imperial power who was infringing upon Canadian autonomy. Whether or not the issue was of interest to the Canadian public, King won the election and formed a majority government.

As the major living authority on the Canadian constitution, Borden understandably took great offense at King's attack on the Governor General. King seemed to undermine Borden's life's work to define dominion autonomy when he argued that Byng had ignored the right of Canadians to govern themselves. Borden assured his friend Byng in July of 1926 that "[o]n both occasions [his] course was distinguished not only by perfect constitutional propriety but by rare good judgement." He also commended Byng for attempting to avoid another election "with its attendant turmoil, discord, sectional antagonisms and waste."[33] But because

[28] John Herd Thompson and Allen Seager, *Canada 1922-1939: Decades of Discord*
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1985), 40.
[29] Borden, *Letters to Limbo*, 19.
[30] Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, *Canada, 1900-1945* (Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 1987), 205.
[31] Ibid, 206.
[32] H. Blair Neatby, "The Right Decision for the Wrong Reasons," in *The King-Byng Affair, 1926: A Question of Responsible Government,* ed. Roger Graham, (Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1967), 130.
[33] Robert Borden, "Sir Robert Borden Addresses the Propriety of Lord Byng's Actions," in *The King-Byng Affair, 1926: A Question of Responsible Government,* ed. Roger Graham, (Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1967), 51.

Borden's position of elder statesman was more symbolic than effectual, he was powerless to change the outcome of the scandal.

The King-Byng affair fundamentally altered Borden's view of King. To Borden, "King had treated the imperial constitution as a political plaything; he had mouthed the language of autonomy but he understood neither the meaning of autonomy nor the responsibilities that it must bring."[34] He abhorred King's "duplicitous tactics" and lack of reverence for the constitution.[35] Borden endeavoured during his premiership to lobby aggressively for Canadian constitutional autonomy and the fact that King was not only questioning its existence, but using the issue to his own political advantage was a severe disappointment.

Despite King's ambivalence toward external affairs, Borden continued to argue for the importance of the League of Nations and collective security throughout his retirement. Assuming the presidency of the Canadian League of Nations Society in 1921, Borden sought to educate Canadians about the aims of the League of Nations in order to foster interest in Canadian external affairs.[36] Though his knowledge of the formation of the League was respected, it was often difficult to convince others in Canada. If he could not assume a practical role in shaping Canadian approaches to the Commonwealth, he could and did play a role in the social and cultural definitions of Canadian autonomy in external affairs.

His support of the League was perhaps most evident in his Marfleet Lectures at the University of Toronto in 1921. Addressing the crowd in the university's Convocation Hall, he insisted that he "...never wavered in the firm and constant belief that, within the British Commonwealth of Nations, Canada will find

her most commanding influence, her widest usefulness, and her highest dignity."[37] It was this equal status in the Commonwealth, he argued, which "carrie[d] with it grave responsibilities."[38] According to Borden, it was not enough to simply assume equality within the British Empire. Equality demanded the assumption of certain external responsibilities, among which were support for the League of Nations. It was a view that became increasingly unfashionable under Mackenzie King.

What was significant about Borden, however, was that his words carried the authority of one who had played a decisive role in the way the Commonwealth was formed. The *Toronto Daily Star* reported that Borden's lectures were of interest as they were "based on the actual experience of a distinguished Canadian who shouldered, during the war, responsibilities both national and imperial."[39] Indeed, C.P. Lucas concurred that no one but Borden could speak with such authority on the events which transformed Canada's constitution.[40] His status as an elder statesman, therefore, mandated that his version of diplomacy during the war be taken seriously.

Borden continued to use his authority of the subject of Canadian external policy to elucidate the importance of Commonwealth cooperation. In 1922, in the same article for the *Canadian Historical Review* in which C.P. Lucas commended Borden's authority, he also accused him of relegating the British to the role of a "repressive Mother Country" throughout Canada's history.[41] Not one to let a criticism go unacknowledged, Borden replied

[34] English, 211.
[35] Brown, 193.
[36] Ibid, 201-202.

[37] Sir Robert Laird Borden, *Canadian Constitutional Studies: The Marfleet Lectures, University of Toronto, 1921* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1922), 138.
[38] Ibid, 138.
[39] *The Toronto Daily Star,* October 8, 1921, 10.
[40] C.P. Lucas, "Want of Vision," *Canadian Historical Review* vol. 3 (1922): 343.
[41] Ibid, 344.

with an article in the following edition of the *Canadian Historical Review.*[42] After refuting Lucas' claims with a flood of pre-confederation examples, Borden shifts to his consistent theme of Commonwealth cooperation:

> And Canadians of to-day, if they would avoid narrowness of view, must continually remember that assumption of national status within the Commonwealth carries with it national responsibility for the Commonwealth's security.[43]

In this pointed reply, Borden revealed a thinly-veiled sense of pride for his accomplishments in the realm of Canadian foreign policy.

Borden also saw himself as an authority figure on the subject of Canadian foreign policy. In a speech made later in his retirement, Borden opined: "Perhaps as much as any living man I have striven for the right of full nationhood which the dominions now enjoy and toward which a great step was taken in the constitutional resolution of 1917."[44] Because of his wartime service and his continued support of his international initiatives during his retirement, Borden expected both respect and continued recognition.[45] His position as Canada's elder statesman dictated that his work during his retirement be acknowledged as well. In this, he would continue to advocate for dominion responsibility.

Borden's authority on Commonwealth policy was sought once again when he was asked to deliver a series of Rhodes Memorial Lectures in 1928. The lectures, entitled "Canada in the Commonwealth: From Conflict to Co-Operation", detailed Canada's history from early explorers such as Jacques Cartier and Samuel de Champlain to the early 1920s. According to John English, these lectures proved that Borden, who was approaching his seventy-fifth year, "…retained a surprisingly alert and informed mind."[46] It is not so surprising, however, that Borden agreed to deliver these lectures during a period in which the bedrock of his foreign policy, the League of Nations, was under significant threat from apathetic nations. Retirement could not dispel his hope to see the practical application of the League of Nations during his lifetime.

Borden, perhaps realizing the fading optimism which haunted the League in the late 1920s, made an earnest appeal to the values which he thought should have drawn the Commonwealth together:

> Assuredly the nations of the Commonwealth, bound to each other by the ties of kinship, tradition, language, laws, institutions, literature, by common ideals of liberty, justice and international right, by the memories and associations of a thousand years- surely these nations owe it to each other, owe it still more to the world, that they should carry on to a glorious conclusion the wonderful experiment in governance that hitherto has been crowned with aspiring success. If the League of the Commonwealth may not endure, how is it possible that the League of Nations can survive?[47]

Borden continued to believe firmly in the possibility of Commonwealth cooperation

[42] Borden would go on to become the president of the Canadian Historical Association in 1930. "Membership of the Canadian Historical Association." *Report of the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association,* vol. 10:1 (1931): 105-112. See also his presidential address to the Association on the reformation of the Canadian Civil Service: Borden, Robert. "Problem of an Efficient Civil Service: Presidential Address." *Report of the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association.* Vol. 10, no. 1 (1931): 5-34.

[43] Sir Robert Borden, "'Want of Vision'- Or What?" *Canadian Historical Review.* Vol. 4 (1923): 11.

[44] Borden, *Letters to Limbo*, 45.

[45] Brown, 194.

[46] English, 213.

[47] Borden, *Canada in the Commonwealth: From Conflict to Co-operation,* 129.

during this period, and used his status as a respected elder statesman in order to argue on behalf of the organization he had worked tirelessly to bring together.

In 1930, Borden led what was Canada's last delegation to the League of Nations during his lifetime. He remarked to the London *Times* that he would fulfill his duty as the Canadian representative, but would hold no other official office. [48] There was a rumour circulating that he was going to be the High Commissioner for Canada in London, but he maintained that he was focussed solely on the League in Geneva. [49] He also asserted his position to the press: "…as I had a leading part in the effort which gave to the Dominions the right of nomination and election to the Council, I finally consented to accept the task."[50] It was his status as a respected international diplomat which allowed him to participate in an official, albeit limited, capacity in the discussions at Geneva.

Borden's remarks to the League are indicative of his personal investment in its creation and maintenance. He re-iterated that the mandate of the League of Nations, above all, was to promote peace. "They [the nations of the world] are here in the kindergarten of peace" Borden argued, "and already they have learned many useful a lesson. There are others still harder yet to be learned."[51] It was the role of the League, therefore, to teach these nations the value of peaceable negotiation. It was a cause Borden viewed as not only a Canadian responsibility, but one of the other British dominions as well.

In the same speech, Borden attributed the lack of peaceful negotiation among certain European nations to the militaristic culture which prevailed there. He indicated that the continued armament of Europe was the greatest threat to the pursuit of peace. Borden argued: "Today the world is expectant. War has been renounced. Why has there not been a like renunciation of armaments? This is the hardest lesson of all."[52] It must be noted, however, that although Borden denounced the moral renunciation of violence without actual disarmament, he failed to offer any practical methods to implement a wider system of demilitarization. This moralizing, rather than explicit action, demonstrated that Borden's international influence was decreasing during this period.

Borden also responded to the claim that his hope for peace through the League was overly idealistic. Because he held the status of one of the greatest advocates of the dominion right to representation and of one of the League's most vocal supporters, he had to maintain an optimistic view of its progress. He argued:

> Let us thank God that the idealism of one generation becomes the achievement of the next. In my country there are thousands of worthy and contented citizens from every nation in Europe and from many other nations. If I might interpret their message, they would bid you look forward and not backward.[53]

In his last official, though symbolic, duty, Borden felt it necessary to urge the League to continue. He knew that his role as a policy maker had come to its conclusion, and wished to encourage what he thought was a significant part of his legacy to Canadian foreign policy. His capacity to influence public opinion on external affairs was, from then on, limited to social functions and the written word.

As the Honorary President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Borden also addressed delegates from other British

[48] *The Times,* 29 August 1930, 12.

[49] Martin Thornton, *Sir Robert Borden: Canada* (London: Haus Publishing Ltd., 2010), 131.

[50] *The Times,* 29 August 1930, 12.

[51] *Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy: 1917-1939* edited by Walter A. Riddell (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1962), 313.

[52] Ibid, 314.

[53] *Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy*, 314.

dominions at the British Commonwealth Relations conference in September of 1933. In his welcome address, Borden defined the Commonwealth as a "tremendous experiment in governance", but one which needed to succeed to ensure the maintenance of peace. If the Commonwealth could not create efficient consultative methods, he argued, the League of Nations could not sustain its power as an international diplomatic unit. [54] The deliberations, therefore, needed to provide a systematic way for the dominions to consult each other on matters of foreign policy.[55]

Was Borden naïve to think that a policy of consultative cooperation among the nations of the British Commonwealth would last beyond the political changing of the guard in the early 1920s? Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein seem to think so. In their assessment of Canadian foreign policy during the period of Borden's retirement, they argue that because the Prime Ministers of each dominion had to consistently travel to London for the imperial alliance to be effective, Borden's ideology "was doomed to failure anyway." [56] No prime minister during this period was willing to spend extended periods away from their own governments, because they feared (as Borden found during the Great War) that it would harm them politically. [57] Dominion consultation became particularly difficult under Meighen and nearly impossible under Mackenzie King; the system was the cause of the old guard of which Borden was arguably the leader.

Despite Borden's efforts to maintain interest in dominion consultation and the League of Nations, he did not wield enough

practical influence in the government to save the system he had attempted to create in the immediate aftermath of the Great War. In a "letter to Limbo" dated May 5th, 1936, Borden admitted the League's lack of use in the wake of the territorial aggressions of Germany, Japan, and Italy. He lamented the League's failure to live up to its mandate to "…end the awful violence and destruction of war, to assure peaceful determination of international disputes and to maintain public right throughout the world." [58] This letter, admittedly pessimistic in tone, reveals Borden's frustration with his inability to affect the course of the League's response to aggression.[59] Imperial co-operation was also so neglected during this period that, to Borden's dismay, it "vanished as though it had never been."[60]

Yet even as he began to lose faith in the League's ability to curtail international aggression, the eighty-two year old Borden remained publicly supportive. In an address at a League of Nations Society banquet in 1936, Borden acknowledged the League's failure to "meet early expectations", but expressed his hope that it could be resurrected in the uncertain future.[61] In a motion which was somewhat uncharacteristic of the former Conservative leader, Borden concluded that it was only public opinion which could compel to consult and cooperate with each other. This was Borden's implicit acknowledgement that his hope that the League (and by extension, peace) could be maintained through the diplomatic consultation between Commonwealth nations had failed.

Historians today tend to credit Borden with an intuitive awareness of the context within

[54] Borden, *Letters to Limbo*, 46.
[55] Borden advocated that the dominion delegates "be regarded as preparing the drawings for the architectural design of an improved structure of the British Empire." Ibid, 47.
[56] Norman Hillmer and Jack Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World into the 21st Century.* 2nd edition (Toronto: Thompson/Nelson, 2008), 73.
[57] Ibid, 74.

[58] Borden, *Letters to Limbo*, 269.
[59] Borden concludes that "This letter is written in great sadness; it expresses the feeling of pessimism which now possesses me, but which I hope may yet pass. So, my last word is *Sursum corda.* [Lift up your hearts]" Ibid, 270.
[60] Bothwell, Drummond, and English, 239.
[61] Borden, *Letters to Limbo*, 290-291.

which he shaped Canadian foreign policy and developed the constitution during his premiership. Martin Thornton argues that Borden and Canada were ideally suited to one another, as both remained "not revolutionary, not radical, but capable of prompting change at the appropriate time and at a pace that suited them both."[62] J. Castell Hopkins espoused similar sentiment in his history of the 1917 Union Government: "[Borden knew] much of the difficult and divergent temperaments of the Canadian public and the danger of going too fast, as well as the international danger of going too slow."[63] Borden pursued dominion autonomy in such a way that it did not alarm the Canadian public, of which a significant portion had direct British roots. His calm and logical approach to Canadian external relations changed the direction of the British empire without alienating too much of his base of support. It was a remarkable achievement.

During Borden's retirement, however, his once aptly-timed constitutional development became outdated. "With the retirement of Sir Robert Borden", argues historian Harold A. Wilson, "there ended a great epoch in the history of the British Empire in general, and in Canada's relationship with Great Britain in particular."[64] Succeeding Prime Ministers such as Meighen and Mackenzie King interpreted the ability to form their own foreign policy as a way in which to decline any involvement in European affairs. Borden's hard-won constitutional authority, then, was used not to support the British Empire in international conflict as he intended, but rather to avoid having to do so at all costs.[65] The rhetoric Borden favoured during his retirement,

therefore, became one of a statesman out of touch with growing Canadian isolationism.

In 1937, Borden died of the effects of a heart attack in Ottawa. It was only a year after the policy he put so much stock into came tumbling down with the League of Nations. Arthur Meighen stated in his introduction to Borden's memoirs that "[o]ne is saddened indeed to think that within the space of his own fast fleeting years he should witness the inexorable receding of the horizon of his hopes."[66] Borden was not one to dwell on disappointment, but the increasing hostility toward the League of Nations during the 1930s doubtless had its effects. During his sixteen-year retirement, however, Borden accomplished what he could with the limited power that he had.

The legacy of Borden's remarkably active period of retirement is decidedly more difficult to measure than that of his wartime service. He was certainly the instigator of multiple pieces of legislation regarding dominion autonomy during his term as Prime Minister, but his retirement involved significantly less official action. His vision of a consultative empire also failed during his retirement. During this period, even Borden himself worried that his work would achieve little and be eventually be forgotten.[67]

Little stock could be placed in the assumption that history would be kind to him. In fact, there was little to suggest during his own time that he would be recalled as one of the nation's eminent statesmen. To his contemporaries, Borden was a reserved man who seldom betrayed any personal feeling. At times during his retirement, he even seemed to some "a trifle insecure."[68] The lack of symbolic recognition for his efforts during the

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[62] Thornton, 146.
[63] J. Castell Hopkins, *The Book of the Union Government: A Record and Souvenir of 1917* (Toronto: The Canadian Annual Review Limited, 1918), 2.
[64] Harold A. Wilson, *The Imperial Policy of Sir Robert Borden* (Gainsville, Florida:
University of Florida Press, 1966), 76.
[65] Thornton, 138.

[66] Arthur Meighen, introduction to *Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs. Volume 1,* by Robert Laird Borden, edited by Henry Borden (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1938), xiii.
[67] English, 206.
[68] Brown, 197.

Great War certainly disappointed him.[69] As a result, the former Prime Minister had to navigate his reduction in status and the limitation of his official capacity to influence the course of Canadian external affairs.

Throughout the interwar period, however, Borden stood steadfastly behind the policies that he truly believed would enact a more efficient way for nations to consult one another on matters of war and peace. Arthur Meighen perhaps defined Borden's retirement best in his introduction to Borden's memoirs:

> …he was privileged for seventeen years to enjoy a serene and honoured but by no means idle repose and to survey from the vantage ground of an unrivalled experience the puzzling transformations of what he confidently believed would be a better world.[70]

During his retirement, Borden effectively pursued the practical application of the policies he enacted during his premiership. Though his political course was eventually abandoned, Borden's strict adherence to it and his optimism regarding its implementation demonstrate his dedication to his country even after his official retirement from public life.

The retirement of Sir Robert Borden was a unique period in Canadian political affairs. No other politician before him had maintained such a strong presence in the affairs of his day once his term in office was behind him. His actions as Canada's "elder statesman" changed the perception of retirement in an age when most elder politicians settled into lives away from the public eye. Indeed, his status as a respected authority on constitutional matters availed him the opportunity to remain very much a part of Canadian public life during the interwar period.

His participation in international affairs in an official capacity continued throughout the early years of his "retirement". As a leader of the Canadian delegation under the British Empire for both the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-1922 and the League of Nations in Geneva in 1930, Borden demonstrated his will to see the practical application of his prior work toward dominion autonomy become a reality. By exercising Canada's right to negotiate with other nations separately from the British Empire, Borden effectively attempted to maintain Canada's public involvement in international peace-making.

Borden's frustration with Mackenzie King's unwillingness to commit Canadian resources to international responsibilities manifested itself in his dedication to furthering the cause of the League of Nations in a symbolic role. Though his practical influence in Canadian external affairs was on the decline after his involvement with the League in 1930, he argued his case for dominion responsibility through his positions in the League of Nations Society and the Canadian Historical Association. His series of lectures in both 1921 and 1928 reveal his adherence to the ideology of consultative diplomacy among the nations of the British Commonwealth.

Sir Robert Borden was devoted to his country and its constitutional development until his death, despite the increasing isolationism of the interwar period. Disappointment in the current state of external affairs aside, he was resolute in his belief that Canadians would once again pursue the cause of peace around the world. Borden himself perhaps encompassed his optimism best in a letter to King Edward VIII in 1936 a year before his death: "I am profoundly thankful that in the vicissitudes, trials, and suffering of

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[69] Perhaps the most striking disappointment recorded in *Letters to Limbo* is Borden's description of the unveiling of the Vimy Ridge Memorial in 1936. He thought that since the monument was distinctly Canadian, he would be allowed to speak at the ceremony as Canada's wartime Prime Minister. He noted sardonically, however, that "the volume of eloquence seeking outlet from the lips of ministers was altogether too great to permit the five minutes originally allotted to me, as I understand." Borden, *Letters to Limbo,* 276.

[70] Meighen, xiii.

the past five years, the spirit of our people has never faltered. I know that it will remain to the end."[71]

[71] Borden, *Letters to Limbo,* 266-267.

"Hong Kong: Economic Miracle from the Cold War," by Dalton Rawcliffe

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The city of Hong Kong today stands as the third greatest global city and represents an important node in the global economic system. Yet Hong Kong has not always held such a position of prestige. Hong Kong's rise as an economic powerhouse began when the British transformed the island into an entrepot in 1862. This came to an abrupt end due to the Second World War and the subsequent Japanese occupation. The growing tensions of the Cold War in Asia put Hong Kong in a very dangerous position and ended its status as an entrepot. Asia had changed following the Second World War, and from Japan to Malaya lay in ruins. Communism was spreading and tensions were rising. The decline of the British Empire following the Second World War left many to believe that Hong Kong's future lay with mainland China. This idea was shattered in 1949 with Mao's victory and the subsequent founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). This very act ensured British commitment to Hong Kong to maintain a foothold in East Asia.

This paper examines the economic success of Hong Kong in the 1950s. Hong Kong's early industrial phase has been completely overshadowed by its economic achievements during the 1970s and 1980s. However, the later economic success would not have occurred had Hong Kong not made the vital step of industrializing in the 1950s. To date the only academic writing in English on the industrial development of Hong Kong in the 1950s is Stella Chen's "Hong Kong's Economy, 1949-1959," published in 1961. Chen does a good job of highlighting the role of the British government in the colony's development, the contribution of the Chinese refugees, and the values of import and export to and from Hong Kong. However, her research fails to mention the value of machinery for Hong Kong's industry, the development of Hong Kong's plastic industry, as well as Hong Kong's trade with East and Southeast Asian nations. But the key shortcoming in Chen's research is that she overlooks the effects of the Cold War and of the American/United Nations embargo.

This paper probes the impact the Cold War had on Hong Kong's economy. The Cold War has always been viewed as a monumental struggle between democracy and communism. Thus, academics have tended to focus on the superpowers such as the United States and China during the 1950s, ignoring smaller regional powers such as Hong Kong. Hong Kong remained within the British Empire, and hence played the role of a capitalist outpost within a communist sphere of influence. Most academic writings skim through the economic miracle of Hong's Kong industry in the 1950s, which only occurred because of the Cold War.[1] In part, the economic success of Hong Kong provides a unique window between East-West relations with China and Great Britain maintaining a link due to the small colony of Hong Kong.

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[1] Jik-Joen Lee, *The Colonial Government of Hong Kong's Development of Social Welfare: From Economic and Social Service Perspectives* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009). David C. Donald, *A Financial Centre for Two Empires: Hong Kong's Corporate, Securities and Tax Laws in its Transition from Britain to China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Gavin Peebles, *Hong Kong's Economy: An Introductory Macroeconomic Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

This paper investigates how Hong Kong developed manufacturing and how it maintained this economic sector through the early years of the Cold War. The four key areas to be examined include: 1) the key demographic and economic transformation in Hong Kong following the influx of refugees from China, 2) British policy regarding Hong Kong's economy, 3) the nature of Hong Kong's industry, and 4) Hong Kong's economic relations with other nations during the Cold War prior to and following the American and United Nations embargo. Overall, Hong Kong's economic development in the 1950s demonstrates that despite the Cold War rhetoric of conflicting ideologies the curtain was never fully closed and trade was not only possible, but also flourished.

Pre-1950s Hong Kong

Following the First Opium War and subsequent Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, the Chinese handed over the island of Hong Kong to the British Empire.[2] The colony was founded under the premise of being a free port. Without import and export duties, Hong Kong became an entrepot that traded and stored Chinese goods to be sold to the West and vice versa.[3] Heavy manufacturing developed within Hong Kong as the shipbuilding and repair industries grew, especially with demands of the First World War. The Ottawa Agreements of 1932 also encouraged merchants to expand and export shipping goods to Commonwealth countries.[4] Other small-scale industries existed, including footwear, food, and beverage production, but this was no more than ten percent of Hong Kong's gross domestic product before 1941.[5] By and large, Hong Kong's main economic role between the years 1842–1941

was as an entrepot overseeing trade goods between China and the West. This all came to an abrupt end in 1941 when Imperial Japanese forces attacked and occupied the colony. The economy of Hong Kong came to a complete standstill. The Japanese occupation forces pillaged and ransacked the colony. Mass war deaths and forced migration of Hong Kongers by the Japanese occupiers led to the shrinking of Hong Kong's population from 1.6 million in 1939 to 600,000 in 1945.[6] Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, Hong Kong was restored to British rule and arrangements were made to resume trade.[7] The British administration employed 30,000 labourers to clean and repair the infrastructure of Hong Kong after the Japanese withdrawal. The colony's utilities and banks began operating and the population increased from 600,000 to 1 million by early 1946.[8]

Hong Kong's status as an entrepot would be temporarily restored following the Second World War. Hong Kong was in great need of Chinese foodstuffs, while China was in need of raw materials and manufactured goods due to the Japanese devastation of the mainland. Hong Kong merchants purchased as many manufactured goods as they could from the world in order to sell to China.[9] Even with a world shortage of goods following the Second World War, Hong Kong's trade value increased from HK$1.7 billion in 1946 to HK$3.7 billion in 1948.[10] These figures tell us that Hong Kong was still economically viable even in the postwar period. One important development in 1946 was that China decided to begin exporting most of its textiles through Hong Kong's fully functioning port. Textiles were in high demand, and China's decision to trade this material through Hong Kong would have a lasting

[2] Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), 158–159.

[3] Ming K. Chan, ed., *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain 1842–1992* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 10–11.

[4] Keith Hopkins, ed., *Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony: A Political, Social and Economic Survey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 1.

[5] Theodore Geiger and Frances M. Geiger, *The Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore* (Hong Kong: Macmillan Publishers, 1973), 69.

[6] Ibid., 65.

[7] David Faure and Lee Pui-tak, ed. *Economy: A Documentary History of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 136.

[8] Francis Pike, *Empires at War* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd), 245.

[9] Geiger and Geiger, *The Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore*, 66.

[10] Ibid., 68.

impact on Hong Kong's economy. [11] The colony's status as a warehouse of goods was coming to a rapid conclusion due to the changing world events in East Asia, and Hong Kong's economic situation would undergo a radical transformation in the decade following 1949.

Influx of Chinese Refugees

At the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945, China was once again thrust into a bloody civil war, with the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek on one side fighting against the Communist Party led by Mao Zedong.[12] The Chinese Civil War ended in 1949 with a communist victory and Chiang's forces retreated to the island of Taiwan.[13] Although the communist victory of 1949 started a new era for China, the Civil War had an indirect impact upon Hong Kong's postwar development. Within the first months of 1950, over 700,000 Chinese refugees fled to Hong Kong. Hong Kong's population increased from 1.6 million in 1946 to 2.5 million in 1956.[14] These refugees came mainly from the province of Guangdong and the city of Shanghai.[15] The refugees seeking safe haven from the new communist regime travelled to the British colony of Hong Kong due to its proximity to the mainland. [16] The colony was viewed as a politically and economically stable location in East Asia.[17] Most of the Chinese refugees were unskilled labourers, yet they had two assets: willingness to work and a determination to make Hong Kong their home.[18] However, there were also expert labourers who sought refuge in Hong Kong. These men and women not only brought their labour to Hong Kong, but also their industrial experience and technical know-how.[19] They proved to be the nucleus of many industries in Hong Kong and helped train and supervise the unskilled labourers, who were more than willing to learn and obtain work in these new areas of employment.[20] The mass influx of refugees proved to not be detrimental for the colony's development. In fact, industrial development and prosperity became dependent to a considerable extent on these refugees. Manufacturing employed 81,708 workers by the end of 1950; by 1959, this number had increased to 177,271.[21] The light industries would not have properly functioned without the expertise and labour of the Chinese-born refugees in the colony who applied their skills to manufacturing.

Influx of Chinese Capital

The most important resource to enter Hong Kong due to the Chinese Civil War was capital. Before the war, Shanghai was the industrial centre of the east coast of China. The greatest industry in Shanghai was the textile industry, which had been steadily developed by Chinese entrepreneurs and technicians.[22] The flight of capital began in 1947 when the Nationalist government issued the Gold Yuan currency, which rapidly declined in value due to constant Nationalist defeats at the hands of the communists. Bankers were the first to distrust this new currency when the government began printing money without the necessary backing during the Second World War.[23] Thus, bankers began to exchange the Gold Yuan for American dollars, pound sterling, and Hong Kong dollars and transfer these currencies into Hong Kong banks.[24] Due to Hong Kong's rapid postwar

[11] Nigel Cameron, *An Illustrated History of Hong Kong* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 293.
[12] Faure and Pui-tak, *Economy: A Documentary History of Hong Kong*, 136.
[13] Pike, *Empires at War*, 129.
[14] Chan, *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain 1842–1992*, 131.
[15] Hopkins, *Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony: A Political, Social and Economic Survey*, 2.
[16] Garry Lyle, *Major World Nations: Hong Kong* (Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 1999), 34.
[17] Cameron, *An Illustrated History of Hong Kong*, 295.
[18] Chan, *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain 1842–1992*, 132.

[19] Ibid.
[20] Geiger and Geiger, *The Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore*, 69.
[21] Edward K. Y. Chen, Mee-kau Nyaw, and Teresa Y. C. Wong, ed., *Industrial and Trade Development in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1991), 190.
[22] Geiger and Geiger, *The Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore*, 69.
[23] Faure and Pui-tak, *Economy: A Documentary History of Hong Kong*, 136.
[24] Ibid.

development, Hong Kong banks were viewed by Shanghai bankers and investors as being strong and safe compared to the banks in Shanghai.[25] By 1947 and 1948 businessmen, bankers, and capitalists alike realized that it was only a matter of time before the communists won the civil war. The fall of Shanghai to Mao proved an economic miracle to Hong Kong. Knowing their wealth, and possibly their lives, would be taken away, the capitalists fled nearby to the economically strong colony of Hong Kong. The capitalists and manufacturing owners were keen to invest in industry again and brought with them their wealth.[26] Since light industry had proven to be a success in Shanghai, it only made sense to try manufacturing in the colony. The most important element of capital was that it enabled entrepreneurs and industrialists to invest in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong banks were very strong and had ample funds to loan out to eager investors wishing to start up their own plants.[27] The influx of capital and business skills from overseas, especially from Britain, the United States, Australia, and Japan, clearly reflected the economic strength of Hong Kong.[28] Startup costs for factories were not cheap and industrial development would not have been possible for Hong Kong had the capitalists of Shanghai not brought wealth to invest within the colony.

Influx of Chinese Machinery

The value of the machinery that was purchased and sent to Hong Kong was one of the topics that Chen's study did not address, for even with capital and labour, Hong Kong's industry could not have functioned without machinery. There was a huge demand for textile goods following the Second World War. After the Japanese surrender, Shanghai textile owners placed new orders for textile equipment. New spinning, weaving, knitting,

and finishing equipment were ordered from Europe and North America to feed this new demand for the textile industry. Following the communist advances in 1948, orders from the West were off-loaded and stored in Hong Kong for reasons of security.[29] After the fall of Shanghai, the capitalists fled to Hong Kong with their wealth and vital machinery needed for industry. This machinery started up many of Hong Kong's light industries and helped facilitate the training of the unskilled refugee labourers. In 1950 there were 1,284 registered industrial plants in Hong Kong, a number that grew to 4,860 plants by 1959.[30] Therefore, the equipment that was ordered and off-loaded in Hong Kong by Shanghai proved to be the first stepping-stone of Hong Kong's industrial development.

British Policy with China

There is no denying that following the Second World War Great Britain had declined in power and prestige in East Asia. The British Empire was decolonizing, and in London discussions occurred relating to whether the colony of Hong Kong should be given back to China.[31] The situation rapidly changed in 1948 with the eventual collapse of the Nationalist government and the rise of Mao's Communist Party. The British Foreign Office deemed that the future of Hong Kong would be determined by the relationship between the British government and the Chinese Communist Party.[32] Although the British maintained a garrison of 30,000 troops in Hong Kong, British rule was tangible if the People's Army crossed the strait.[33] Ironically, the communists had little interest in Hong Kong and Mao publically stated, "I am not interested in Hong Kong; the communist party is not interested in Hong Kong; it has never been the subject of

[25] Geiger and Geiger, *The Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore*, 69.
[26] Pike, *Empires at War*, 249.
[27] Geiger and Geiger, *The Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore*, 69.
[28] Lyle, *Major World Nations: Hong Kong*, 41.

[29] Geiger and Geiger, *The Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore*, 69.
[30] Faure and Pui-tak, *Economy: A Documentary History of Hong Kong*, 184.
[31] Chan, *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain 1842–1992*, 113.
[32] Ibid., 114.
[33] Pike, *Empires at War*, 247.

discussion amongst us."[34] With the Cold War on, the British government was determined to protect the citizens of Hong Kong, for losing the colony without a fight would have been an embarrassing blow for the West. Also, Hong Kong was one of the few colonies left in the Empire that was not a burden to British taxpayers.[35] London accepted the PRC government on January 6, 1950, only three months after the formal founding of Mao's government.[36] Despite being an ally of the United States and American protests, Britain had very little choice but to accept the communist government in order to protect Hong Kong from being completely cut off from mainland China. Interestingly enough, American officials and the business elite understood the position of Hong Kong with its dependency on foodstuffs from mainland China.[37] This acceptance of the new Chinese government would have two major implications for Hong Kong: first, the British government turned a blind eye to the smuggling of goods between Hong Kong and China despite the American embargo during the Korean War,[38] and second, in spite of this small link, Britain was able to keep the door open with China. Although the American public was outraged, the British maintained a small trade link between China and the West, despite ideological differences.[39] This trade link would be greatly expanded and built upon to what we have today thanks in part to the Hong Kong trade link between China and Western nations.

Pound Sterling

One direct contribution Britain made to Hong Kong's economy that also indirectly supported the Chinese economy was its backing of the Hong Kong dollar with the pound sterling. For a time the Chancellor of the Exchequer was going to exclude Hong Kong from the sterling area for fears that the sterling would overvalue the Hong Kong dollar. However, this changed in August 1949 when the pound sterling was devalued, which came as an advantage to the colony. After this decision was made, many of the wealthy capitalists felt confidence in the strong Hong Kong dollar, which was backed by the pound sterling.[40] This led to many Shanghai capitalists investing and setting up accounts within Hong Kong's banks.[41] Being second only to the US dollar, pound sterling was still one of the principal currencies used for trading in East Asia. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) emerged as one of the chief creditor banks in Asia.[42] Backed by a strong currency, Hong Kong banks felt confidence in investing and lending throughout Asia; but, more importantly, this led to the boosting of Hong Kong's growing economy. The second benefit of being tied to the pound sterling was that it allowed Hong Kong to enjoy the Commonwealth Preference with neighbouring and distant Commonwealth nations. Although the Commonwealth Preference has long since been abolished, the fact that Hong Kong was able to get a competitive edge in the markets following the Second World War greatly increased the colony's manufacturing sales. The Commonwealth Preference is visible as Hong Kong's trade with Malaya[43] and especially with Britain[44] expanded during the 1950s.

The pound sterling would have a secondary effect on Hong Kong and an indirect effect on China. America and Britain had completely different opinions of China. The Americans felt that embargoing all goods and having tight financial control over communist China was the appropriate course of action. The British took a more pragmatic approach, knowing that any

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.. 246.

[36] Chan, *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain 1842–1992*, 118–119.

[37] Kailai Huang, *American Business and the China Trade Embargo in the 1950s* (Boston: Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts, 2001), 33.

[38] Pike, *Empires at War*, 248.

[39] Huang, *American Business and the China Trade embargo in the 1950s*, 119.

[40] Pike, *Empires at War*, 249.

[41] Akita and White, *The International Order of Asia in the 1930s and 1950s* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 141.

[42] Ibid., 143.

[43] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1954* (Hong Kong: Ye Olde Printerie Limited, 1955), 90.

[44] Lyle, *Major World Nation: Hong Kong*, 39.

embargo or financial control would be negligible due to smuggling through Hong Kong.[45] This American policy forced China to adopt trade in sterling. The fears of the Chinese were soon realized in 1950 when the United States Treasury froze all Chinese balances and accounts that used US dollars.[46] Hong Kong and the HSBC became vital for China's use of sterling. In fact, it was the HSBC in close cooperation with the Bank of China that oversaw China's payments and trade with the world throughout the 1950s. This trade was only possible because both Hong Kong and China accepted the pound sterling.[47] Hence, this currency ensured close cooperation between all three parties of Hong Kong, Great Britain, and China.

British Policy for Hong Kong

Britain had a commitment to the colony of Hong Kong and its economic well-being. The British government performed non-governmental interference in Hong Kong's economy, which was the opposite of what was occurring in Britain with nationalization of large parts of the economy.[48] With little governmental interference, the British set the economic transformation of Hong Kong towards industrial development and growth in motion. In fact, governor Christopher Patten stated, "Both Adam Smith and Milton Friedman would find much to celebrate in Hong Kong's record,"[49] indicating that capitalism was the driving force of the colony. The British ensured minimal government interference in the economy and low taxes for a few reasons. First, because of its declining influence in Asia, Britain wanted to maintain at least some foothold in Asia without having a huge burden on the taxpayers of Britain.[50] Second, Britain wanted to ensure that Hong Kong was an attractive place to invest due to the low taxes

on the colony and its industries.[51] When it became apparent that Hong Kong was financially doing well, the British injected capital into the colony because of its strong commercial value and proximity to other Asian nations. In 1949 it was estimated that Britain had £156 million invested into the colony.[52] Despite fears that Hong Kong's industry would falter in 1950 due to the American embargo on all Chinese trade, this proved false. In fact, British investments paid off, and a total of £28.9 million of goods from Hong Kong was purchased by Britain in 1959.[53] This laissez-faire capitalist system consisted of an income tax of less than twenty percent on each Hong Konger.[54] Moreover, Hong Kong remained a free port, thus being exempt from import and export duties.[55] Libertarian economics was a smashing success for Hong Kong in the 1950s, which would not have been possible in Britain due to demands for socialist reforms following the war.[56] Britain's policy of non-governmental interference ensured the colony would become a fertile ground for capitalist investment in manufacturing.

Industrialization

Hong Kong's industry in the 1950s focused on light rather than heavy manufacturing. Two main reasons for this can be identified. First, the Shanghai capitalists and technicians already had experience in light manufacturing, such as the textile industry. Demands for textiles in East Asia were high in the postwar period, so it only made sense to continue light manufacturing in Hong Kong.[57] Second, there was no competition in East Asia for light manufactured goods from Hong Kong. Korea gained independence from Japan in 1945. Under the Japanese colonial regime, the Korean

[45] Akita and White, *The International Order of Asia in the 1930s and 1950s*, 140–141.
[46] Ibid., 142.
[47] Ibid., 144.
[48] Pike, *Empires at War*, 250–251.
[49] Ibid., 250.
[50] Chan, *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain 1842–1992*, 125.

[51] Pike, *Empires at War,* 250.
[52] Chan, *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain 1842–1992*, 119.
[53] Faure and Pui-tak, *Economy: A Documentary History of Hong Kong*, 161.
[54] Pike, *Empires at War*, 251.
[55] Cameron, *An Illustrated History of Hong Kong*, 296.
[56] Pike, *Empires at War*, 250.
[57] Geiger and Geiger, *Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore*, 69.

economy was largely bifurcated, with the northern part of Korea having a handful of heavy industries and the southern region dominated by agricultural activities. This economy was further weakened by the separation of the north and south in 1945 and the reconstruction work after the Korean War.[58] Industrialization began in Taiwan in 1937, and it developed aluminum, metal-refining, cement, and fertilizer plants. Yet, Taiwan's economy struggled in the wake of the Chinese Civil War. Moreover, these heavy industries struggled due to the lack of expert Chinese technicians, a role the Japanese technicians fulfilled previously.[59] The Japanese economic miracle in the postwar period saw Japanese industry take a completely different route from pre-war textile manufacturing. Japan abandoned light industry for the high-tech industry, such as electronic manufacturing, developed by companies such as Sony. The car industry also grew and expanded due to initiatives by major companies such as Toyota and Honda in the 1950s.[60] China, which had locked the doors to foreign trade, would suffer through the next decade. What Mao had hoped would be a giant step forward for China, the Great Leap Forward, resulted in agricultural failure and industrial setbacks. Backyard furnaces were meant to outpace Western steel production, but only produced pig iron.[61] Malaya for its post-war period faced a completely new war from within. From the end of the 1940s up to the 1960s the Malayans and the British were embroiled in what was called the Malayan Emergency, fighting communist forces from within the country. It was hard for the government to develop industry, and even when Malaya gained independence in 1956 the government's expense was heavily devoted to military expenditure.[62] Singapore was in a very similar situation as Hong Kong as both were

islands and served as entrepots. The small industries that existed in Singapore such as timber and rubber production actually declined throughout the 1950s. The realization that Singapore could no longer be simply an entrepot came in 1961 when the government finally recognized that it had to develop manufacturing to resolve the unemployment issue.[63] Therefore, Hong Kong was in a prime position to develop light industry for no one else was pursuing this form of economic activity in Asia. The Shanghai businessmen who fled to Hong Kong knew that there was a huge demand in the postwar world for small consumer goods. Thus, Hong Kong could enjoy a monopoly on light manufactured goods.

As previously mentioned, the biggest and most financially successful light industry in Hong Kong was the textile industry. The expertise and machinery that fled Shanghai had given the edge to Hong Kong to develop this vital industry. Within the year of 1950 alone, there were 187,500 cotton spindles in operation within the colony.[64] Nearly half of the industrial workforce of Hong Kong was employed in 1959 in either yarn spinning or cloth making.[65] The value of textile goods was substantial in the year 1954, during which Hong Kong exported £11,343,023 worth of cotton pieces, £6,048,774 worth of cotton yarn, and £9,945,604 worth of textile materials.[66] Ironically, just four years ago in 1950, it was feared that Hong Kong's textile industry would find it very difficult to survive competition with Japan's textile industry.[67] Yet, luckily for the colony, Japan's textile industry was in full decline as the nation switched its focus to the high-tech and car industries.[68] The clothing that came out of Hong Kong consisted of regular cloth shirts, sweaters, blue jeans, jackets,

[58] Chen, Nyaw, and Wong, *Industrial and Trade Development in Hong Kong*, 149.
[59] Ibid., 149–150.
[60] Pike, *Empires at War*, 332.
[61] Ibid., 270–271.
[62] Ibid., 222–223.

[63] Chen, Nyam, and Wong, *Industrial and Trade Development in Hong Kong*, 189.
[64] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1950*, 47.
[65] Chen, Nyam, and Wong, *Industrial and Trade Development in Hong Kong*, 190.
[66] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1954*, 81.
[67] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1950*, 34.
[68] Pike, *Empires at War*, 333.

raincoats, and even expensive formal clothing.[69] Textile goods from Hong Kong were popular not only in Asia, but also in Europe and the United States due to their excellent quality and affordability.[70]

The second most prosperous industry in Hong Kong is the plastic industry. Unlike the stroke of good luck from Shanghai with the experience and technical know-how of textile making, the plastic industry had to be learned by Hong Kongers. The global impact of Hong Kong's plastic industry and Hong Kongers' own initiative to develop this important trade product has been overlooked in previous studies, including Chen's. From the late 1940s onward the world had been caught up in craze of plastic products. In the United States plastic flowers had become extremely popular. When one such plastic flower arrived in Hong Kong, the spirit of the Hong Kong industrialists was determined to learn how to manufacture this new product.[71] Chieng Han-Chow was one of those industrialists and has often been called the father of Hong Kong plastic. Chieng's China Plastics Company became one of the most successful plastic companies within Hong Kong.[72] This industry began meagrely in 1947 with limited technical skill, and plastic moulds were in their embryo stage. Within the next decade, the plastic industry in Hong Kong benefitted from more skillful technicians and designers and the introduction of injection and extrusion techniques to improve and diversify plastic products.[73] By early 1950, the only challenge Hong Kong's plastic industry faced was the difficulty in supplying petrochemicals, which was soon overcome.[74] This industry began with plastic flowers but expanded into making housewares, slippers, packing materials, plastic bags, and toys. Plastic products rapidly grew in popularity in the

1950s and eventually became indispensable household products.[75] Within the year 1954 alone Hong Kong sold nearly £500,000 worth of plastic products.[76] By the year 1959 the industries of plastic flowers and toys employed nearly 10,000 workers, thus reflecting the importance of the plastic industry for the colony.[77] Due to low wages, the plastic goods from Hong Kong could be produced at less than half the price possible in any other nation and still proved to be profitable for industrialists. With these favourable circumstances, Hong Kong's plastic industry came to dominate the world market.[78]

There were other light industries that developed throughout Hong Kong aside from textiles and plastic. While the United States and other Western nations began to concentrate on heavy industry following the Second World War,[79] Hong Kong focused on small consumer goods the rest of the world needed. After textiles and plastic goods, enamel and aluminum products were large moneymakers for the colony. In 1954 enamelware earned £3,831,010 and aluminum ware earned £286,366 for Hong Kong. The enamelware and aluminum items manufactured included cups, plates, pots, and pans that were necessities for the common household.[80] Rubber shoes and boots had become extremely popular in postwar Great Britain with the nation purchasing nearly £3,000,000 worth of footwear in the mid-1950s from Hong Kong.[81] Flashlight and battery production became very profitable for the colony by the mid-1950s, earning in 1954 nearly £3,500,000 worth in exports.[82] Other smaller industries that existed in 1959 in Hong Kong included tobacco and alcohol packaging, food canning, woodworking,

[69] Lyle, *Major World Nations: Hong Kong*, 39.

[70] Geiger and Geiger, *The Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore*, 70.

[71] Lyle, *Major World Nations: Hong Kong*, 37.

[72] Faure and Pui-tak, *Economy: A Documentary History of Hong Kong*, 138.

[73] Ibid., 137.

[74] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1950*, 60.

[75] Faure and Pui-tak, *Economy: A Documentary History of Hong Kong*, 137.

[76] Government of Hong Kong: *Hong Kong Annual Report 1954*, 84.

[77] Chen, Nyaw, and Wong, *Industrial and Trade Development in Hong Kong*, 190.

[78] Lyle, *Major World Nations: Hong Kong*, 37.

[79] Pike, *Empires at War*, 731–732.

[80] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1954*, 90.

[81]Ibid., 83.

[82] Ibid., 82.

printing and publishing, and paint and cement production. [83] Thus, Hong Kong had a diversified production base of light industrial goods that were in great demand by the world.

Hong Kong's Economic Relations in the Cold War

When the Chinese communist army marched southward to the Yangtze valley in 1949, the United States government introduced an export control list to China. Any material deemed of military use, except oil, required special licences to sell to China. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States froze all trade in oil and effectively embargoed all imports and exports to and from China. [84] Following the Second World War, the American public had been becoming increasingly anti-communistic, and when the PRC was founded in 1949, the American public felt that China had been lost. Interestingly, the United States business elite wanted to continue trade with China, but due to an increasingly hostile public attitude to China, companies were compliant in ending trade with what was viewed as an enemy state.[85] Even with the end of the Korean War, Sino-American relations did not improve and in fact worsened due to the crises in Indo-China and the Taiwan Straits. The defeat of the French in Indo-China to communist forces created the American fear of the domino effect in Southeast Asia. In the years 1954–1955, on the islands of Quemy and Matsu both Chinese and Nationalist forces began to shell each other's positions. This resulted in the invasions of I-jiang and Dachen islands by mainland China and the responding threat of atomic retaliation by the United States to defend Taiwan. Finally, throughout the 1950s the United States Congress, spurred on by McCarthyism, was strictly anti-communist and left no room for softness against China.[86]

However, not all the allies agreed with the embargo of goods to China. Most importantly, Great Britain did not follow America's example.[87] The British were in a vulnerable position. Since Hong Kong neighbours China, the British became the first Western nation to acknowledge the PRC government. Despite American outrage and the pressure from their Western allies to cut off all trade with China, Britain countered by stating that Hong Kong would not survive a complete cutoff with the mainland due to the colony's reliance on China for foodstuffs and water.[88] The British knew a complete embargo was impossible due to the proximity of the colony and the mainland. The Bank of England even stated that a blockade would be useless due to the long coastline and the long history of smuggling between Hong Kong and China.[89] The United States Defense Department wished to punish Britain with sanctions, but both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations understood the British position. Even Eisenhower recognized the potential of the Chinese market, but Congress wished to have a harsh policy towards China.[90] The British government even suggested to Washington that maintaining Hong Kong as a toehold in China for trade as a way to expand upon the Chinese market when tensions eventually relieved. [91] Despite the embargo taking full effect during and after the Korean War, there remained a small but steady amount of trade between Hong Kong and China. In fact, both the British government and the Hong Kong government acknowledged the fact that smuggling was occurring and the trade value of these smuggled goods.[92] Fortunately for the brave Hong Kong smugglers who dared to defy the United States and United Nations embargo and blockade of the mainland, the

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[83] Chen, Nyaw, and Wong, *Industrial and Trade Development in Hong Kong*, 190.

[84] Huang, *American Business and the China Trade Embargo in the 1950s*, 33–34.

[85] Ibid., 34.

[86] Ibid., 38–39.

[87] Ibid., 36.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Akita and White, *The International Order of Asia in the 1930s and 1950s*, 140–141.

[90] Huang, *American Business and the China Trade Embargo in the 1950s*, 42.

[91] Ibid., 36.

[92] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1950*, 36–37.

British administration turned a blind eye to their smuggling activities.[93]

Although relations between Britain and China were strained during the Korean War, the links were not severed between the two, and Hong Kong was able to ride the storm out.[94] Yet, the embargo was the most serious event to affect the colony following the Second World War. The trade with China, as Governor Grantham stated, was the life-blood of Hong Kong, and the embargo cut this down to a mere trickle.[95] Even though smuggling maintained some trade between the colony and the mainland, this had declined since 1950 to less than 100,000 long tons by 1954.[96] Many Western journalists who visited Hong Kong in 1950 predicted that the embargo would lead to the demise of the colony.[97] Scholars, including Chen, have discussed the negative impact the embargo had on economic relations between Hong Kong and China[98]. Yet my research findings show that the embargo had positive implications for Hong Kong's trade with the rest of the world. In fact, with the embargo in place, Hong Kong, for the first time in its history, could no longer rely on the mainland for trade and was forced to diversify its trading partners. What was believed to be the economic demise of Hong Kong, the embargo of China, turned out to be a blessing for the colony.

Hong Kong-China Trade

Hong Kong, being an island, has very little arable land and few bodies of fresh water for use by residents. The colony would not have survived due to lack of the basic necessities of life without importing all foodstuffs and water from mainland China. Fortunately, the British accepted the smuggling activities between the colony and the mainland. Due to its dependency on the mainland and the effects of the embargo, Hong Kong faced a growing trade deficit to China. Beginning in 1952, Hong Kong faced a trade deficit of HK$300 million per annum that increased to HK$1,000 million per annum in 1956.[99] Following the embargo, Hong Kong continued to smuggle rubber and pharmaceutical products to China,[100] maintaining a small but steadily declining trade with China throughout the 1950s and 1960s.[101]

Hong Kong-Japan Trade

Hong Kong's trade with Japan was far different from that with China. Hong Kong was heavily importing raw resources from Japan such as cotton pieces, wool, and new man-made fabrics and synthetic fibers.[102] Hong Kong's textile industry was large and needed these raw materials in order to feed the colony's number one industry. In 1954 alone Hong Kong imported £29 million worth of raw textile resources from Japan. There were very few exports to Japan from Hong Kong due to Japan's trade barriers throughout the 1950s.[103] However, Japanese imports were vital for Hong Kong's light industry, for without the Japanese raw resources, Hong Kong's textile industry would have faltered. In spite of the trade barriers that impacted Hong Kong's direct trade with Japan, because of Hong Kong's status as a free port the colony became an important place to re-export Japanese goods to Southeast Asia: for example, in 1953 Hong Kong re-exported Japanese goods to Indonesia running at a rate of £900,000 per month.[104]

Hong Kong-United States Trade

Both imports from and exports to the United States declined due to the embargo of China,

[93] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1954*, 90.
[94] Chan, *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain 1842-1992*, 123.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1954*, 90.
[97] Chan, *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain 1842-1992*, 123.
[98] Stella Chen, *Hong Kong's Economy, 1949-1959* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 1961), 25.

[99] Akita and White, *The International Order of Asia in the 1930s and 1950s*, 144.
[100] Huang, *American Business and the China Trade Embargo in the 1950s*, 36.
[101] Chang, *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain 1842–1992*, 142.
[102] Geiger and Geiger, *The Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore*, 74.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Akita and White, *The International Order of Asia in the 1930s and 1950s*, 146.

but began to increase after the Korean War. The United States supplied Hong Kong with heavy industrial goods such as weaving and knitting equipment.[105] As well, Hong Kong was buying brass sheet, aluminum, and other metallic goods from the United States in order to feed its growing basic metal industries throughout the 1950s.[106] Hong Kong ran a trade deficit with the United States during the mid-1950s, purchasing £17.5 million worth of heavy industrial goods and materials[107] and petrochemicals.[108] Running this trade deficit was a necessity since no other nation in East Asia had developed or had the skill of running heavy manufacturing and Hong Kong was in need of metallic resources, heavy machinery, and raw resources for plastic. One of the largest exports of Hong Kong goods to the United States was plastic goods, especially plastic flowers, which the Americans bought by the millions.[109] The United States was the second most important overseas textile market, second only to Great Britain, which the Americans eventually surpassed in the 1960s.[110] Despite American restrictions on imports of Hong Kong textiles, the American market would remain one of Hong Kong's most important export markets, generating $61 million in revenue in 1959, especially from ladies' blouses and brassieres.[111]

Hong Kong-Great Britain Trade

Hong Kong's trade with Great Britain was fairly similar to its trade with the United States. Hong Kong purchased heavy machinery for its manufacturing from Britain[112] as well as metallic material such as brass sheets for

flashlights.[113] Imports from Great Britain were worth a total of £23.1 million for the colony in 1951.[114] Throughout the 1950s the British were purchasing increasing amounts of textile materials from Hong Kong, and by 1955 British textile firms began complaining about the lower-priced Hong Kong textiles.[115] However, this did not stop Hong Kong from selling its goods to Great Britain and in 1959 the export value of textiles from Hong Kong to Britain was worth £28.9 million.[116] Starting in the late 1950s and up to the 1970s, most of the employees of the British House of Parliament wore shirts and pants officially provided by Hong Kong because of economic and political reasons.[117] The British were also the number one buyers of Hong Kong footwear.[118] What really aided and strengthened the trade between Great Britain and Hong Kong was the fact that both were a part of the Commonwealth Preference system. This meant that Britain had minimum tariffs placed on its goods, which in turn helped both parties have a competitive edge in the market due to the affordability of each other's goods.[119] The Hong Kong market aided in the recovery of the British economy following the Second World War because of the import quotas that Britain had placed on Hong Kong in 1948.[120] Thus the trade between the colonizer and the colony was of a mutual benefit.

Hong Kong's Trade with Other Asian Nations

Chen's research notes the importance of the Hong Kong-Western and Chinese trade, yet fails to mention the value of Hong Kong's trade throughout the rest of Asia.[121] It is important to

[105] Geiger and Geiger, *The Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore*, 69.

[106] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1950*, 59.

[107] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1954*, 90.

[108] Faure and Pui-tak, *Economy: A Documentary History of Hong Kong*, 138.

[109] Lyle, *Major World Nations: Hong Kong*, 37–38.

[110] Geiger and Geiger, *The Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore*, 70.

[111] Faure and Pui-tak, *Economy: A Documentary History of Hong Kong*, 158.

[112] Ibid., 162.

[113] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1950*, 59.

[114] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1954*, 90.

[115] Geiger and Geiger, *The Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore*, 70.

[116] Faure and Pui-tak, *Economy: A Documentary History of Hong Kong,* 161.

[117] Lyle, *Major World Nations: Hong Kong*, 39.

[118] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1954.* 83.

[119] Cameron, *An Illustrated History of Hong Kong*, 295–296.

[120] Geiger and Geiger, *The Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore*, 70.

[121] Chen, *Hong Kong's Economy,* 31–33.

note that Hong Kong's neighbours in East and Southeast Asia were the colony's primary trading partners throughout the early 1950s. This market became dominated by Hong Kong until the mid-1950s as Japan's textile industry declined and many East and Southeast Asian nations began enacting tariffs to protect their growing economies.[122] Hong Kong started to open up trade with neighbouring Asian nations because the colony could no longer rely on China for imports and exports due to the American embargo. Throughout the 1950s, foodstuffs, petrochemicals, limestone, and wood were imported from Malaya/Singapore.[123] The total import cost for Hong Kong from Malaya in 1954 was £10.1 million, but total exports to Malaya were valued at £20.6 million.[124] Malaya was the most profitable trade partner in Asia for Hong Kong because of the shared Commonwealth Preference between the two. Imports from Indonesia consisted of coal and petrochemicals,[125] valued at £2.2 million in 1954. The same year, export value to Indonesia from Hong Kong was £14 million.[126] Hong Kong had virtually no imports from South Korea, but exports were valued at a total of £10.6 million by the mid-1950s. Malaya/Singapore, Indonesia, and South Korea were the three most profitable Asian trade partners that Hong Kong had in the 1950s. Hong Kong also traded with other nations such as Thailand and Taiwan, and the total exports combined from these two nations were valued at £13.1 million.[127] The principal exports from Hong Kong to East and Southeast Asia were textiles, enamelware, aluminum ware, and plastic goods such as toys, flowers, flashlights and batteries.[128] The exported goods from Hong Kong became very popular throughout Asia because of the bleak conditions following the Second World War.[129] As economies were restored and purchasing power grew, people in both Asia and the West finally had the ability to buy consumer goods in large numbers for the first time since the Great Depression. Hong Kong was prepared to sell the small consumer goods that many in Asia sought, especially textile goods,[130] and was able to capitalize on the needs and preferences of the people.

Conclusion

The economic success of Hong Kong in the 1950s did not solely rest on the British; more than anyone else, the Hong Kongers and the Chinese who fled to the island should be credited. Mao's victory in the Chinese Civil War opened the floodgate for Chinese refugees. Anyone living within China who had capital or any significant wealth fled to Hong Kong to protect not only their riches, but also their lives. The experience, capital, and labour the Chinese refugees brought to Hong Kong led to the growth and expansion of light industry within the colony. Great Britain had a responsibility for Hong Kong and its economic future. The British introduced a policy of non-governmental interference ensuring economic liberalism for Hong Kong. The pound sterling was used to back the Hong Kong dollar, which in turn strengthened Hong Kong's economy and allowed for close trade and investment with mainland China. In the wake of the Korean War, as Cold War tensions rose the Americans embargoed all trade goods with communist China. Although many felt Hong Kong's fledging industry would decline, the opposite occurred. Forced to diversify trading partners with neighbouring Asian and Commonwealth nations, Hong Kong's economy flourished.

Hong Kong is one of the most important and integrated nodes in the global economic system. Most studies to date on Hong Kong's economic success have focused on the 1970s

[122] Ibid., 71.

[123] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1950,* 74–79.

[124] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1954*, 90.

[125] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1950*, 75–78.

[126] Government of Hong Kong, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1954*, 90.

[127] Ibid.

[128] Chen, Nyaw, and Wong, *Industrial and Trade Development in Hong Kong*, 190.

[129] Geiger and Geiger, *The Development and Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore*, 65.

[130] Ibid., 70.

and 1980s, and have bypassed the importance of the 1950s. It appears that in scholarship there has been a general tendency to favour the post-industrial phase, overlooking the development of manufacturing in the 1950s. The Cold War began during the 1950s, and it seemed as if the world was preparing for a Third World War. However, the Cold War proved to be the pivotal point in Hong Kong's long history. Manufacturing is the first step for a developing economy, and Hong Kong used the 1950s to build and diversity its manufacturing base. Light industrial goods may not seem to be big moneymakers, yet Hong Kong clearly shows that their manufacture could be a profitable business. The weakening of Hong Kong-China trade actually improved the colony's economy.

Although the world was being separated between democratic America and communist Russia, Hong Kong stayed out of the conflict. The main ideology of the colony was neither democracy nor communism, but in fact capitalism. Hence, Hong Kong refused to be a pawn of the superpowers and simply wished to be financially successful. The colony of Hong Kong helped to ensure that Britain and China remained in contact due to the colony's status and location. Thus the concept of the curtain closing off the world between the Cold War blocs was false, for trade between the two continued through the small island of Hong Kong.

"An Address To All Patriotic Britons!: An Examination of British Propaganda During The Invasion Scare of 1803-1805, by Eric Vero

HI 489: Research Seminar on Napoleon and his Times
Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo Campus
Supervised by Dr. Michael Sibalis

Modern propaganda originated in the early 19th century. As we understand it today, it is a deliberate form of communication (often by leaders of state) to "shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior" to further the aims of the propagandist. [1] Particularly, during the Napoleonic wars, governments employed propaganda to foster unity within their populations. A successful example of this was British propaganda against Napoleon's planned invasion across the English Channel between 1803 and 1805. Although Napoleon's plans failed, the British people stood firmer against Napoleon's empire until its end in 1815 in part due to propaganda. British propagandists played on three anxieties of the British people during the Invasion Scare. First, they appealed to the British public's threatened national identity. Second, they castigated and ridiculed the feared Napoleon, creating a caricature that British people could direct their unified contempt towards. Third, they emphasized gender norms to compel men to volunteer in order to protect women from the sexual threat of French soldiers. Ultimately, these three aspects expressed a message that successfully played on the fears and anxieties of the British people, compelling them to unite against the common enemy of Napoleon. This message was that Britain ought to unite against Napoleon, lest this tyrant destroy the British "way of life."

This was not Great Britain's first invasion scare. The British had grown quite familiar with defending against invasions after numerous threats over hundreds of years.[2] However, Napoleon's came at a time of national insecurity. With the dissolution of the Treaty of Amiens, and the resuming of war between France and England on May 18, 1803, the Great Terror of Napoleon's invasion began, making national defence the priority of the British government.[3] Napoleon's forces concentrated in French Channel ports numbered 167,000 when at maximum strength.[4] This considerable army stationed in Channel ports (such as Calais and Bolougne) waited for the day that it would embark across the Channel. The leaders of Britain feared that their country could not stand against Napoleon's army. Leading British thinkers feared that the British national spirit paled in comparison to that of their ancestors. [5] Previously, France's reputation grew since the 1790's, giving the British much to fear. Additionally, since the French Revolution, Britain had become politically divided, with conservatives under William Pitt the Younger suspicious of reformist sympathies that were in line with French

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[1] Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda And Persuasion* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1986), 16

[2] Alone in the eighteenth century, the governments under Louis XIV, XV, and XVI planned invasions from 1708 until 1782. For an overview of these events see H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, *Napoleon And The Invasion Of England: The Story Of The Great Terror* (London: John Lane The Bodley Head, 1907), 1:vii-ix.

[3] J. Holland Rose and A. M. Broadley, *Napoleon In Caricature 1795-1821,* (London: John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1911), 1:vii.

[4] Roger Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon: The Organization of Victory 1793-1815* (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 251.

[5] Stuart Semmel, *Napoleon and the British* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 40.

Revolutionary ideals.[6] Britain during the summer of 1803 was unstable, facing a considerable challenge. The scare of invasion was quite real to the British people.[7]

In response, the British government devised a defence plan unprecedented in scope.[8] The British government deployed three main battle fleets, and instituted a Defence Act that raised many volunteers.[9] At the war's beginning, 81,000 regulars were garrisoned in Britain, with 50,000 of the Old Militia called out. Additionally, 25,000 were called for the Supplementary Militia.[10] Seventy-four Martello towers[11] (easily garrisoned coastal fortifications, near impossible to capture)[12] were established around the coast. By August 1805, Napoleon had enough landing craft in the Channel ports to carry his stationed army.[13] Even with Napoleon being occupied with matters on the continent, both sides still prepared for what they saw as an inevitable invasion.[14]

Propaganda during the invasion scare was instrumental in forging unity against Napoleon. It was unprecedented in its reach and scope.[15] However, how should British propaganda be defined? In general propagandists directly communicate with their audience with a distinct objective in mind.[16] However, these objectives always vary. Depending on what context, propaganda operates and is administered differently. For example, propaganda under Napoleon is more similar to present day propaganda than its contemporary British propaganda. Napoleon employed propaganda in an unprecedented, systematic, and official propaganda machine, carefully cultivating the message that he wanted.[17] Using carefully crafted imperial imagery, Napoleon created an image of himself as a romantic hero. His sophisticated use of propaganda marks him as one of the first modern propagandists to convince his population that their individual needs were inferior to the intents of this larger than life head of state.[18]

However, propaganda was considerably less regulated in Britain. For example, broadsides, one of the main media for propaganda in this period, were not government supervised. These leaflets were often circulated by elites to the lower classes and independently printed in order to meet the demands of a growing market.[19] This meant that the British public did not buy into a state-sanctioned narrative, but were influenced by a collective – but certainly elite – message. Broadsides represent the work of many individuals.[20] Another key source

[6] Alexandra Franklin and Mark Philip, *Napoleon And The Invasion Of Britain* (Bodleian Library: University of Oxford, 2003), 9, 11.

[7] For a critique of historians who make light of the invasion scare, see Richard Glover, *Britain At Bay: Defence against Bonaparte, 1803-14* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973), 13-4.

[8] Knight, xxi-xxii.

[9] Frank McLynn, *Invasion: From The Armada To Hitler, 1588-1945* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 100.

[10] Glover, 125, 127.

[11] McLynn, 103.

[12] Rose and Broadley, 234.

[13] Knight, 252.

[14] McLynn, 103.

[15] Semmel, 41.

[16] Jowell and O'Donnell, 16.

[17] For the seminal (and in many ways still the best work on the subject) see Robert B. Holtman, *Napoleonic Propaganda* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950). Holtman outlines how Napoleon was the first modern propagandist, outlining his sophisticated analysis of his audience, his instilling into his populace the desire to fight the enemy, his strengthening of his populace's morale (and undermining his enemies'), and being an early adopter of media and propaganda agencies. See Holtman, xi-xiv for examples and comparisons to the twentieth century.

[18] Jowett and O'Donnell, 59-60.

[19] Franklin and Philip, 18.

[20] Frank J. Klinberg and Sigurd B. Hustvedt, introduction to *The Warning Drum,* ed. Frank J. Klinberg and Sigurd

of propaganda were political cartoons that caricatured Napoleon. In general a caricature is a portrait of an individual that exaggerates their characteristics.[21] Caricature, by this point, was a familiar political satire medium in Britain,[22] and should be understood as produced by individual caricaturists. Therefore, within the British context, propaganda should be understood as a message that many individuals left their mark on. Rather than one individual directing the message (such as Napoleon in France), British propaganda had a collective message.

How do we assess the success of this propaganda? It is difficult to do so. Certainly, there was an explosion of men volunteering. According to Wheeler and Broadley, "The male population indulged in a universal game of follow-my-leader."[23] However, finding a direct and tangible link between propaganda and enlistment may be a fruitless endeavour. After all, there was a plethora of reasons for a man to enlist. Aside from personal inclinations, forces outside of an individual's control influenced enlistment.[24] Rather, the real value of propaganda as a historical source lies in its embodiment of the anxieties and attitudes of its age. Because British propaganda was fashioned for a specific audience, it reveals what their attitudes were.

Perhaps the British public's most prevalent attitude was the sense of British national identity. British propaganda continually emphasized Britain's history. It often used ancient names for the British Isles and France to appeal to a common national past. In *A new patriotic song* (1803), Britain is mentioned as "Albion," while France is "Gallia."[25] Albion is the oldest name for the British Isles.[26] Gallia is the ancient word for France. Using these ancient names would have suggested to British readers how ancient this conflict between Britain and France had been. This would impel British people to support the present day conflict, because it would mean that they, as British people, were carrying on a centuries old conflict. This, therefore, fostered British national identity.

Propaganda also stressed England's military legacy, which the present British nation saw as its inheritance. The broadside *Britons! to Arms!!!* lists English victories: "What! shall that England want her Sons' Support / Whose Heroes fought at Cressy—Agincourt? [...] By all the gen'rous Blood for Freedom shed..."[27] Here the song creates a national identity for British people based on English history. Although it is specifically listing English history, the title of the broadside reveals that English history really should be understood as British history. After all, the song identifies the British reader as a "Son of England" right in the first line. Identifying with this national history, British people would be roused to fight as their forefathers did. Additionally, in this

B. Hustvedt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), vi.

[21] Lynch, Bohun, *A History of Caricature* (Boston: Little, Brown, And Company, 1927), 1.

[22] Wheeler and Broadley, xxviii.

[23] Wheeler and Broadley, 2: 72.

[24] For a thorough analysis of cultural, and demographic influences on enlistment see Edward J. Cross, "Gone for a Soldier: The Realities of Enlistment" in *All for the King's Shilling: The British Soldier under Wellington, 1808-1814* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010).

[25] Lieut. Charles Durand, *A new patriotic* song (1803), in *Napoleon And The Invasion Of* Britain, ed. Alexandra Franklin and Mark Phillip (Bodleian Library: University of Oxford, 2003), 31.

[26] Eilert Ekwall, "Early Names of Britain," *Antiquity* 4 (1930): 149-158, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 25, 2015).

[27] *Britons! to Arms!!!,* in *The Warning Drum,* ed. Frank J. Klingberg & Sigurd B.Hustvedt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), 58.

conception of English history, the fight for freedom has been emphasized. Contemporary British people would have drawn parallels to their fight for "freedom" against Napoleon, and their forefathers' (even if "freedom" was not the actual cause for war in these past battles).

Propaganda also portrayed Britain as an island nation that was difficult to invade. One broadside titled *Citizens of London!* lists the number of troops raised in London in 1588 when the Spanish Armada sailed against England. It made clear the connection to the present situation: "...when the Spaniards threatened to invade England, as *Bonaparte* threatens to invade us now."[28] If London had fielded such an impressive number of troops in 1588, then surely it could do the same hundreds of years later. Elizabeth I was also prominent in these narratives concerning the Spanish Armada. In one cartoon titled "The Ghost of Queen Elizabeth" (1803), she shows Napoleon a picture of the armada's defeat, crying out "Monster! look at that and tremble!!!"[29] With the confidence that they had a long history of repelling invasions, the British public could have indefatigable morale in the face of the French. Regardless that British determination against invaders did not repel the Spanish Armada,[30] what is more

important here is how the British public understood the event.

Even Shakespeare weighed in on his descendants' conflict. One broadside titled *Shakespeare's Ghost!* entails, "Our immortal Bard...addresses his Country-men...Britons! Be stirring as the time; be fire with fire / Threaten the Threatener, and out-face the brow..." [31] Using Shakespeare as a British cultural figure, this broadside speaks to its audience's historical identity. Its authors certainly did not need to put words into Shakespeare's mouth, because these lines are taken from his *King John* (which was itself a form of historical memory used for contemporary purposes). Hearkening back to Britain's brave past, propaganda had ample material to rouse British hearts against Napoleon.

Aside from historical figures, current British figures featured in propaganda. John Bull, the personification of Britain, was a common sight. He represented the quintessential British everyman. Propagandists portrayed him with "loyalism, peasant-like stoicism, and deference..." that was thought to be at the heart of every British man.[32] Often he spoke directly to Napoleon, such as in *Plain answers to plain questions in a dialogue between John Bull and Bonaparte, met half seas over between Dover and Calais.* It is not so much of a dialogue as John Bull interrogating Napoleon. Bull asks, "Why are you such an Enemy to our LIBERTY OF THE PRESS?", and "Why have you suffered your Soldiers to burn so many Towns, shed so much innocent

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[28] *Citizens of London!,* in *The Warning Drum,* ed. Frank J. Klingberg & Sigurd B. Hustvedt (Berkely: Universty of California Press, 1944), 105.

[29] "The Ghost of Queen Elizabeth, 1803," in *Napoleon And The Invasion Of Britain,* ed. Alexandra Franklin and Mark Phillip (Bodleian Library: University of Oxford, 2003), 85.

[30] For an overview of the reasons historians have given for Spanish defeat see Colin Martin & Geoffrey Parker, "Anatomy of Failure," in *The Spanish Armada* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988), 195-225; Garrett Mattingly, "Epilogue," *The Defeat Of The Spanish Armada* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1959), 333-6.

[31] *Shakespeare's Ghost!,* in *Catalogue Of English Broadsides 1505-1897,* ed. James L. Lindsay-Crawford (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), 325.

[32] Miles Taylor, "John Bull," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,* http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/68195 (accessed April 23, 2015).

Blood...?" [33] Here John Bull acts as a mouthpiece for an average British person. Bull embodied traditional, rural living, while being matter-of-fact. This broadside allowed a common British person to interrogate Napoleon himself through the guise of Bull, further engaging him. In a song titled *John Bull's Invitation to Bonaparte,* he again speaks for the British man: "Let them come when they will we're ready to meet 'em..."[34] John Bull was the embodiment of the British national will to fight, and the common British person reading these broadsides could easily slip into Bull's shoes. The reader could so easily engage with these broadsides, because John Bull embodied their sense of British national identity.

Additionally, George III featured prominently in propaganda. In one of Gillray's cartoons titled "St. George and the dragon" (1805), George III is portrayed as St. George, rescuing Britannia, whom Napoleon (here a dragon) is attacking. [35] George III's depicted as St. George is a nationalistic image. St. George has been a symbol of England ever since the Middle Ages. In his most known story, which here Gillray references, St. George slays a dragon who had demanded people to eat as tribute. Just before the local princess' untimely turn as dragon fodder, St. George spears the beast, saving the maiden and her town. [36] Through Gillray's allegory that puts George III in the place of St. George in the story, Gillray created a cartoon that would resonate with his audience. Again, the public would have responded well to this connection to Britain's past. Gender conceptions of the time further emphasize George III's heroic nature. As the man, he is the saviour protecting the defenseless maiden, who here is Britannia. He fulfills his manly duty to save the weak (and therefore sympathetic) woman that is Britannia.[37] These gender conceptions only heighten the potency of this historical memory. Propaganda during the Invasion Scare made sure to hearken back to Britain's past in order to instill national identity into its reader.

Nationalism also manifested as a comparison between British and French values. A key ideological divide for the British and French was the importance of religion: Britain's advocacy for religion in creating a just world was opposed to France's new found revolutionary secularity.[38] Napoleon in propaganda was portrayed as anti-religious, and therefore to be seen as an enemy of Christian Britain. Another broadside ballad, called *A king or a consul?*, outlines why Napoleon could not rule England. According to the song, "No Disciple avow'd of the Mussulman school / A Papist at Rome, and at Cairo a Turk / [...] as best helps his work." This song references Napoleon's campaign in Egypt, when he tried to appeal to the local population by "converting" to Islam (hence "Mussulman" in the song). [39] The next

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[33] *Plain answers to plain questions in a dialogue between John Bull and Bonaparte, met half seas over between Dover and Calais,* in *Napoleon And The Invasion Of Britain,* ed. Alexandra Franklin and Mark Philip (Bodleian Library: University of Oxford, 2003), 34.

[34] *John Bull's Invitation to Bonaparte,* in *The Warning Drum,* ed. Frank J. Klingberg & Sigurd B. Hustvedt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), 69.

[35] James Gillray, "St George and the dragon, 1805," in Semmel, 54.

[36] Loomis, C. Grant *White magic, an introduction to the folklore of Christian legend* (Cambridge: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1948), 119.

[37] For further discussion of gender norms in British propaganda, see p. 15-21 of this paper.

[38] Klingberg and Hustvedt, introduction to *Drum,* 3.

[39] For an overview of his time in Egypt and religious/cultural conciliations see Philip Dwyer, "The Civilizing Hero, 1798-1799," in *Napoleon: The Path To Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 333-449.

verse castigates French atheism, when declaring that the British cannot be ruled by "heathenish Consuls," for "Our Country is Christian..."[40] Another broadside titled *Epilogue to the New Play of The Maid of Bristol* emphasizes his blasphemy, "And must Religion's mantle be profan'd / To cloak the crimes with which an Atheist's stain'd?"[41] Again, the propaganda references Napoleon's insincere use of religion for political gain. The only faith of Napoleon was for political gain.

His atheism was in contrast to Britain's identity as a religious society. Love of country and love of God were intimately linked for the British. A sermon called *The Duty of Defending Our Country,* preached August 19, 1803 at the Cathedral Church of St. Peter, begins, "The love of our native country is a sentiment which God has [...] implanted in the heart of man, and which he has been pleased [...] to adopt into the number of Christian virtues..."[42] This demonstrates how nationalism was intertwined with British piety. Additionally, this religious difference was what made Napoleon so eager to invade. One broadside titled *Proclamation* (1803) identified that Napoleon did "not [have] the Fear of God before his eyes, but [is] thereto moved by the Hatred to Us for the aforesaid Blessings We enjoy..."[43] In this conception, the scheming Napoleon

desired the prosperity given by God to the British for their religious piety. But, Napoleon did not just threaten Britain's religious nature. He also threatened the British concept of liberty.

Propaganda claimed the importance of British liberty. The same proclamation stated what made Britain great: "the natural Advantages of our Situation, the Excellence of our Constitution, and the Wise Administration of our Government, we are a Glory to ourselves, [...] the Empire of Happiness and Wealth..."[44] The British advantage was often put in blatant terms. William Cobbett in his *Important Considerations* (1803) wrote, "You must immediately choose which you will have: a Corsican master, with [...] scornful slavery, or George III with Old England, proud Freedom and Prosperity."[45] The British were given a choice, as one broadside titled *Britons, The Period is now arrived* (June 1803) stated, "The Period is now arrived, when it is to be discovered whether you are to be Freemen Or Slaves..."[46] This need to preserve British liberty transcended classes and thus could unite all of Britain against Napoleon. What was truly at stake, according to propaganda, was the British way of life.[47] Should Napoleon conquer Britain, British liberty would be extinguished, destroying what the British saw as the foundation of their society.

Therefore, considering that upper classes purchased broadsides and

[40] Hannah More, *A king or a consul?,* in *Napoleon And The Invasion Of Britain,* ed. Alexandra Franklin and Mark Philip (Bodleian Library: University of Oxford, 2003), 32-3.

[41] *Epilogue to the New Play of The Maid of Bristol,* in *The Warning Drum,* ed. Frank J. Klingberg and Sigurd B. Hustvedt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), 97.

[42] Rev. Edward Drewe, *The Duty of Defending our country: A sermon, preached at the Cathedral Church of St. Peter, Exter, On the Nineteenth of August, 1803* (London: Cadell and Davies, 1803), 5.

[43] *Proclamation* (1803)*,* in *The Warning Drum,* ed. Frank J. Klingberg and Sigurd B. Hustvedt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), 63.

[44] Ibid., 63-4.

[45] William Cobbett, *Important Considerations* (London: 1803), 23, in Alexandra Franklin and Mark Philip, introduction to *Napoleon And The Invasion Of Britain,* ed. Alexandra Franklin and Mark Philip (Bodleian Library: University of Oxford, 2003), 14.

[46] *Britons, The Period is now arrived* (1803)*,* in *Catalogue Of English Broadsides 1505-1897,* ed. James L. Lindsay-Crawford (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), 319.

[47] Semmel, "National Character and National Anxiety," in *Napoleon and the British,* 38-71.

disseminated them to lower classes, this message of preserving British liberty ought to be seen as serving elite interests. The upper class greatly feared French radicalism. Should revolutionary ideals take hold in Britain, the existing system, which the upper classes ran, was in jeopardy. This narrative in propaganda can be seen during the outbreak of the French Revolution. In the broadside *The Riot* (1797), two farmers contemplate rioting, because of their poverty. However, cooler heads prevail: "What shall I get by [rioting]?...I'd rather be hungry than hang'd, I'd protest," as the farmer then "threw down his pitchfork, and went to his work." [48] The elites, therefore, crafted a narrative that British liberty was good and at the heart of being British, so that the lower classes would not embrace French radicalism, out of fear that their British identity would be jeopardized. With stakes as high as these, it is no wonder that the message of the propaganda was well received. The British public's sense of nationalism was appealed to, because propaganda emphasized that Napoleon threatened British national identity.

Nationalism, however, was not the only theme in propaganda. Propaganda attacked Napoleon's character in order to confer Britain's fear of invasion to an easily detestable villain. The British public could unify in their hatred of him. Propaganda explored Napoleon's past, emphasizing his crimes. One broadside details *Buonaparte's Confession Of The Massacre of Jaffa* (June 1803). [49] Some were more vitriolic. *Horrors upon Hororrs*

[sic] details the "Hellish Deeds...committed by the Blood-Hounds of that Arch-Fiend of Wickedness, the Corsican Bonaparte." [50] Accounts emphasized Napoleon's sadistic nature. One broadside titled *The Tender Mercies Of Bonaparte In Egypt* states that Napoleon "could not restrain his joy, but broke out into exclamations of approval" after seeing prisoners executed at Jaffa.[51] Another broadside titled *Plain answers to plain questions* entails a conversation between John Bull and Napoleon. Upon being asked why he committed such atrocities, Napoleon responds, "I encouraged it. [...] Witness the deliberate massacre of four thousand Turks at Jaffa, who were my prisoners ; and my poisoning several hundred of my own soldiers, who were of no use to me."[52] One titled *Napoleon's Life* details his Italian campaign, where "it would fill at least Ten Volumes of the *Book of* Martyrs to mention all the Robberies and Murders committed by him and his Gang..." [53] Propaganda stated that Napoleon relished human suffering, seeing life as expendable for his own aims.

Napoleon's crimes were also woven into cartoons. The sheet music for *A new patriotic song* included a cartoon of George III firmly standing on the English side of the Channel, accompanied by Peace and Freedom. On the other, whispering into Napoleon's ear is the devil. Underneath them are the victims at

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[48] Hannah More, *Cheap Repository Tracks* (London, 1797), 13, 15.

[49] *Buonaparte's Confession Of The Massacre of Jaffa* (1803), in *Catalogue Of English Broadsides 1505-1897,* ed. James L. Lindsay-Crawford (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), 319.

[50] *Horrors upon Hororrs* [sic], in *Catalogue Of English Broadsides 1505-1897,* ed. James L. Lindsay-Crawford (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), 322.

[51] *The Tender Mercies Of Bonaparte In Egypt: Britons, Beware,* in *The Warning Drum,* ed. Frank J. Klingberg and Sigurd B. Hustvedt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), 49.

[52] *Plain answers to plain questions*, 34.

[53] *Napoleon's Life,* in *The Warning Drum,* ed. Frank J. Klingberg and Sigurd B. Hustvedt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), 79, 81.

Alexandria (here women and children) and soldiers at Jaffa.[54] In another cartoon titled *What Britons ought to avoid. The tender mercies of Buonaparte in Egypt*, Napoleon steps over a corpse of a woman, her breasts bared, holding her baby. Two soldiers with Napoleon have impaled babies on their bayonet and sword. Another stabs a fleeing woman. On the ground there is a decapitated head of an Egyptian man.[55] The imagery is quite clear. Britain stood against a villainous Napoleon who had committed gruesome crimes. His cruelty was wanton. The British public was meant to go above and beyond hating this intended invader, because he was one after the Devil himself. One song titled *Britons! to Arms!!!* exclaims, "Fortune herself shall be no more his Friend / And *here* the History of his Crimes shall end..."[56] This hatred was to be a rallying point for the British to fight against Napoleon, as they were to enact justice against a true villain.

Despite Napoleon being such a heinous individual, British propaganda did not always mean to instill fear. Rather, this hatred was in conjunction with understanding Napoleon as incompetent and laughable. In the iconic cartoon "The King of Broddingnag and Gulliver" George III, portrayed as the King of Broddingnag, studies through a telescope a tiny Napoleon. The king concludes that Napoleon is "one of the most pernicious, little-odious-reptiles that nature ever suffer'd to crawl upon the surface of the Earth."[57] All of the British hatred towards

Napoleon focused on Napoleon's evil deeds. However, propaganda ensured to portray Napoleon in such a pathetic way that he should not be feared. Indeed, as the King of Broddingnag perceived, Napoleon was "odious," but only just a "little...reptile." Often times, his bastardized English – due to him being French – highlighted his incompetence. In Holborn's cartoon *My Ass in a Bandbox,* Napoleon rides a donkey within a floating box. He cries, "Me will make dat Jean Bull Tremble now I have found Out de Grande Conveyance."[58] The propaganda portrayed Napoleon as a hateful, stupid individual. This meant that Britain could easily defeat him.

Many broadsides were positively confident about repelling Napoleon. One song titled *Britons Unconquerable!* states that

Yes, afraid of the French we will be when the moon
Shines as clear and as bright as the sun does at noon;
[...]
[England shall] tremble with dread when these Frenchmen are near
Till then, as of old, we will beat them wherever
We meet them...[59]

Another song titled *John Bull's Invitation* echoes this sentiment: "For the more they send over, the more will be

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[54] Lt. Durand, 31.

[55] *What Britons ought to avoid. The tender mercies of Buonaparte in Egypt,* in *Napoleon And The Invasion Of Britain*, ed. Alexandra Franklin and Mark Philip (Bodleian Library: University of Oxford, 2003), 78.

[56] *Britons! to Arms!!!*, 59.

[57] Lt. Col. Thomas Braddyll, "The King of Broddingnag and Gulliver," in *Napoleon And The Invasion Of Britain,*

ed. Alexandra Franklin and Mark Phillip (Bodleian Library: University of Oxford, 2003), 88-9.

[58] Robert Holborn, "My Ass in a Bandbox, 1803," on British Museum, "My ass in a band box," *Collection online,* http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=1468794&partId=1 (accessed January 28, 2015).

[59] *Britons Unconquerable!,* in *The Warning Drum,* ed. Frank J. Klingberg and Sigurd B. Hustvedt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), 67-8.

slain / And the more we kill off, the less will remain."[60] There would be no chance for the French, as another song titled *Invasion. A New Song* puts it: "Yes, let them come, they come to die."[61] This sentiment is portrayed in the Gillray cartoon "French Invasion or Buonaparte landing in Great-Britain" (1803). On a plateau, British soldiers fire a cannon into the routing French army, their dead in gruesome (yet cartoonish) carnage. Their legs are missing, blood pours everywhere, and heads roll.[62] Propaganda spouted such optimism because Napoleon's forces would be incompetent against the British.

Additionally, Napoleon would not just fail against the British army and navy. In one cartoon titled "Boney attacking the English hives or the Corsican caught at last in the island" (1803), bees from hives representing coastal counties attack Napoleon. One hive is labeled the "Royal London Hive," which possibly refers to the "Declaration of the merchants, Bankers, Traders, and other Inhabitants of London" made in 1803. This was a Patriotic Fund that businessmen paid into to support the country against Napoleon. He laments, "I did not think this Nation of Shopkeepers could have stung so sharp."[63] Propaganda portrayed Napoleon as being incapable of fighting all facets of the British nation.

However, not all propaganda stressed optimism. One broadside titled *A Letter to the Volunteers* stressed how dangerous overconfidence could be: "Should every body join in [this] opinion, a security fatal to the happiness and glory of Englishmen would ensue."[64] However, there was still undoubted optimism. In one Gillray cartoon titled "John Bull and the alarmist" (1803), John Bull responds to a cautioner: "what care Johnny Bull! With my Crab-tick assured, I will fracture his Scull!"[65] It was certainly easier to believe in invincibility than be brought back down to earth with caution. British blood was sufficiently boiled. Propaganda during the invasion scare transferred the fears of the British into hatred against Napoleon. Instead of being afraid, the British could be unified in hatred against the wolf at their door.

Another key aspect in mobilizing public support was using gender norms. Particularly, propaganda required men to serve in the army or navy. This expectation is summed up in *A Dialogue Between A British TAR just landed at Portsmouth and A Brave SOLDIER lately turned from Egypt*. Both men embody these masculine ideals. The soldier optimistically says, "but if you [sailors] will keep a good look...we shall be ready for their reception."[66] The manly camaraderie (and perhaps a sense of friendly competition) is present in the dialogue. The sailor, on the other hand, expresses the other aspect to masculine norms, "Well, remember, you on shore

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[60] *John Bull's Invitation*, 69.

[61] *Invasion. A New Song,* in *The Warning Drum,* ed. Frank J. Klingberg and Sigurd B. Hustvedt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), 74.

[62] James Gillray, "French invasion or Buonaparte landing in Great-Britain, 1803," in *Napoleon And The Invasion Of Britain,* ed. Alexandra Franklin and Mark Phillip (Bodleian Library: University of Oxford, 2003), 79.

[63] A. M., "Boney attacking the English hives or the Corsican caught at at last in the island, 1803," in *Napoleon And The Invasion Of Britain,* ed. Alexandra Franklin and Mark Phillip (Bodleian Library: University of Oxford, 2003), 83.

[64] *A Letter to the Volunteers,* in *The Warning Drum,* ed. Frank J. Klingberg and Sigurd B. Hustvedt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), 38.

[65] James Gillray, "John Bull and the alarmist, 1803," in *Napoleon And The Invasion Of Britain,* ed. Alexandra Franklin and Mark Phillip (Bodleian Library: University of Oxford, 2003), 75.

[66] *A Dialogue Between A British TAR just landed at Portsmouth, and A Brave SOLDIER lately turned from Egypt,* in *The Warning Drum,* ed. Frank J. Klingberg and Sigurd B. Hustvedt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), 115.

must prepare for the worst...if [the enemy] should escape us...thousands must fall a sacrifice to their country's cause."[67] Men were called upon to do their duty, and perhaps even give their lives.

Propaganda emphasizes that men ought to have been brave. For example, one broadside is titled *An Address To Those Brave, Gallant, and Loyal Hearts...of The British Navy.* [68] British men were, according to *A new patriotic song*, to "brave all Dangers men can know," because, as sons of England, they were "renowned for Hearts of Oak."[69] This was the masculine ideal portrayed by British propaganda. British men would have then joined in order to fulfill this expectation of their gender. This norm persisted a hundred years later. One poster from World War I displays a line of soldiers, and asks, "There is still a place in the line for YOU. Will you fit it?" A sign reads, "This space is reserved for a fit man."[70] British men were supposed to be brave, strong, and to enlist during war. It speaks to how well entrenched this concept of masculinity was in Georgian society that it persisted more than a hundred years afterwards.

According to the propaganda, British men needed to be good soldiers and sailors, because the safety of their womenfolk was at stake. Using the threat of French soldiers sexually violating British women was a key tactic within British propaganda (and certainly would continue to be against Germany in World War I and World War II). The sources constantly list past depravities of French soldiers. While in Italy, according to the broadside titled *Napoleon's Life*, he "most dreadfully ill-us[ed] the poor defenceless Woman, and all because they would not let his Gang have their Desires of them."[71] In one that describes the French army in Hanover, "The French Soldiers have the most unbounded indulgence of their ruling passions..." raping women "in the presence of their husbands and fathers."[72] British men, therefore, understood that French soldiers would violate their women based on recent events. This threat was further made apparent when considering how the propaganda characterizes French soldiers. They were ruled by their passions -- sexual violations were part of the French masculine ideal. This was to be seen in contrast to British men's self-conception as honourable, dutiful individuals. And, assuming the worst based on this view, British men were prompted to serve to protect their women from such harm. The broadside continues, "Such, and ten thousand times worse, is the Fate prepared for England, if the valour of her people do not avert it..."[73] The stakes were high for British men and their womenfolk.

Broadsides announced to the public that Napoleon promised his soldiers to pillage and rape.[74] In *A consul or king?,* Englishmen were told to "join with one heart and one hand / Let each fight for his Wife, for *we* marry but *one* / The French

[67] Ibid., 115.

[68] *An Address To Those Brave, Gallant, and Loyal Hearts, the Commanders, Officers, Seamen, and Marines, of the British Navy* (1803), in *Catalogue Of English Broadsides 1505-1897,* ed. James L. Lindsay-Crawford (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), 317.

[69] Lt. Durand, 31.

[70] "There is still a place in the line for you," on Reveille Press, "Feature Products," http://www.reveillepress.com/ (accessed April 23, 2015).

[71] *Napoleon's Life*, 80.

[72] *A Peep into Hanover; Or, A Faint Description of the Atrocities Committed by the French in that City*, in *The Warning Drum,* ed. Frank J. Klingberg and Sigurd B. Hustvedt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), 148.

[73] Ibid., 149.

[74] Semmel, 58.

wed to many, they oft care for none."[75] "Marriage" within this broadside can be read two ways. On the one hand, it speaks to the fear of French sexual freedom, and how French soldiers would seduce British women, stealing them from British society. On the other, marriage also could be understood as a euphemism for rape. Here the broadside suggests a fundamental moral difference between British and French men. Each British man honourably married one wife, while French soldiers did not care for their many "wives," the implication being that they were seducers or rapists of many women. Either way, this broadside speaks to the sexual threat that French soldiers posed to women and their place within British society. Some propaganda, however, was much more explicit. A broadside titled "The Consequences of Buonaparte's Succeeding In His Designs Against This Country," states that "Women of All Ranks [would be] Violated."[76] Propaganda did not mince words when speaking to British men about the threat of French soldiers. Whether or not British women gave consent to their French lovers, British men still saw this as an immoral union.

Thus, propaganda compelled British men to take up their manly duty of serving in order to save their women from being seduced or raped. A cartoon titled "The consequence of invasion – the hero's reward" (1803) depicts a British soldier raising Napoleon's head on a pike, surrounded by women. The women praise him, saying, "he has saved us from Death and Vileation," and "Bless the

warrior that saved our Virgin charms."[77] A foppish man off to the side says, "Old Niggins I wish I had been a Soldier too then the Girls would have run after me..."[78] Through the juxtaposition of this foppish shirker, and the heavily praised soldier, it is clear that men's anxieties of being masculine and protecting women were played upon within the propaganda. In order to protect British women from the improper lust of the French, British men were compelled to enlist. British propaganda used gender norms of the time as a mobilization tactic. It was a potent strategy to untie all of Britain, because certainly British men from all classes could see the danger of sexual violation.[79]

However, British propaganda also called upon women through female gender norms to play an active role in serving their country. An extract from the *British Neptune* was printed in a broadside that addresses "the Women of England" to subscribe money for the war effort.[80] Within their own domestic sphere, women could fight the French. British propaganda thus worked within the contemporary conception of femininity. This speaks to another aspect of how propaganda used gender norms. British women within the propaganda are a symbol for domestic order. Traditional Britain society based around the family would be threatened should women, the foundation of domestic order, be violated.

Additionally, women were expected to give domestic support beyond money.

[75] More, *Consul or a king?,* 32-3.
[76] *The Consequences of Buonaparte's Succeeding In His Designs Against This* Country (1803), in *Catalogue Of English Broadsides 1505-1897,* ed. James L. Lindsay-Crawford (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), 320.

[77] C. Williams, "The consequence of invasion – the hero's reward, 1803," in *Napoleon And The Invasion Of Britain,* ed. Alexandra Franklin and Mark Phillip (Bodleian Library: University of Oxford, 2003), 76-7.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Semmel, 58.
[80] *To the Women of England*, in *Catalogue Of English Broadsides 1505-1897,* ed. James L. Lindsay-Crawford (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), 332-3.

Women were called upon to support their male relations. "Countrywomen!" begins one broadside titled *Address To The Females of Great Britain,* using inclusive language towards women. "...'tis surely Time that *you* should be reminded of those great Duties which...*may* save or overturn the State of Britain." Here the broadside gives a sense of agency to women, but also an integral duty. It continues, revealing contemporary complaints that women must have given concerning their gender roles, "Women no longer have a Right to complain of a confined or sterile Education...Nobody now hinders them from being wise or strong...You are therefore here solemnly call'd upon, to act rationally and steadily...." It is interesting to note that it uses contemporary conceptions of gender against these complaints that were against these very conceptions. It "prohibit[s] all Screamings, Faintings," and urges women to "cling not around your Parents, Husbands, Lovers: holding their Hands and weakening their Exertions, when every Exertion is no more than necessary....She must keep *in* her *Wits*, and not be frighted; but lend her best Ability to help us:" The broadside urges women to be stronger than their gender would have them be, if indeed they wanted more agency. As it states, this was integral for the morale of British men. Women were expected, even when asked to be strong, to be an auxiliary to men. They were also to deny everything to French invaders: "if every Woman will be but true, and shew no Favour to a Foreigner, none will be left in Three Weeks after Landing," with women also willing to die rather than "divulge a National Secret."[81] Whether it was giving aid to French soldiers, or compromising sensitive intelligence, women also had a duty to their country.

Examining British propaganda of this period paints a complex picture of gender anxieties. On the one hand, men were expected to protect their country, and womenfolk from the evil French invaders. Here, women were understood to be nothing but something needing to be saved. On the other, women were directly spoken to, urged to maintain strength for their nation, in an appeal to their own growing sense of agency. They were also a vital part of British society as the bedrock of the domestic order. Regardless of the nuances concerning British gender identities that are outside of the scope of this essay, the propaganda designed to unite the populace against Napoleon, did so by playing off of anxieties concerning gender roles. Both men and women had their gender roles channeled into the fight against Napoleon. This is one of the key aspects that made the message of this propaganda so appealing to the British public. The very British way of life was threatened, because French soldiers threatened to attack the foundation of the domestic order: women.

The British public feared that Napoleon's invasion would destroy their way of life. British national identity would be snuffed out, replaced by a secular, immoral, and radical French society. Propaganda used this nationalism to compel the British public to fight for their British identity. The British public also feared the bogeyman of Europe that Napoleon had become. Since the rupture of the Treaty of Amiens, war between Britain and France renewed, meaning that the island nation was not necessarily safe. Again, propaganda used this anxiety,

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[81] *Old England to Her Daughters,* in *The Warning Drum,* ed. Frank J. Klingberg and Sigurd B. Hustvedt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), 76.

channeling it into hatred (rather than fear) of Napoleon. Napoleon within this propaganda became a cartoonish villain that was susceptible to hatred from the British public. United in this hatred, the British public did not need to fear this threat to their nationhood. Lastly, with the threat of invasion came that of rape towards British women. This anxiety was played upon by the propaganda by urging men to do their gender's duty, and protect their (nearly) helpless womenfolk from the depravities of French soldiers. With these three things addressed, the British public could believe that their way of life was not threatened. Their liberty, nationhood, and morality would be protected from Napoleon and his invading force. There would be no French tyranny under a terrifying individual, who would destroy the sanctity of British life.

"The Deeds of my Forefathers:" A Study of Roman Elite Historical Memory in Funerary Inscriptions, by Eric Vero

HI 496L: Research Seminar on War and Society
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The Ancient Romans were obsessive genealogists, partaking in an expensive memorialization industry that lay at the core of their identity. This paper explores how the elites of Roman society maintained their ancestral memory using funerary inscriptions. It is important to understand how a group within a society constructed its memory of the past, because it gives us insight into their mindset. [1] Within the Roman elite mindset, family was everything. An elite's pedigree equaled his or her status, and the men of a prominent family were expected to run for office and wage wars in order to add to the deeds of their ancestors. Therefore, it was imperative for families to preserve the memory of their ancestors, but in a way that benefited their place in society. If family history was such an important part of Roman elite culture, I would like to explore how the Roman elite constructed this historical memory using funerary inscriptions, and what the ramifications are for our understanding of this culture, and the accounts that it left behind.[2] Upon assessing funerary inscriptions, I contend that it is necessary for historians to understand the Roman elite as made up of partisan family entities that were constantly fashioning the collective memory of their ancestors, creating a narrative that solidified their position in society as rightful rulers.[3]

First, however, I must define what I mean by "Roman elites." Largely, I am talking about the Patricians, a class made up of the prominent ruling families. Patrician men were the high (and low) ranking officials, senators, and military officers. They should be understood as a distinct memory community. This is a useful term by Susan Alcock when discussing the study of ancient memory.[4] According to Alcock, any defined group within a society interacted with a

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[1] Simon Price and Peter Thonemann, *The Birth of Classical Europe: A History from Troy to Augustine* (New York: Viking, 2010), 7. Price and Thonemann bring an excellent (and thorough) synthesis of ancient memory studies that is accessible for lay audiences. For a broader overview of how historical identities shaped antiquity, see their work.

[2] A discussion has slowly developed concerning elite Roman historical memory. However, funerary inscriptions have yet to be fully tapped. See Harriet I. Flower, *Ancestor Masks And Aristocratic Power In Roman Culture* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), and Harriet I. Flower, *The Art of Forgetting: Disgrace & Oblivion in*

Roman Political Culture (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006) for studies focusing on other sources. For commemorative inscriptions in general, see Maureen Carroll, *Spirits of the Dead: Roman Funerary Commemoration in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

[3] This should apply to all of elite culture throughout Roman history. However, due to how far back the Republic went (with king Lucius Tarquinius Superbus' deposition in 509 BC), and how long the Empire in the west lasted (beginning in 27 BC with the senate granting Octavius the title of Augustus and overarching powers, and ending with Romulus Augustulus' deposition in 476 AD), a thorough examination of this culture is beyond the scope of this essay. That being said, I have limited my study to the Middle to Late Republic, and the Early Empire (c. 200 BC – C. 200 AD) due to source availability. What I say about should remain true for all of the elite's history.

[4] Susan Alcock, *Archaeologies Of The Greek Past: Landscape, Monuments, and Memories* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 71.

memorial in their own unique way. Thus, collectively, Roman elites have a specific way they memorialized their ancestors based on their worldview. This concern drove their process of remembering.

For the Roman elite, memorializing their ancestors focused on the family members' civic achievements. The process began with an elaborate funeral procession to be seen by all. Actors were hired to wear the wax masks of the deceased and their ancestors, imitating their mannerisms, thus memorializing them through performance.[5] Wax masks are something unique to the Romans. Similar to death masks (although created when the deceased was living), they were facial memorializations hung in a wealthy home's entrance room called the *atrium*, and worn during funeral processions. They were given to politicians having achieved at least the rank of aedile, the office responsible for maintaining public buildings. [6] Thus, they hold special significance as political objects, representing the deceased's and their family's contribution to Roman civics. [7] They represent that the deceased lived virtuously by civically serving Rome. Thus, the entire funeral process was meant to memorialize the person's civic deeds. After the procession, the deceased was eulogized, which was later partially inscribed on the tomb. Therefore, although we do not have many extant eulogies, [8] we do have a condensed version on funerary inscriptions.

The deceased and their heirs organized the inscriptions and tombs. Many inscriptions state that the heir commissioned the memorial. For example, on the tombstone of Caecilius Avitus, a soldier with the Twentieth Legion Valeria Victrix, is written "*heres faciendum curavit,*" meaning that his heir erected the tomb.[9] This means that heirs certainly wanted this information to be known. Heirs wanted to show that they preserved the memory of their progenitors, fulfilling their filial duty. [10] For example, L. Memmius' inscription states, "His daughter Memmia ordered this to be made by the order of his will."[11] Caecilius' and Memmius' heirs wanted to make it apparent that they were good children, because other Romans would see them favourably. Thus, as cynical as it may sound (and certainly other inclinations such as genuine grief, and a sense of duty impelled heirs to commission tombs), heirs benefitted from the memory of a deceased family member. This is why so many inscriptions mention the part heirs played in memorializing the deceased. Roman society praised heirs who maintained ancestral memory.

This is especially seen in the public nature of commemoration. A tomb memorialized an individual in a public setting. Tombs were a constant reminder to the important place memory had in Roman society. By Roman law, burials were to be outside of the city gates, so a

[5] Flower, *Masks*, 126.
[6] Flower, *Masks*, 59.
[7] Flower, *Masks*, 3.
[8] The eulogies we do have are often quoted second hand by ancient historians.

[9] Alastair Scott Anderson, *Roman Military Tombstones* (Bucks, UK: Shire Publications Ltd, 1984), 45.
[10] Carroll, 282.
[11] *ILS* 887. Most inscriptions in this paper are taken from Hermann Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae* 3 vols. (Berlin: Berolini Apud Weidmannos, 1892) – one of the foremost collections of Roman inscriptions. The rest of this paper will follow proper convention for citing inscriptions from such collections: the abbreviation of the collection, followed by the inscription's catalogue number. Translations are my own. The *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (*CIL*) is the more comprehensive collection, from which this paper takes one inscription from *see infra* note 52.

"street of tombs" formed on the roads to the city.[12] Anyone leaving or entering the city was immediately confronted by the memory of its inhabitants. According to the Roman author Varro, the word for monument came from the Latin word to admonish, thus reminding the memorial reader of his or her own mortality.[13] In such a way, the memory of the dead pervaded Roman society. Funerary inscriptions were a lasting testament to any audience (whether patrician or plebeian) of a family's status. It is no wonder, then, that Roman elites intended for their ancestors to be memorialized as the most virtuous. Their place within society depended upon it. This is most obviously seen in how Roman politicians appealed to their ancestral past when seeking election.

Key to any election campaign was promoting one's ancestry. It was rare for a politician to be elected who had had no family members in the senate. It was therefore essential to declare what one's forefathers had accomplished. Much more than half of the consuls[14] between 179 and 49 BC had fathers or grandfathers as previous consuls, and the number rises to around 80% with remote ancestors included.[15] Even if it seems like blatant nepotism in our eyes, Roman mores must be appreciated. The Romans held their republican principles highly. A consul had to have the right blood, but he was most

certainly voted in. These positions were not inherently hereditary; rather, pedigree was essential for election.

Elite males employed many tactics to promote themselves through ancestry. Some scholars believe that politicians were more likely to succeed if they had wax masks, because they could bring them to public assemblies for voters to see their ancestry.[16] Officials employed their position's power to further broadcast their ancestral narrative. Young noblemen often held the office of mint master, and celebrated the deeds of their ancestors (and even their own achievements) on their issued coinage. For example, a mint master during Sulla's dictatorship (82-81 BC), named C. Manilius Limetanus, issued coins with allusions to his ancestral connections to the god Hermes and the hero Odysseus.[17] Candidates also mustered verbose election speeches to illustrate their ancestry. Although we do not have surviving verbatim campaign speeches, we do have the inscriptions written on tombs. Completed by both the children and the deceased themselves, these inscriptions emphasized the key points of ancestry that would have been declared during an election campaign. What was important enough to inscribe in stone to memorialize an individual would have been important to recapitulate for elections.

Inscriptions devote a considerable amount of space to the deceased's deeds, revealing their importance. The sarcophagus inscription for L. Cornelio Scipio devotes all of its space to his deeds. It reads: "Son of Barbatus, he was a

[12] Michael Koortbojian, "In commemorationem mortuorum: text and image along the 'street of tombs'" in *Art And Text In Roman Culture* ed. Jas Elsner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 210-211.

[13] Varro, *On the Latin Language,* 6.49 quoted in Valerie M. Hope, *Death In Ancient Rome: A Sourcebook* ed. Valerie M. Hope (London: Routledge, 2007), 71.

[14] During the Republic (but only symbolic positions during the Empire), two consuls were elected each year to hold the highest office of power. Often, one waged war on the frontier, and the other governed in Rome.

[15] Price and Thonemann, 189.

[16] Flower, *Masks*, 157.

[17] Paul Zanker, "Chapter 1: Conflict and Contradiction in the Imagery of the Dying Republic," in *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1988), 11-12.

consul, censor, and aedile among you. He captured Corsica and the city of Aleria. He dedicated a temple to the gods of storms as a due."[18] Scipio's great political and military deeds are his legacy. Additionally, he is remembered as a pious man for his temple dedication. These are the aspects of his life most worthy of remembrance. He was remembered for his civic duty. On the same level of Scipio's deeds is the mention of his father, Barbatus, a consul from 259 BC.[19] His filial connection to a consul was just as worthy of his high positions within government, and his conquests. Additionally, through this explicit connection, his deeds are added to his father's deeds, perpetuating the collective worth of the family.

Tiberius Claudius Candidus' inscription, a high-ranking officer under Emperor Marcus Aurelius and eventually general under Septimius Severus,[20] lists many military accomplishments. He was the proconsul for the province of Inner Hispania, where he fought rebels, and conducted campaigns in Parthia, Gaul, and Germania, to name just a few of his deeds.[21] Both of these men are the cream of the crop in terms of Roman achievements. It is clear that these deeds were of the most important to be remembered, becuase they take up most of the inscriptions. L. Munatius' inscription stresses his civic deeds: "[he] constructed a temple of Saturn for the gods, distributed lands of Benerentum in Italy, settled the colonies of Lugundus and Raurica in Gaul."[22] What is common in all of these examples is the importance of these men as civic builders. Although

Munatius was no conqueror, it was worthy that he distributed and colonized lands. He still contributed to the civic welfare of the Roman state.

A commonality in inscriptions is simply listing the deceased's positions. P. Plautius is listed as being an augur,[23] a moneyer, a tribune of the plebs,[24] and an officer of the treasury.[25] L. Minicius Quadronis has an even longer list of positions, listing his consulship, proconsulship[26] of Africa, his time as tribune of the plebs, but also such positions as quaestor,[27] and priest.[28] Minicius certainly was not unique for having held all of these offices (although still notable for governing a province); most high-ranking politicians had to climb through these positions in what was known as the *cursus honorum.* However, Munatius and his heirs still wanted to stress his civic achievements, and so included his impressive resume. This was what they wanted Munatius to be remembered for. Additionally, when Munatius' ancestors were running for office, it would be handy to have a credible list of his achievements. These men lived up to the expectation of their order by holding political offices. As Patricians, they were meant to govern, and precisely this was meant to be remembered.

It was important that these deeds were preserved, because rivals contested a family's credentials. This was especially prevalent starting in the late Republic period (c. 100 BC). As Flower puts it,

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18 *ILS* 2-3.
19 Price and Thonemann, 189.
20 Matthew Bunson, *Encyclopedia of the Roman Empire* (New York: Facts On File, 1994), 92.
21 *ILS* 1140.
22 *ILS* 886.

23 An augur was a priest of political office who sanctioned official acts on behalf of the gods.
24 A sacred position that interceded on behalf of the Plebs should the senate pass a law that harmed them.
25 *ILS* 964.
26 A proconsul was a governor of a province.
27 The lowest ranking magistrate. Typically managed financial matters.
28 *ILS* 1061.

elites fought in "a zero-sum game," trying "to prevail by the complete erasure and defeat of [their] political opponents."[29] This is reflected in how many funerary inscriptions claim the deceased to be a good man. Lucius Scipio's inscription begins with "Most Romans agree that this one man, Lucius Scipio, was the best of the good men" in Rome.[30] C. Annius Iulius Secundus was the "rarest friend" a Roman could have. [31] Implicated in these examples is that some of their peers doubted that.[32] With power and prestige on the line, opponents discredited the virtue of each other. It was key that a male elite was favourably remembered, because many contested their virtue. Additionally, elites tried to outdo their rivals by making extravagant tombs. This was an indirect way to discredit rival ancestral memory by overshadowing them. By the end of the Republic, elites employed many types of tomb ornaments, such as *aedicula,* altars, temples, *tumuli*, and even pyramids. [33] The more impressive a tomb was, the more likely that the individual would be remembered over a rival. At the extreme end, the ultimate blow to prestige was the complete erasure of an individual's memory.

Damnatio memoriae was the process by which a disgraced individual was erased from official records. These memory sanctions reveal how elites fashioned the past to bolster their claims of authority. Each generation of Roman politicians "(re)designed and (re)created" memory sanctions, in order to "preserve [their] own characteristic memory space as the defining symbol of its political

system." [34] Memory sanctions were extreme, but they reveal how important the ancestral past was to the elite. To erase an individual from a family's past was to erase a part of their credibility and legitimacy. To have a family member's memory be shamed was detrimental to the larger family's success.

Perhaps one of the most prominent examples of the restoration of the memory of a shamed family is Emperor Caligula's effort after Emperor Tiberius' death in 37 AD. Tiberius had banished Caligula's mother and brother. [35] According to the historian Suetonius, Caligula did all he could to preserve the memory of his ancestors after they were banished:

> Shedding many tears he delivered a funeral speech for Tiberius.... But at once he set off...to bring back the remains of his mother and his brother; and during stormy weather too, to make his filial duty more noticeable.

Suetonius stresses how important to Caligula his family's memory was. Caligula certainly displayed his devotion to his adopted father Tiberius by publicly crying, but made even more of a show when bringing back his mother and brother's remains.

> With no less theatrical effect he brought them to Ostia....He had the urns carried to the Mausoleum...when the streets were busy. He established annual funeral sacrifices and in addition games in the Circus in honour of his mother, providing a carriage to carry her image in the procession. In memory

[29] Flower, *Forgetting*, 110.
[30] *ILS* 2-3.
[31] *ILS* 1110.
[32] Price and Thonemann, 183.
[33] Zanker, 17.

[34] Flower, *Forgetting*, 276.
[35] Hope, 83.

of his father he renamed the month September Germanicus.[36]

Even if Suetonius is exaggerating Caligula's theatrics, his description still tells us about the importance of controlling the public memory of a family. There was real political danger, because it meant losing elite reputation. Caligula wanted to make sure that the narrative of his family was in his favour, and simply not forgotten. He spared no effort in doing so, even renaming September Germanicus in memory of his father. The public of Rome certainly would have seen the importance, because these individuals were exiled in living memory. As the new emperor, Caligula certainly had the most cause for anyone to legitimize his rule through his family's history. Caligula's efforts to undo his mother's and brother's banishments show how important family narratives were to political legitimacy. This constant tug of war between rivals (Emperors certainly not being the only ones) was what lay behind the claims of funerary inscriptions.

With such importance on what one's ancestors did, descendants used the memory of their ancestors for advancement in politics. The more your forefathers had built for Rome, the more likely you would be elected to do the same. Therefore, Roman elite families maintained their ancestral memory, while discrediting their rivals', in order to acquire more power through elections. Having these memories be shamed through *damnatio memoriae,* or banishment was the worst-case scenario for a family's narrative. Indeed, the fact that the Romans had these cultural institutions that attacked a family's

memory reveals how important ancestral memory was to this society. Funerary inscriptions were an effective way of carving into stone a family's narrative.

But, the elites did not just craft ancestral memory for each other. Ancestral memory also legitimized the order of things in the eyes of all. For example, wax masks played an integral part in this. During funeral processions, the group of actors portraying ancestors "acted as a powerful verification of traditional values…"[37] While families were perpetuating their prestige in such displays, they were also perpetuating the very system that they partook in. Furthermore, during elections, using ancestral memory (whether through wax masks, speeches, or funerary inscriptions) allowed nobles to compete for power, while "[adhering] to the traditional norms and rules governing office-holding developed by the ancestors."[38] Ancestral memory was the backbone of the stability of the Roman Republic. The history of the institutions, having the ancestors of the Patricians within it, was an integral narrative for preservation. For this reason, the Roman elite took such care to preserve this narrative through crafting their own family history. In a similar fashion, funerary inscriptions also perpetuated the Roman political system.

This can be seen in how funerary inscriptions address a general audience. As stated above, they were ubiquitous for Romans, being at a city's entrance. Therefore, not just Patricians would have read them. Many inscriptions address the people of Rome. Cornelius Lucius Scipio Barbatus is described as "a consul, censor, aedile among you."[39] The use of "among"

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[36] Suetonius, *The Lives of the Twelve Caesars,* Gaius 15, quoted in Hope, 83-4.

[37] Flower, *Masks*, 126.
[38] Flower, *Masks*, 89.
[39] *ILS* 1.

in the inscription emphasizes the republican nature of the system. Barbatus was one of the people, because he was their representative. In this way, the inscription portrays him as being virtuous in his political duties. He was not above the people, as a king would be. Rather, he was to be remembered as a representative of the people. After all, the people of Rome played an integral role in the order of things. Entrenched within the Roman conception of the Republic was that the people gave their consent to an elected body, instead of having a tyrannical king.[40] It is not so important that power was not actually distributed equally. Any Roman would have confronted inequalities on a daily basis. However, what is important for understanding the state of such a power relationship is what narrative was maintained for the justification of it.

Indeed, the inscriptions also stress the representative nature of the system. P. Plautius was the proconsul of Sicily, who had been "Chosen by his neighbours due to the authority of [Emperor Tiberius]."[41] Even though this is during the imperial period, the Patricians were still justifying their position in society as representatives of the people (and would still be doing so to the end of the Western Empire). In this case, the Emperor, having given authority to Plautius, is the ultimate representative of the people. Plautius was to be remembered as a legitimate ruler, as he had "consent" from the people. L. Apronius's inscription describes his victory against enemies in Africa. However, it should be noted that it mentions how his father, the proconsul of

Africa, had sent him to fight.[42] Not only does this inscription mention how a proconsul, an official appointed by the senate, rightfully sent him, but how they were father and son. Additionally, Apronius was a rightfully celebrated war leader: "this man, a victor through just combat."[43] It was important that war leaders waged war justly. Otherwise, they would not have the right to do so. Apronius, according to the inscription, legitimately waged war by the consent of the Roman people. He was part of the political body, and not a tyrant. Here this family is stressing how they have been interwoven with the Roman institution of government. Not only were they perpetuating the validity of the current order of things; they were perpetuating their family's place within it.

In this way, funerary inscriptions should be understood as each family actively trying to write themselves into a place of prominence. Furthermore, it was important to point out one's connection to the foundations of Rome's institutions. Indeed, most elites claimed earlier founders of their clan. For example, on the sarcophagus of Barbatus, two lines were erased, which possibly claimed him as the founder of the family. Later family members probably erased these lines when claiming an even earlier founder.[44] Elites also stressed ancient ancestry through funerary symbols. Caecilia Creticus' tomb on the Appian Way is divided into three sections, one being the ancient form of interment, a *tumulus.* This was to imply that the family had archaic grave mounds, stressing their antiquity.[45] These funerary symbols only further enhanced the message of their

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[40] In 509 BC, Rome's kings were deposed, replaced by the familiar republic ran by a senate and two consuls. This historical event played a key part in the Romans' own historical identity.
[41] *ILS* 964.

[42] *ILS* 939.
[43] *ILS* 939.
[44] Price and Thonemann, 188.
[45] Zanker, 16.

corresponding funerary inscriptions. A family's ancestral history, although claiming a continuity of lineage, was constantly in flux as the political needs of a family changed.

And so it should be noted that the audience was not just the public. Ancestral memory was also supposed to be for its own family. It can appreciated that there would have been many members of a family. Therefore, it was important that they were taught their own history. If that family was to continue holding power, subsequent generations had to maintain the ancestral memory that was key to justifying their power. The elite Roman family was an institution that was held together by a common past, regardless of how constructed it could be.

As discussed above, one in a certain sense shared the deeds of their ancestors. Conversely, one constantly tried to add to these collective deeds. Subsequent generations were meant to carry on the torch. According to Cicero in his speech honouring Servius Sulpicius Rufus, notable deeds were to be "handed on as a memorial to succeeding generations."[46] Sullust claimed that "the glory of the ancestors" was to inspire "an ardent desire for moral excellence."[47] By emulating their ancestors, descendants, inspired by their forefathers, tried to live up to this "moral excellence" Sullust described. Emulating an ancestor's deeds meant perpetuating and sharing in their legacy.

Inscriptions are clear that the deceased added to these collective deeds. Cornelius Scipio Hispanus claims, "I added the virtue to the deeds of my family / [...] I aimed for the deeds of my father / I desired the praise of my ancestors, so that

they may rejoice that I am their descendant / My honor rendered my family noble." [48] On L. Apronius' inscription, father and son are listed both as military leaders: "For you he dedicated his successful sword / And [commissioned] the portrait of his father, Apronius / This same man was a leader and the son of a war leader."[49] Again, the son is meant to be understood as a good offspring for perpetuating the memory of his father through commissioning his father's sculpted funeral portrait. This also ensured that the memory of him was connected to his father's. Additionally, this inscription stresses how both men were leaders. Their positions are put on par with each other, with the son continuing the father's place as leader. In this, they share a collective deed. By trying to add to the deeds of one's ancestors, one was emulating them. Thus, the maintenance of ancestral memory was key for family members to know what to aspire to, and eventually add to.

This importance can be seen in the tomb of the Scipii. The tomb itself was closed to the public, and was thus only for the family.[50] Indeed, a fundamental aspect to ancestral memory was how ancestors were venerated. Tombs were places of worship for the *Manes*, the spirits of the ancestors. [51] Upon death, they became divine, and watched their descendants. In general, the Romans believed that the soul upon death separated from the body. One epitaph from 2nd Century AD Serbia illustrates this statement: "To the spirits

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[46] Cicero, *De Servio Sulpicio Rufo* quoted in Carroll, 30.
[47] Ibid.

[48] *ILS* 6.
[49] *ILS* 939.
[50] Flower, *Masks*, 160.
[51] Sébastien Lepetz, et al., "Publius Vesonius Phileros vivos monumentum fecit: Investigations in a sector of the Porta Nocera cemetery in Roman Pompeii," in *Living Through The Dead: Burial and commemoration in the Classical world* (Oxford and Oakville: Oxbow Books, 2011), 110.

of the departed. The ground holds the body, the stone / the name and the air the soul."[52] Thus, a person lived on (without their body) as a soul above the living. The Romans revered their dead, as seen in the Latin word for ancestors: *maiores.* This literally means "the greater ones." Tombs were sacred, and, as in many cultures, violating them was taboo and against the law. According to the legal jurist Paulus, violators of tombs "will suffer the ultimate penalty if they are of the lower orders [humiliores]; if they are more reputable [honestiores], they will be deported. Otherwise the latter will be relegated and the former condemned to the mines."[53] These harsh penalties speak to how sacred ancestors were in Roman culture. The sacred space of the grave was continually maintained, and used to worship ancestors. Thus, the Roman elite perpetuated the memory of their ancestors through veneration. Their very justification for their place in society rested upon their progenitors. And this was reinforced through the tombs of the deceased, meant exclusively for family worship.

Funerary inscriptions should also be understood as useful for keeping track of ancestors. Often, they contain a list of family members for the deceased. Sometimes, inscriptions only contained immediate family. T. Titius' inscription

mentions his father, mother, sister, and wife. [54] However, many others include extended family, reaching back into the generations. P. Paquius' inscription includes his parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, his wife (who was also his first cousin), and her grandparents and great-grandparents. [55] Maintaining an accurate family tree was important if claims to ancestry were to be seen as valid. The farther back inscriptions went, the better, as this gave greater weight to the family's claims of prestige. Although elites stretched the truth, they also would have maintained a semblance of accuracy, because a completely false ancestry would have discredited the family. So, carving into stone a family's tree for descendants to see in a place that was meant exclusively for them would have ensured that bloodlines were remembered. Additionally, an inscription's actual accuracy was not necessarily important for the Roman elite; rather, its apparent accuracy was most important. So long as every family member was on the same page, the narrative broadcasted to other Roman elites would have been consistent. Inconsistent narratives would not have been trusted. Even if tombs were meant exclusively for family worship, having a family tree carved in stone gave credibility to the narrative supplied by descendants.

Growing up in such an environment, it is no wonder that Roman politicians were so ambitious. Imagine the house that Julius Caesar would have grown up in. Hanging on the walls were the wax masks of his ancestors. Constantly he must have been told that he needed to aspire to deeds on par with his forefathers. Only

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[52] *CIL III 3247* quoted in Hope, 213. Although it is an epitaph for a slave named Quintus Ammerus, it still illustrates what Roman elites would have believed. For studies into Roman conceptions of the afterlife, see F. Cumont, *After Life in Roman Paganism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1922); J. Warren, *Facing Death. Epicurus and His Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); D. Felton, *Haunted Greece and Rome. Ghost Stories from Classical Antiquity* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999).

[53] Paulus, *Digest*, 47.12.11 quoted in Hope, 166. This is a text from the 3rd century AD; however, it reflects customs and unwritten law existing previous to Paulus writing them down.

[54] *ILS* 908.

[55] *ILS* 915.

the conquest of Gaul, and events that would overturn the Roman political system could satiate that ambition. Many men before, and many after were raised in this culture that encouraged being bigger and better than anyone else. Perhaps it is tragic, depending on how you see it, that the very ambition that was integral to the Roman republic led to a thinly veiled monarchy. History played a defining role in how leading Romans shaped their society. Within their eyes, history was very much alive, and something potent, and even dangerous.

Roman ancestral memory, considering the three audiences it was meant for, was integral to the identity of Roman elites. Politicians spouted the deeds of their ancestors in order to be elected. Collectively, Roman elites stressed their heritage as the true leaders of society. And, families clung, and maintained their own histories, so that future generations could continue the legacy – and narrative – of their clan. In these ways, the Roman elite ought to be understood as a collection of independent factions who were constantly manipulating the histories of their ancestors. This is how we have to understand the Roman elite as a memory community. They operated as factions weaving partisan genealogical narratives. It follows, then, that the political and military history of elite Rome ought to be seen as founded on these self-serving accounts. This is not to say that all of it is bunk. It would be naïve to say that it was. However, we have to understand that the records that we use as historians were created by people who had vested interests in them. Their ideals and personal inclinations leave a mark. In this way, their own views of the past have an impact on our own.

The ancient accounts, which we rely upon, use these memorials as sources. For historians from a senatorial background, living memory and an understanding of their class' monuments gave them a degree of accuracy, although still giving them an elite bias. However, not all Roman historians had such a vantage point. The very first Roman historians, Q. Fabius Pictor and L. Cincius Alimentus, lived through the Second Punic War (218 to 201 BC), and relied on Greek sources, which focused on Rome's foundation, but little else afterwards. Their only reliable source after that period was living memory for recent history, relying on traditional stories for everything else.[56] The best that these historians had for Roman history consisted of living memory of those who had a stake in portraying themselves in the best light. Here it can be assumed that these historians took from freshly constructed family narratives. Afterwards, these family narratives only cemented themselves into the Roman mindset through memorials, and word of mouth. For first century, non-senatorial historians, such as Quadrigarius, Antias, and Livy, they could easily misread monuments from the middle Republic.[57] They did not even have access to elite living memory; they were that much farther from the past. Partisan narratives carved into stone could easily be taken at face value. Therefore, it is integral that, when using ancient authors, historians properly examine them as being founded on self-serving family histories. It follows that it would be unwise to not see historical memory as having a major

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[56] These Greek sources focused on Rome's foundation stories, because of their ties back to Greek history. T. P. Wiseman, "Annals and History," in *Clio's Cosmetics* (Totowa N. J.: Leicester University Press, 1979), 9-10.
[57] T. P. Wiseman, "Monuments and the Roman Annalists," in *Historiography And Imagination: Eight Essays On Roman Culture* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1994), 39.

impact on our own understanding of Roman history. For the elites of Rome, every action took place within the shadow of their ancestors. Similarly, much of our own perception of the Roman past also falls under these specters.